

# GLOBAL PEACE INDEX

## 2021



Measuring peace in  
a complex world



## **Quantifying Peace and its Benefits**

The Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP) is an independent, non-partisan, non-profit think tank dedicated to shifting the world's focus to peace as a positive, achievable, and tangible measure of human well-being and progress.

IEP achieves its goals by developing new conceptual frameworks to define peacefulness; providing metrics for measuring peace; and uncovering the relationships between business, peace and prosperity as well as promoting a better understanding of the cultural, economic and political factors that create peace.

IEP is headquartered in Sydney, with offices in New York, The Hague, Mexico City, Brussels and Harare. It works with a wide range of partners internationally and collaborates with intergovernmental organisations on measuring and communicating the economic value of peace.

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This is the 15<sup>th</sup> edition of the Global Peace Index (GPI), which ranks 163 independent states and territories according to their level of peacefulness. Produced by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), the GPI is the world's leading measure of global peacefulness. This report presents the most comprehensive data-driven analysis to-date on trends in peace, its economic value, and how to develop peaceful societies.

The GPI covers 99.7 per cent of the world's population, using 23 qualitative and quantitative indicators from highly respected sources, and measures the state of peace across three domains: the level of *Societal Safety and Security*, the extent of *Ongoing Domestic and International Conflict*, and the degree of *Militarisation*.

**This year's results** show that the average level of global peacefulness deteriorated by 0.07 per cent. This is the ninth deterioration in peacefulness in the last thirteen years, with 87 countries improving, and 73 recording deteriorations; however, the change in score is the second smallest in the history of the index. The 2021 GPI reveals a world in which the conflicts and crises that emerged in the past decade have begun to abate, only to be replaced with a new wave of tension and uncertainty as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic and rising tensions between many of the major powers.

The full impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on peacefulness is still unfolding. While some forms of violence declined in the short term, growing unease with lockdowns and rising economic uncertainty resulted in civil unrest increasing in 2020. Over 5,000 pandemic-related violent events were recorded between January 2020 and April 2021. It is still too early to fully gauge the long-term effects of the pandemic on peace. However, the changing economic conditions in many nations increases the likelihood of *political instability* and *violent demonstrations*.

Iceland remains the most peaceful country in the world, a position it has held since 2008. It is joined at the top of the index by New Zealand, Denmark, Portugal, and Slovenia. Afghanistan is the least peaceful country in the world for the fourth consecutive year, followed by Yemen, Syria, South Sudan, and Iraq. All, except Yemen, have been ranked amongst the five least peaceful nations since at least 2015, with Afghanistan having been ranked amongst the three least peaceful nations since 2010.

Eight of the ten countries at the top of the GPI are located in Europe. This is the most European countries to be ranked in the top ten in the history of the index.

Singapore fell out of the top ten, replaced by Ireland which improved by three places.

Only three of the nine regions in the world became more peaceful over the past year. The largest improvement occurred in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), followed by Europe and South Asia. However, MENA still remains the least peaceful region in the world. An improvement in the level of *Ongoing Conflict* in MENA was the biggest driver of increased peacefulness, with every indicator on the domain, recording an improvement. In Europe the improvement in peacefulness was driven by improvements in internal safety and security, including improvements in *terrorism impact*, *violent demonstrations* and *violent crime*. However, *political instability* and *military expenditure* deteriorated.

The largest regional deterioration occurred in North America, which deteriorated across all three GPI domains. The primary driver of this fall in peacefulness was a deterioration on the *Safety and Security* domain, especially in the United States, where growing civil unrest led to increasing perceptions of *criminality* and *political instability*, and more *violent demonstrations*.

**In the past fifteen years peacefulness has fallen**, with the average country score deteriorating by just under two per cent. Of the 163 countries in the GPI, 86 recorded improvements, while 75 recorded deteriorations and two recorded no change in score. Year on year deteriorations in peacefulness have been much more common, with peacefulness only improving four times since the beginning of the index. Fifteen of the 23 GPI indicators deteriorated between 2008 and 2021.

Two of the three GPI domains deteriorated over the past decade, with *Ongoing Conflict* deteriorating by 6.2 per cent and *Safety and Security* deteriorating by 2.5 per cent. *Militarisation* was the only domain to improve. Terrorism and civil unrest have been the biggest contributors to the global deterioration in peacefulness. Ninety countries recorded increased terrorist activity, while only 50 had lower levels of terrorism. However, after peaking in 2014, during the height of the Syrian civil war, total deaths from terrorism have fallen every year for the last six years, with the largest falls occurring in Syria, Iraq, and Nigeria.

Although the impact of terrorism and conflict have fallen over the past six years, the level of civil and political unrest has risen. The number of *violent demonstrations* rose in 61 countries since 2008, and fell

in just 27 countries. There was a 244 per cent increase globally in riots, general strikes, and anti-government demonstrations between 2011 and 2019. There is currently no sign that this trend is abating.

In 2021 the *Ongoing Conflict* domain improved for the first time since 2015, with falls in the total number of conflicts fought, and a decrease in the overall *intensity of internal conflict*. Twenty-one countries improved on *internal conflicts* fought, while only one deteriorated. However, although the total number of conflict-related deaths has been falling for the past six years, the total number of conflicts and deaths is still much higher than a decade ago. Since 2010, the number of conflicts globally has increased by 88 per cent.

The *Militarisation* domain has improved by 4.2 per cent since 2008, the only GPI domain to record an improvement in the last 15 years. The *armed service rate* has fallen in 111 countries, and *military expenditure* as a percentage of GDP fell in 87. However, there are signs that the trend of falling militarisation is slowing and even reversing in some countries. Both the *armed services rate* and *military expenditure* have deteriorated since 2016. The increase in militarisation comes on the back of rising tensions between the most economically and militarily powerful nations in the world. In the last five years, the MENA region recorded the five largest deteriorations in *military expenditure*.

**The economic impact of violence** to the global economy in 2020 was \$14.96 trillion in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms. This figure is equivalent to 11.6 per cent of the world's economic activity (gross world product) or \$1,942 per person. The economic impact of violence increased by 0.2 per cent during 2020. This was mainly driven by an increase in global military expenditure, which rose by 3.7 per cent, however, the economic impact of terrorism fell by 17.5 per cent.

Violence continues to have a significant impact on the world's economic performance. In the ten countries most affected by violence, the average economic impact of violence was equivalent to 36 per cent of GDP, compared to just under four per cent in the countries least affected by violence. Syria, South Sudan, Afghanistan, and the Central African Republic incurred the largest proportional economic cost of violence in 2020, equivalent to 82, 42, 40, and 37 per cent of GDP, respectively.

**Violence remains one of the most pressing issues for people globally.** This year's report looks at the newly released Lloyd's Register Foundation World Risk Poll which examines attitudes towards risk and violence across 145 countries. The poll found that violence is cited as the biggest risk to daily safety in nearly a third of countries, and is the second most cited risk globally behind road accidents. Worldwide, over 60 per cent of people are at least somewhat worried about sustaining serious harm from violent crime.

Around 18 per cent of people globally have suffered from an *experience of violence*, meaning that they or someone they know experienced serious harm from violent crime at some point in the last two years. The experience of violence is highest in sub-Saharan Africa, where there are five countries where more than half of the population have had a recent experience of violence.

Despite the high *fear of violence* across the world, most people feel that the world is getting safer. Nearly 75 per cent of people globally feel as safe or more safe today than they did five years ago. The region that fared the worst was South America, where over 50 per cent of those surveyed felt less safe than five years ago.

The country that recorded the highest *fear of violence* was Brazil, where nearly 83 per cent of Brazilians were very worried about being a victim of violent crime. However, the *experience of violence* is greatest in Namibia, where 63 per cent of the population experienced serious harm from violence, or known someone who had in the previous two years. *Feelings of safety* deteriorated the most in Lebanon. Just over 81 per cent of Lebanese people feel that the world was less safe in 2019 compared to 2014.

**The key to building peacefulness in times of conflict and uncertainty is Positive Peace.** It can also be used to forecast future falls in peacefulness, with accuracy rates of up to 90 per cent. Positive Peace is defined as the *attitudes, institutions and structures that create and sustain peaceful societies*. Countries that have higher levels of peace, as measured by the GPI, than Positive Peace are said to have a 'Positive Peace deficit'. This is where a country records a higher level of peacefulness than can be sustained by its level of socio-economic development. Most countries found to be in deficit subsequently record increasing levels of violence. Ninety per cent of the countries with the ten largest Positive Peace deficit places in 2009 had substantial deteriorations in peace between 2009 and 2019.

The Pillars of Positive Peace interact systemically to support a society's *attitudes, institutions and structures* that underpin development and peacebuilding. High levels of Positive Peace occur where attitudes make violence less tolerated, institutions are resilient and more responsive to society's needs, and structures create an environment for the nonviolent resolution of grievances.

# KEY FINDINGS

## SECTION 1: RESULTS

- The average level of global peacefulness deteriorated by 0.07 per cent in the 2021 Global Peace Index. Although a relatively small deterioration, this is the ninth time in the last 13 years that global peacefulness has deteriorated.
- In the past year, 87 countries recorded an improvement in peacefulness, while 73 countries recorded a deterioration. Three countries recorded no change in their overall score.
- The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region remained the world's least peaceful region. It is home to three of the five least peaceful countries in the world. However, it recorded the largest regional improvement over the past year.
- Europe remains the most peaceful region in the world. The region is home to eight of the ten most peaceful countries, and no country in Europe is ranked outside the top half of the index.
- Peacefulness improved on average for the *Ongoing Conflict* domain, but deteriorated in both the *Militarisation* and *Safety and Security* domains. This was the first time that the *Militarisation* domain had the largest deterioration.

## SECTION 2: TRENDS

- Since 2008, the level of global peacefulness has deteriorated by two per cent, with 75 countries recording a deterioration, while 86 improved.
- The average level of global peacefulness has deteriorated for nine of the past 13 years.
- The gap between the least and most peaceful countries continues to grow. Since 2008, the 25 least peaceful countries declined on average by 12.1 per cent, while the 25 most peaceful countries improved by 4.3 per cent.
- Conflict in the Middle East has been the key driver of the global deterioration in peacefulness since 2008.
- Of the three GPI domains, two recorded a deterioration, while one improved. *Ongoing Conflict* deteriorated by 6.2 per cent and *Safety and Security* deteriorated by 2.5 per cent. However, *Militarisation* improved by 4.2 per cent.
- The improving trend in *Militarisation* was widespread, with 111 of the 163 countries covered in the GPI improving. Eighty-seven countries reduced their *military expenditure* as a percentage of GDP, although military spending increased in absolute terms.

## SECTION 3: THE ECONOMIC IMPACT

- The global economic impact of violence was \$14.96 trillion PPP in 2020, equivalent to 11.6 per cent of global GDP or \$1,942 per person. The year-on-year increase was primarily due to higher levels of military expenditure.
- The global economic impact of violence worsened for the second year in a row, increasing by 0.2 per cent or \$32 billion from 2019 to 2020. However, it is still \$535.9 billion lower than in 2007.
- In 2020, the economic impact of armed conflict decreased by 7.6 per cent, to \$448.1 billion. The decline was driven by improvements in the number of deaths from terrorism and GDP losses from conflict, which fell by 17.5 and 13.7 per cent, respectively. This is the lowest impact since 2013.
- Syria, South Sudan and Afghanistan incurred the highest relative economic cost of violence in 2020, equivalent to 81.7, 42.1 and 40.3 per cent of GDP, respectively.

- Of the 23 GPI indicators, 11 recorded an improvement, ten had a deterioration, and two recorded no change over the past year.
- There was an increase in *military expenditure* as a percentage of GDP for the second straight year, with 105 countries deteriorating on this indicator, exacerbated in part by falling economic activity resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic.
- Despite the overall deterioration on the *Safety and Security* domain, there were a number of indicators that improved, including the *internal conflict* and *terrorism impact* indicators. Deaths from terrorism have been decreasing for the past six years.
- The pandemic had a significant impact on levels of conflict and violence. The level of civil unrest rose in 2020, fuelled in large part by responses to government's measure designed to stop the spread of the coronavirus. Over 5,000 pandemic-related violent events were recorded between January 2020 and April 2021.

- However, since 2014 there has been little improvement in the *Militarisation* domain and there are now signs that militarisation is increasing.
- The number of forcibly displaced people increased from just over 40 million in 2007, to over 84 million in 2020.
- The indicator with the largest deterioration globally was the *terrorism impact* indicator. Ninety countries recorded an increase in terrorist activity since 2008. However, the total number of deaths from terrorism has been falling globally since 2014.
- Although the number of conflicts and deaths from conflict have been falling, the long-term impact of conflict remains high.
- Demonstrations, general strikes, and riots rose by 244 per cent between 2011 and 2019.
- 2020 was the first year since 2010 that the indicators for intensity of conflict and number of conflicts improved. Since 2010, the number of conflicts globally has increased by 88 per cent.

- In the ten countries most economically affected by violence, the average economic cost was equivalent to 35.7 per cent of GDP. In the ten most peaceful countries, the average economic cost of violence was equal to just 4.2 per cent of GDP.
- At \$266.1 billion, the economic impact of refugees and internally displaced persons was more than three times higher than the GDP losses from conflict.
- North Korea, Cuba and Burkina Faso were the countries with the steepest increases, all recording increases above 80 per cent. Equatorial Guinea, Venezuela and Libya recorded the largest decreases, all above 30 per cent.
- From 2007 to 2020, 81 countries decreased their economic cost of violence while 82 increased their cost.
- The economic impact of suicide was \$683.9 billion and represented 4.6 per cent of the global total. This is higher

- than all of the Armed Conflict indicators combined and increased by 0.9 per cent from the prior year.
- In 2020, the economic impact of violence improved across four regions — MENA, South America, Central America and the Caribbean, and Russia and Eurasia.

#### **SECTION 4: RISK AND PEACE**

- One in seven people globally cite crime, violence or terrorism as the greatest risk to their safety in their daily lives. Only road accidents are cited as a bigger risk.
- Nearly 20 per cent of people surveyed have experienced serious harm from violent crime, or known someone personally who has experienced serious harm in the past two years.
- Violence is seen as the biggest risk to daily safety in 49 of the 142 countries in the risk poll. Over 50 per cent of people in Afghanistan, Brazil, South Africa, Mexico, and the Dominican Republic see violence as the greatest risk they face in their daily lives.
- Over 60 per cent of people globally are worried about sustaining serious harm from violent crime in the future.
- Despite the majority of people fearing sustaining harm from violent crime, most people also feel the world is getting safer. Nearly 75 per cent of people feel as safe or more safe today than they did five years ago.
- Authoritarian regimes have the highest reported rates of increased feelings of safety, with 35 per cent of people reporting that they felt safer in 2019 than they did in 2014.

- Central America and the Caribbean recorded the largest improvement in its economic impact in 2020, improving by 7.6 per cent, mainly driven by reductions in the number of refugees and displacements. However, its overall deterioration of 46.2 per cent since 2007 is the largest of any region.

- South America had the worst result of any region with over 50 per cent of people surveyed feeling less safe now than five years ago.
- In most countries, perceptions of violence match the risk of being a victim of violence. There is a strong correlation between feeling unsafe and having been a victim of violence, or knowing someone who has been a victim.
- The five countries with the largest proportion of people who experienced violence or know someone who had are all in sub-Saharan Africa. Namibia has the highest rate in the world, at 63 per cent, followed by South Africa, Lesotho, Liberia, and Zambia
- Singapore reported the lowest levels of fear of violence in the world. Less than five per cent of Singaporeans report being very worried about being the victim of violent crime.
- Globally, Rwanda has the highest proportion of people who feel safer today than they did five years ago.

#### **SECTION 5: POSITIVE PEACE**

- Countries that have a higher rank in Negative Peace than in Positive Peace are said to have a Positive Peace deficit. This is where a country records a higher level of peacefulness than can be sustained by its level of socio-economic development. Most countries found to be in deficit subsequently record increasing levels of violence.
- Sixty-nine per cent of countries with a Positive Peace deficit of 20 places or more in 2009 had substantial deteriorations in peace between 2009 and 2019.
- When the threshold is raised to 50 places this percentage increases to 90 per cent.
- The ten largest deteriorations in the GPI ranking from 2009 to 2019 were recorded in Libya, Nicaragua, Burkina Faso, Egypt, Syria, Bahrain, Mozambique, Cameroon, Tunisia and Ukraine. Of these countries, seven had large Positive Peace deficits in 2009. This underscores the predictive power of the Positive Peace deficit model.
- On average, deficit countries that recorded increases in violence saw their GPI Internal Peace score deteriorate by 17.8 per cent from 2009 to 2019. This is compared to a 0.3 per cent deterioration for the median country on the GPI.
- Looking forward, 30 countries recorded substantial Positive Peace deficits in 2019 and may deteriorate further into violence in the coming years. Of particular concern, Eritrea and Equatorial Guinea combine large Positive Peace deficits with a long trend of PPI deteriorations over the past decade.

- Other nations in deficit in 2019 – such as Liberia, Zambia, Guinea-Bissau, Bangladesh, Qatar and Rwanda – have also recorded PPI deteriorations in recent years.
- Countries identified as having a Positive Peace surplus in 2009 on average improved in the GPI by 1.9 per cent over the past decade.
- Of the eight Pillars of Positive Peace, *Low Levels of Corruption, Acceptance of the Rights of Others, Sound Business Environment, Well-Functioning Government and Good Relations with Neighbours* are the most important to improve in countries suffering from high levels of violence.
- Free Flow of Information, Equitable Distribution of Resources and High Levels of Human Capital* become more important as countries move away from very low levels of peace.
- Low Levels of Corruption* is the only Pillar that is strongly correlated with the GPI across all levels of peacefulness. Improvements in this Pillar are associated with reductions in violence in low-peace, medium-peace and high-peace countries.
- Uneven improvements in the Pillars of Positive Peace can lead to increased violence, highlighting the importance of a holistic, systemic approach to building Positive Peace. This is especially true for premature development in Pillars such as *High Levels of Human Capital, Sound Business Environment and Free Flow of Information*.

# 1

# RESULTS



## KEY FINDINGS

- The average level of global peacefulness deteriorated by 0.07 per cent in the 2021 Global Peace Index. Although small, this is the ninth time in the last 13 years that global peacefulness has deteriorated.
- In the past year, 87 countries recorded an improvement, while 73 countries recorded a deterioration in peacefulness. Three countries recorded no change in their overall score.
- The Middle East and North Africa region remained the world's least peaceful region. It is home to three of the five least peaceful countries in the world. However, it recorded the largest regional improvement over the past year.
- Europe remains the most peaceful region in the world. The region is home to eight of the ten most peaceful countries, and no country in Europe is ranked outside the top half of the index.
- Peacefulness improved on average for the *Ongoing Conflict* domain, but deteriorated in both the *Militarisation* and *Safety and Security* domains. This was the first time that the *Militarisation* domain had the largest deterioration.
- Of the 23 GPI indicators, 11 recorded an improvement, ten had a deterioration, and two recorded no change over the past year.
- There was an increase in *military expenditure* as a percentage of GDP for the second straight year, with 105 countries deteriorating on this indicator, exacerbated in part by falling economic activity resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic.
- Despite the overall deterioration on the *safety and security* domain, there were a number of indicators that improved, including the *internal conflict and terrorism impact* indicators. Deaths from terrorism have been decreasing for the past six years.
- The pandemic had a significant impact on levels of conflict and violence. The level of civil unrest rose in 2020, fuelled in large part by responses to coronavirus restrictions. Over 5,000 pandemic-related violent events were recorded between January 2020 and April 2021.



# Highlights

Global peacefulness has deteriorated by a very small margin over the past year. This is the fourth time in the last five years that the world has recorded a fall in peacefulness. However, the change this year was the smallest change in index score since 2011. More countries recorded an improvement in peacefulness than a deterioration, with 87 countries recording an improvement, while 73 recorded a deterioration.

The Global Peace Index (GPI) measures more than just the presence or absence of war. It captures the absence of violence or the fear of violence across three domains: *Safety and Security*, *Ongoing Conflict*, and *Militarisation*. Both the *Militarisation* and *Safety and Security* domains recorded deteriorations, with only the *Ongoing Conflict* domain recording an improvement. Of the 23 GPI indicators, 11 recorded an improvement, ten deteriorated, and two recorded no change over the past year.

The deterioration in *Militarisation* and improvement in *Ongoing Conflict* were both influenced by the COVID-19 pandemic, which had a major negative impact on economic activity, human movement, and international relations in 2020. The pandemic had a noticeable impact on the *violent demonstrations* and *political instability* indicators, with 25 and 46 countries respectively recording deteriorations on these indicators.

Although it was initially believed that the pandemic would lead to increases in peacefulness, this change proved to be short-lived. While homicide, violent crime, and other forms of interpersonal violence did see a decline in the early stages of the pandemic, these indicators of violence soon returned to their pre-pandemic trend. Civil unrest actually increased in 2020, with over 5,000 pandemic-related violent events recorded between January 2020 and April 2021.

Iceland remains the world's most peaceful country, a position it has held since the first iteration of the GPI. Afghanistan is the world's least peaceful country for the fourth consecutive year. Singapore was the only country to fall out of the ten most peaceful, driven by a small increase in its *political terror* indicator, as well as the economic and diplomatic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on *political instability*.

The world is now less peaceful than it was at the inception of the index in 2008. Since then, the average level of country peacefulness has deteriorated by just under two per cent. Year on year deteriorations in peacefulness have been recorded for nine of the last 13 years. The fall in peacefulness over the past decade was caused by a wide range of factors, including increased terrorist activity, the intensification of

conflicts in the Middle East, rising regional tensions in Eastern Europe and northeast Asia, and increasing numbers of refugees and heightened political tensions in Europe and the US.

However, despite the overall deterioration in peacefulness, some indicators have recorded significant improvements since the beginning of the index. There are 123 countries that have seen their homicide rate fall since 2008, and 84 countries where people feel safer walking alone owing to falls in the perception of *criminality*. However, the largest improvements have occurred in the *Militarisation* domain:

- 114 countries have improved the timeliness of their *UN peacekeeping funding*
- 110 reduced their *armed forces rate*
- 85 reduced *military expenditure as a percentage of GDP*
- and 71 lowered their levels of *nuclear and heavy weapons*.

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The deterioration in *Militarisation* and improvement in *Ongoing Conflict* were both influenced by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region remained the world's least peaceful region. It is home to three of the five least peaceful countries in the world, with no country from the region ranked higher than 29<sup>th</sup> on the GPI. However, despite ongoing armed conflict and instability in the region, it did record the largest increase in peace of any region over the past year. *Terrorism impact* and the number of *deaths from internal conflict* continued to fall, while the *intensity of internal conflict* also improved.

Europe remains the most peaceful region and is home to eight of the ten most peaceful countries in the world. It recorded a slight improvement in peacefulness on the 2021 GPI, owing to improvements on the *Ongoing Conflict* and *Safety and Security* domains. Of the 36 European countries in the GPI, 24 recorded an improvement in peacefulness from the 2020 to 2021 GPI. Poland had the third largest improvement of any country, owing to improvements on the *violent crime* and *violent demonstrations* indicators. However, Europe has higher levels of *Militarisation* than many regions around the world, particularly in regards to *weapons exports* and *nuclear and heavy weapons*.

The largest regional deterioration in peacefulness occurred in

North America, owing to a large deterioration in peacefulness in the United States. The deterioration in peacefulness in the US was driven by an increase in *violent demonstrations*, as well as a deterioration in *political instability*. This was driven by a significant increase in social unrest in the United States in 2020, which culminated with the events of the 6<sup>th</sup> of January 2021, in which pro-Trump protestors entered the Capitol building. There was also a significant increase in homicide across many cities across the country in 2020.

Of the three GPI domains, only *Ongoing Conflict* recorded an improvement, owing to falls in the total number of internal and external conflicts fought, and an improvement in the number of *deaths from internal conflict*. Of the six *Ongoing Conflict* indicators, only *neighbouring county relations* recorded a deterioration, with every other indicator recording at least some improvement over the past year. However, the deterioration in *neighbouring country relations* does suggest that the risk of future conflict has increased slightly, with 17 countries recording a deterioration on this indicator.

There appears to be a reversal of the trend in militarisation. After many years of sustained improvements, a number of indicators of *Militarisation* have deteriorated. Of the 163 GPI countries, 105 recorded an increase in *military expenditure as a percentage of GDP*. Whilst some of this increase can be attributed to the decline in GDP stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic, this is the second successive year in which the average level of *military expenditure* increased. There was also a concurrent increase in the number of *weapons imports*, and a very slight deterioration in the *armed forces rate* indicator.

The *Safety and Security* domain deteriorated very slightly on average. However, despite this deterioration, 90 countries recorded an improvement on this domain, while 71 recorded

a deterioration. The improvement in *terrorism impact* that began in 2015 has continued, with 115 countries recording an improvement. Preliminary data for 2020 suggests that there were less than ten thousand deaths from terrorism over the past year, despite some indications that the threat from terrorism has increased in Syria and parts of sub-Saharan Africa.

The biggest deterioration on the *Safety and Security* domain occurred on the *violent demonstrations* indicator. Although the level of civil unrest globally fell at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, lingering political unrest and frustrations with COVID-related policies such as lockdowns saw the level of civil unrest quickly return to pre-COVID levels. This civil unrest resulted in the *violent demonstrations* indicator deteriorating in 25 countries over the past year. This continues a trend of increasing violent demonstrations over the last decade. In the pre-COVID-19 era between 2011 to 2019 there was a 244 per cent increase in riots, general strikes, and anti-government demonstrations across the world.


The COVID-19 pandemic had a significant impact on the level of peace across the world in 2020, leading to both increases and decreases across the whole spectrum of violence and conflict. While most countries recorded a fall in interpersonal violence owing to the pandemic, the level of violent crime and homicide did surge in a few countries, most notably the United States. Domestic violence and hate crimes also increased across the globe. Preliminary data also suggests that there was a fall in the level of conflict and terrorism in 2020, driven in part by COVID-related restrictions on movement.

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Frustrations with COVID-related policies such as lockdowns saw the level of civil unrest quickly return to pre-COVID levels.

# 2021 GLOBAL PEACE INDEX


A SNAPSHOT OF THE  
GLOBAL STATE OF PEACE



## THE STATE OF PEACE



RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE	CHANGE	RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE	CHANGE	RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE	CHANGE
1	Iceland	1.1	↔	29	Qatar	1.605	↑ 2	57	South Korea	1.877	↓ 12
2	New Zealand	1.253	↑ 1	30	Estonia	1.612	↔	58	Tanzania	1.892	↓ 9
3	Denmark	1.256	↑ 2	31	Spain	1.621	↑ 1	= 59	Malawi	1.909	↑ 6
4	Portugal	1.267	↓ 2	32	Italy	1.652	↓ 3	= 59	Moldova	1.909	↑ 4
5	Slovenia	1.315	↑ 5	33	United Kingdom	1.658	↑ 6	61	Cyprus	1.912	↓ 3
6	Austria	1.317	↓ 2	34	Taiwan	1.662	↔	62	Equatorial Guinea	1.915	↓ 9
7	Switzerland	1.323	↑ 2	35	Latvia	1.686	↔	63	Jordan	1.916	↑ 4
8	Ireland	1.326	↑ 3	36	Kuwait	1.688	↔	64	Panama	1.919	↓ 3
9	Czech Republic	1.329	↓ 1	37	Lithuania	1.689	↓ 6	65	Namibia	1.927	↓ 5
10	Canada	1.33	↓ 3	38	Ghana	1.715	↑ 2	66	Greece	1.932	↓ 10
11	Singapore	1.347	↓ 5	39	Costa Rica	1.735	↓ 1	67	Kazakhstan	1.936	↑ 1
12	Japan	1.373	↔	40	North Macedonia	1.744	↑ 11	68	Argentina	1.945	↑ 3
13	Finland	1.402	↔	41	Botswana	1.753	↑ 2	69	Eswatini	1.955	↑ 12
14	Norway	1.438	↑ 1	= 42	Indonesia	1.783	↑ 2	70	Madagascar	1.963	↔
15	Sweden	1.46	↔	42	Mongolia	1.783	↓ 1	71	Zambia	1.964	↓ 24
16	Australia	1.47	↓ 2	44	Serbia	1.797	↓ 3	72	Bosnia and Herzegovina	1.97	↑ 2
= 17	Croatia	1.48	↑ 6	45	Laos	1.809	↑ 3	73	Oman	1.982	↑ 2
= 17	Germany	1.48	↑ 1	46	Sierra Leone	1.813	↑ 10	74	Jamaica	1.992	↓ 1
19	Hungary	1.494	↑ 3	47	Uruguay	1.817	↓ 10	75	Paraguay	1.997	↑ 7
20	Belgium	1.496	↓ 3	48	Albania	1.824	↓ 2	= 76	Kyrgyz Republic	1.998	↑ 20
21	Netherlands	1.506	↓ 2	49	Chile	1.831	↑ 1	= 76	Liberia	1.998	↓ 17
22	Bhutan	1.51	↓ 2	50	Vietnam	1.835	↑ 19	78	Cambodia	2.008	↓ 7
23	Malaysia	1.515	↑ 1	51	Montenegro	1.847	↑ 3	79	Morocco	2.015	↑ 9
24	Poland	1.524	↑ 9	52	United Arab Emirates	1.848	↑ 12	= 80	Angola	2.017	↑ 7
25	Romania	1.53	↓ 4	53	The Gambia	1.853	↑ 13	= 80	Kosovo	2.017	↔
26	Slovakia	1.557	↔	54	Senegal	1.864	↑ 1	82	Dominican Republic	2.024	↓ 5
27	Bulgaria	1.577	↑ 1	55	France	1.868	↑ 7	83	Rwanda	2.028	↓ 4
28	Mauritius	1.592	↓ 3	56	Timor-Leste	1.873	↓ 4				



### IMPROVEMENTS

**87**

countries were more peaceful in 2021 than in 2020

### DETERIORATIONS

**73**

countries were less peaceful in 2021 than in 2020

### OVERALL AVERAGE CHANGE (%)

**+0.07**

The global GPI average deteriorated by 0.07 per cent from 2020 to 2021

RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE	CHANGE
84	Trinidad and Tobago	2.029	↑ 1
85	Nepal	2.033	↓ 2
86	Peru	2.034	↑ 3
87	Cuba	2.042	↓ 1
88	Ecuador	2.044	↑ 4
89	Georgia	2.054	↓ 5
90	Uzbekistan	2.062	↔
91	Bangladesh	2.068	↑ 7
92	Guinea	2.069	↓ 1
93	Gabon	2.074	↑ 14
94	Armenia	2.075	↓ 16
95	Sri Lanka	2.083	↓ 19
96	Benin	2.093	↑ 9
97	Tajikistan	2.095	↑ 6
98	Tunisia	2.108	↓ 3
99	Guinea-Bissau	2.113	↑ 3
=100	China	2.114	↓ 6
=100	Guyana	2.114	↓ 7
102	Bahrain	2.121	↑ 2
=103	Cote d'Ivoire	2.123	↑ 2
=103	Mozambique	2.123	↓ 2
105	Bolivia	2.14	↓ 8
106	Djibouti	2.146	↑ 6
107	Papua New Guinea	2.149	↓ 7
108	Haiti	2.151	↑ 5
109	Turkmenistan	2.154	↔
110	El Salvador	2.184	↔
111	Guatemala	2.195	↑ 3

RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE	CHANGE
112	Lesotho	2.202	↓ 4
113	Thailand	2.205	↑ 5
114	Uganda	2.219	↑ 3
115	Togo	2.239	↓ 4
116	Kenya	2.254	↑ 9
117	Belarus	2.285	↓ 19
118	Mauritania	2.29	↑ 1
119	Republic of the Congo	2.291	↑ 4
120	Congo	2.31	↑ 2
121	Azerbaijan	2.334	↓ 6
122	United States of America	2.337	↓ 2
123	South Africa	2.344	↑ 1
124	Honduras	2.371	↓ 8
125	Saudi Arabia	2.376	↑ 2
126	Egypt	2.397	↑ 3
127	Philippines	2.417	↑ 3
128	Brazil	2.43	↔
129	Burundi	2.434	↑ 3
130	Nicaragua	2.445	↑ 5
131	Myanmar	2.457	↓ 5
132	Chad	2.489	↑ 1
133	Zimbabwe	2.49	↓ 2
134	Burkina Faso	2.527	↓ 13
135	India	2.553	↑ 2
136	Eritrea	2.555	↑ 3
137	Niger	2.589	↓ 1
138	Palestine	2.61	↑ 5

RANK	COUNTRY	SCORE	CHANGE
139	Ethiopia	2.613	↓ 6
140	Mexico	2.62	↓ 2
141	Iran	2.637	↑ 1
142	Ukraine	2.66	↑ 6
143	Israel	2.669	↑ 2
144	Colombia	2.694	↓ 4
145	Cameroon	2.7	↓ 4
146	Nigeria	2.712	↑ 1
147	Lebanon	2.797	↓ 1
148	Mali	2.813	↓ 4
149	Turkey	2.843	↔
150	Pakistan	2.868	↓ 2
151	North Korea	2.923	↑ 1
152	Venezuela	2.934	↓ 2
153	Sudan	2.936	↔
154	Russia	2.993	↔
155	Central African Republic	3.131	↑ 1
156	Libya	3.166	↓ 1
157	Democratic Republic of the Congo	3.196	↑ 1
158	Somalia	3.211	↓ 1
159	Iraq	3.257	↑ 2
160	South Sudan	3.363	↔
161	Syria	3.371	↑ 1
162	Yemen	3.407	↓ 3
163	Afghanistan	3.631	↔

# Results



**The 2021 GPI finds that the world became less peaceful for the ninth time in the last 13 years, with the average level of country peacefulness deteriorating by 0.07 per cent over the past year. Figure 1.1 shows the change in the average levels of peacefulness in the overall score and for each of the GPI domains, as well as the percentage of countries that improved or deteriorated. In total, peacefulness improved in 87 countries and deteriorated in 73, highlighting that falls in peacefulness are generally larger than improvements.**

The deterioration in peacefulness was mainly due to a deterioration for the *Militarisation* domain. *Military expenditure* as a percentage of GDP increased in 105 countries, driven in part by falls in economic activity caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, although absolute expenditure on the military did also increase. The *armed services personnel rate* also deteriorated on the 2021 GPI, after falling year on year for the majority of the past decade.

There was a slight deterioration on the *Safety and Security* domain, driven by an increase in civil unrest that saw the number of *violent demonstrations* increase in 2020, despite a sharp fall at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic. Increased civil unrest also led to a deterioration in *political instability*, with 46 countries experiencing increased political turmoil and uncertainty in 2020, compared to 23 countries that improved.

The *Ongoing Conflict* domain improved for the first time since 2015, with falls in both the total number of conflicts fought and a decrease in the overall *intensity of internal conflict*. The number of deaths from conflict, both internal and external, continued to fall, owing to the defeat of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in Syria and Iraq, and a fall in the level of conflict in Afghanistan.

Eleven of the 23 GPI indicators improved on average, with ten deteriorating and two remaining unchanged. Figure 1.2 shows the average percentage change for each indicator from the 2020 to the 2021 GPI. The largest average deterioration was on the *weapons imports* indicator, while the *terrorism impact* indicator had the largest improvement.

FIGURE 1.1  
**Year-on-year change in GPI score by domain, 2021**

The Militarisation domain had the largest overall change.





FIGURE 1.2

## Percentage change in score by indicator, 2021 GPI

Indicators of *Militarization* increased, but terrorism and internal conflict continued to fall.



Source: IEP

The number of *weapons imports* per capita increased in 92 countries. The largest increases occurred in Armenia, Turkmenistan and Qatar. However, despite the increase over the past year, average *weapons imports* per capita are still considerably lower than at their peak in 2012.

The growth of civil unrest continued through 2020 and into 2021, with 25 countries recording a deterioration on the *violent demonstrations* indicator, compared to just eight that recorded an improvement. The largest deteriorations occurred in Belarus, Myanmar, Russia, the United States and Uruguay. The average *violent demonstrations* score is now the highest it has been since 2008.

*Terrorism impact* continued to improve, with 115 countries recording an improvement, and just 20 countries recording a deterioration. Total deaths from terrorism have now been falling year on year since 2014. The largest improvements occurred in South America, with Bolivia, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and Paraguay all recording large improvements.

The *internal conflicts fought* indicator recorded the second largest overall improvement. This is the first improvement for the indicator since 2012. Twenty-one countries recorded improvements, with just one country recording a deterioration. The largest improvements occurred in India and Ukraine. The total number of conflicts fell by 8.4 per cent between 2018 and 2019.

# FIVE MOST & LEAST PEACEFUL COUNTRIES BY DOMAIN

TABLE 1.1

## Safety and Security domain

Rank	Country	2020 Score	Score change	Rank change
1	Norway	1.182	-0.018	↔
2	Iceland	1.218	-0.006	↔
3	Switzerland	1.242	0.006	↔
4	Denmark	1.258	-0.021	↑ 1
5	Japan	1.292	-0.05	↑ 1

Rank	Country	2020 Score	Score change	Rank change
163	Afghanistan	4.258	-0.017	↔
162	Venezuela	4.089	0.082	↔
161	Yemen	3.944	0.173	↓ 4
160	South Sudan	3.891	-0.066	↑ 1
159	Iraq	3.888	-0.064	↑ 1

TABLE 1.2

## Ongoing Conflict domain

Rank	Country	2020 Score	Score change	Rank change
=1	Botswana	1	0	↔
=1	Bulgaria	1	-0.001	↑ 4
=1	Iceland	1	-0.001	↑ 4
=1	Ireland	1	-0.202	↑ 25
=1	Mauritius	1	0	↔

Rank	Country	2020 Score	Score change	Rank change
163	Syria	3.828	0	↔
162	Afghanistan	3.641	0	↔
161	Yemen	3.559	-0.062	↔
160	Somalia	3.474	0.182	↓ 4
159	Libya	3.3	0.038	↓ 4

TABLE 1.3

## Militarisation domain

Rank	Country	2020 Score	Score change	Rank change
1	Iceland	1.028	-0.001	↔
2	Slovenia	1.129	-0.039	↑ 2
3	Hungary	1.17	0.026	↔
4	New Zealand	1.197	0.083	↓ 2
5	Moldova	1.243	0.007	↔

Rank	Country	2020 Score	Score change	Rank change
163	Israel	3.828	-0.086	↔
162	Russia	3.234	-0.003	↔
161	United States of America	3.172	0.113	↓ 1
160	North Korea	3.135	-0.089	↑ 1
159	France	2.78	0.014	↔

# Regional Overview



**Three of the nine regions in the world improved in peacefulness on the 2021 GPI, while the other six deteriorated. The MENA, Europe, and South Asia were the three regions that improved. Of the six regions that deteriorated North America recorded the largest average deterioration, with South America recording the second largest fall. North America had deteriorations across all three GPI domains, with the largest occurring on the *Militarisation* domain.**

Europe maintained its position as the most peaceful region in the world, which it has held since 2008 with the MENA remaining the least peaceful. However, both regions did record an improvement in the 2021 GPI.

Figure 1.3 shows the overall score for each region on the 2021 GPI, as well as the change in score from the 2020 to the 2021 GPI.

## ASIA-PACIFIC

Asia-Pacific recorded a slight fall in peacefulness on the 2021 GPI, with an average deterioration in overall score of 1.8 per cent. Ten countries in the region recorded deteriorations in their score, with nine recording improvements.

The fall in peacefulness was driven by deteriorations in the *intensity of internal conflict, violent demonstrations, and political instability*. However, there was a notable improvement on the *terrorism impact* indicator.

New Zealand is the most peaceful country in the region and the second most peaceful country overall in the 2021 GPI. New Zealand recorded a very slight deterioration in score on the 2021 GPI, as a result of an increase in *weapons imports* and *military expenditure*.

The country has been relatively unaffected by COVID-19, and it was ranked equal first on the ‘COVID Performance Index’.<sup>1</sup>

The largest deterioration in the Asia Pacific region occurred in Myanmar, as the country grappled with the fall-out from a military coup in early February this year. Myanmar is now the least peaceful country in the region. There were large deteriorations on the *Ongoing Conflict* and *Safety and Security* domains after the coup which sparked a large increase in civil unrest and demonstrations. Hundreds of people have been killed and security forces have been accused of crimes against humanity, including murder, enforced disappearances, persecution and torture.<sup>2</sup>


Vietnam recorded the largest improvement in the region and the fourth largest improvement in peacefulness on the 2021 GPI, improving by 5.3 per cent. The improvement in peacefulness was driven by changes on the *Militarisation* and *Safety and Security* domains. Vietnam was one of the few countries in the world not to fall into a recession as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, with the country’s economy projected to have grown three per cent in 2020.

China recorded a 2.1 per cent fall in overall peacefulness, driven by deteriorations on the *Ongoing Conflict* and *Militarisation* domains. Tensions with other countries in the region over territorial disputes, as well as concerns about China’s increasingly aggressive stance on

FIGURE 1.3

## Regional GPI results, 2021

Six of the nine global regions experienced deteriorations in peacefulness.



Source: IEP

TABLE 1.4  
**Asia-Pacific**

Regional Rank	Country	Overall Score	Score Change	Overall Rank
1	New Zealand	1.253	0.01	2
2	Singapore	1.347	0.043	11
3	Japan	1.373	-0.015	12
4	Australia	1.47	0.035	16
5	Malaysia	1.515	-0.037	23
6	Taiwan	1.662	-0.02	34
7	Indonesia	1.783	-0.003	42
8	Mongolia	1.783	0.016	42
9	Laos	1.809	-0.019	45
10	Vietnam	1.835	-0.102	50
11	Timor-Leste	1.873	0.03	56
12	South Korea	1.877	0.063	57
13	Cambodia	2.008	0.038	78
14	China	2.114	0.044	100
15	Papua New Guinea	2.149	0.046	107
16	Thailand	2.205	-0.02	113
17	Philippines	2.417	-0.014	127
18	Myanmar	2.457	0.097	131
19	North Korea	2.923	-0.022	151
<b>REGIONAL AVERAGE</b>		<b>1.887</b>	<b>0.009</b>	

Taiwan led to a deterioration in the *neighbouring countries relations* indicator. These tensions increased with the introduction of China's Coast Guard Law in February 2021, which allowed the use of "all necessary means" to deter threats posed by foreign vessels in waters "under China's protection"<sup>3</sup>. This led to increased tension throughout the South and East China Sea, especially with the Philippines. Other countries have raised concerns about China's treatment of its Uighur minority population, with increasing international calls for this treatment to be classified as genocide.<sup>4</sup>

South Korea recorded the second largest deterioration in peacefulness in the region, owing to increases in *Militarisation*, *Military expenditure*, *weapons imports*, and *weapons exports* all increased, although the *armed forces* rate did improve. The South Korean government released a 'Reform Defense Plan' in 2020, outlining its plans to downsize its military and place a stronger emphasis on technological sophistication.<sup>5</sup>

Increases in civil unrest were recorded in a number of other countries throughout the region. In Thailand, there was a deterioration on the *violent demonstrations* indicator following mass protests calling for constitutional reform. These were the largest protests in the country since 2014. In response, the government reintroduced the dormant 'lese majeste' law, which prohibited criticism of the monarchy and cracked down on activists. Further protests were sparked by a growing public backlash against the government handling of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Indonesia also saw mass protests involving tens of thousands calling for the release of individuals accused of pro-independence activities. These demonstrations, which followed on from mass student-led demonstrations in late 2019, led to a deterioration in *political instability* in Indonesia.

## CENTRAL AMERICA & THE CARIBBEAN

Peacefulness fell slightly in Central America and the Caribbean on the 2021 GPI, with an average deterioration in score of 0.75 per cent. Of the twelve countries in the region, nine recorded deteriorations in peacefulness, with only Nicaragua, Haiti, and Guatemala recording improvements. Honduras had the biggest overall deterioration in the region, and the third largest deterioration of any country. The region deteriorated across all three GPI domains, with the largest deterioration occurring on the *Militarisation* domain.

Costa Rica remains the most peaceful country in the region, and is ranked 39<sup>th</sup> overall on the 2021 GPI. However, it recorded a deterioration in peacefulness over the past year, owing to increases in *terrorism impact*, rising *military expenditure* as a percentage of GDP, and a reduced commitment to UN peacekeeping funding. Despite these deteriorations, Costa Rica still scores very well on both the *Militarisation* and *Ongoing Conflict* domains. It also recorded an improvement on the *Safety and Security* domain, owing to a fall in its *homicide rate*.

Mexico is the largest and most populous country in Central America, and it remains the least peaceful country in the region. Mexico recorded a 1.9 per cent deterioration in peacefulness on the 2021 GPI. There was a slight deterioration in *political instability*, as the past year saw an increase in the deployment of federal troops internally, increases in allegations of political corruption against government officials, and an increase in violence against journalists and political candidates. Despite some falls in interpersonal violence in Mexico owing to the COVID-19 pandemic, the level of violence in the country remains extremely high, with Mexico having the ninth highest *homicide rate* in the world in 2018. The five cities with the highest homicide rates in the world are also all in Mexico. However, organised crime improved over the past year, with a 2.9 per cent fall, according to the 2021 Mexico Peace Index.

Honduras recorded the biggest deterioration in peacefulness in the region and the third biggest deterioration in the 2021 GPI, with falls in peacefulness across all three GPI domains. The largest change occurred in the *Ongoing Conflict* domain owing to an increased *intensity of internal conflict* and a rising number of deaths from internal conflict. Overcrowding in the prison system has led to outbreaks of violence between different organised criminal groups, including the first ever organised-crime-related

TABLE 1.5  
**Central America & The Caribbean**

Regional Rank	Country	Overall Score	Score Change	Overall Rank
1	Costa Rica	1.735	0.016	39
2	Panama	1.919	0.027	64
3	Jamaica	1.992	0.013	74
4	Dominican Republic	2.024	0.029	82
5	Trinidad and Tobago	2.029	0.001	84
6	Cuba	2.042	0.013	87
7	Haiti	2.151	-0.04	108
7	El Salvador	2.184	0.011	110
9	Guatemala	2.195	-0.006	111
10	Honduras	2.371	0.158	124
11	Nicaragua	2.445	-0.079	130
12	Mexico	2.62	0.049	140
<b>REGIONAL AVERAGE</b>		<b>2.142</b>	<b>0.016</b>	

massacre inside a female prison. The re-election of the president Juan Orlando Hernandez and allegations of corruption also contributed to increased *political instability*. The death of a female student in police custody, for allegedly breaching COVID-19 restrictions, sparked protests involving thousands of people after forensic tests revealed “strong indications” of homicide.<sup>6</sup>

Although Nicaragua is the second least peaceful country in the region, it recorded the largest increase in peacefulness in Central America on the 2021 GPI. Falls in *terrorism impact, perceptions of criminality, and deaths from internal conflict* saw its overall score improve by 3.13 per cent. However, while the country recorded improvements on both the *Safety and Security* and *Ongoing Conflict* domains, concerns have been raised about rising levels of political authoritarianism. The level of *Militarisation* in Nicaragua has also increased, with the *weapons imports* indicator deteriorating by almost 23 per cent.

## EUROPE

Europe was one of only three regions to record an improvement in peacefulness on the 2021 GPI, with an average improvement in overall score of one per cent. Europe remains the most peaceful region in the world, and is home to eight of the ten most peaceful countries. The improvement in peacefulness in Europe was driven by the continued improvement of the *terrorism impact* indicator, and a fall in average *weapons exports* per capita. Of the 36 countries in the region, 24 had improvements in peacefulness, and 11 had deteriorations, with one country recording no change in its overall score.

Europe was heavily affected by the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. GDP growth was strongly impacted across the continent, with economic activity in the European Union (EU) expected to have shrunk by over seven per cent over in 2020. Most European countries implemented some form of lockdown or movement restrictions in response to the pandemic, with some countries, such as Finland, even declaring a state of emergency. This restriction on movement has led to a fall in interpersonal violence and initially resulted in fewer demonstrations and less civil unrest, although tensions began to grow as restriction on movement remained in place resulting in demonstrations against lockdowns in many countries.

Iceland remains the most peaceful country in the region and the world on the 2021 GPI, with a small improvement in its score of 0.27 per cent. Both the *incarceration rate* and *perceptions of criminality* indicators improved. Iceland’s *incarceration rate* of 33 per 100,000 people is the lowest in Europe, and the eighth lowest globally.

Greece is the least peaceful country in the region, and is ranked 66<sup>th</sup> overall on the 2021 GPI. Its score deteriorated by 3.2 per cent over the past year, the largest deterioration in Europe, as rising tensions with Turkey led to an increase in *political instability*. Although Greece improved on the *Militarisation* domain, it deteriorated on a number of indicators of *Safety and Security*, most notably *political terror*. It also recorded deteriorations on the *homicide rate* and *incarceration rate* indicators.

Austria had the second largest deterioration in peacefulness in Europe, although it remains one of the ten most peaceful countries in the world. The fall in peacefulness was the result of a deterioration in the *terrorism impact* indicator. In early November 2020, an ISIL sympathizer shot and killed four people and injured

23 others. The Austrian government responded strongly to the attack, introducing legislation that allows the government to keep individuals convicted of terror offences behind bars for life and facilitate electronic surveillance of those who were released.<sup>7</sup>

Poland recorded the largest improvement in the region and is now ranked 24<sup>th</sup> on the index overall. The country recorded a significant improvement in *violent crime, violent demonstrations* and *political terror*. Despite this, Poland experienced the largest ever mass protests since the fall of communism following a court decision that would criminalise abortion in cases where the foetus had a congenital defect.<sup>8</sup>

TABLE 1.6

## Europe

Regional Rank	Country	Overall Score	Score Change	Overall Rank
1	Iceland	1.1	-0.003	1
2	Denmark	1.256	-0.012	3
3	Portugal	1.267	0.031	4
4	Slovenia	1.315	-0.034	5
5	Austria	1.317	0.056	6
6	Switzerland	1.323	-0.024	7
7	Ireland	1.326	-0.053	8
8	Czech Republic	1.329	-0.017	9
9	Finland	1.402	0.011	13
10	Norway	1.438	-0.033	14
11	Sweden	1.46	-0.011	15
11	Croatia	1.48	-0.059	17
13	Germany	1.48	-0.019	17
14	Hungary	1.494	-0.042	19
15	Belgium	1.496	0.011	20
16	Netherlands	1.506	-0.015	21
17	Poland	1.524	-0.142	24
18	Romania	1.53	0	25
19	Slovakia	1.557	-0.024	26
20	Bulgaria	1.577	-0.051	27
21	Estonia	1.612	-0.033	30
22	Spain	1.621	-0.042	31
23	Italy	1.652	0.018	32
24	United Kingdom	1.658	-0.075	33
25	Latvia	1.686	-0.003	35
26	Lithuania	1.689	0.043	37
27	North Macedonia	1.744	-0.097	40
28	Serbia	1.797	0.03	44
29	Albania	1.824	0.003	48
30	Montenegro	1.847	-0.02	51
31	France	1.868	-0.028	55
31	Cyprus	1.912	0.03	61
33	Greece	1.932	0.06	66
34	Bosnia and Herzegovina	1.97	-0.011	72
35	Kosovo	2.017	0.017	80
36	Turkey	2.843	-0.055	149
REGIONAL AVERAGE		1.607	-0.016	

## MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA

Middle East and North Africa remains the least peaceful region in the world for the sixth consecutive year, despite recording the largest improvement in peacefulness of any region on the 2021 GPI. Notably, four of the five least peaceful countries in the region recorded an improvement.

There were improvements in the overall score in 15 of the 20 countries in the region, with an average overall increase in peacefulness of 0.81 per cent. Five countries in the region recorded a deterioration in peacefulness. The primary driver of the increase in peacefulness in the region was the improvement on the *Ongoing Conflict* domain.

Yemen is now the least peaceful country in the MENA region, a position that had been held by Syria since 2014. Yemen has recorded falls in peacefulness every year since 2008. Yemen recorded deteriorations on both the *Militarisation* and *Safety and Security* domains, with the largest deterioration occurring on the *refugees and IDPs* and *violent crime* indicators. It is estimated that nearly 13 per cent of the country's population are either refugees or internally displaced. Less than a decade ago, this number stood at under one per cent. Yemen's internal conflict has been stuck largely in a stalemate since 2016, with the Saudi-led coalition and the internationally recognised government unable to make any headway against the Houthi rebels that occupy most of the northern provinces, as well as the capital Sana'a.

Syria is the second least peaceful country in the region and the third least peaceful country in the world. The country experienced a very slight improvement in *political instability* as a result of President

Assad securing his hold on power with the help of Russian and Iranian support. Although the intensity of the conflict in Syria has fallen in the past few years, the country has suffered sustained attacks by ISIL and Al-Qaeda throughout 2020, particularly in the northwest province of Idlib. However, the number of deaths from internal conflict has decreased slightly from the previous year. There have also been clashes between rival jihadist groups Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and ISIL.

Iran recorded an improvement in the *safety and security* domain primarily resulting from a reduced *incarceration rate* and *terrorism impact*. However, the country also saw a deterioration on the *Militarisation* domain. Although *military expenditure* as a percentage of GDP fell, there was a significant reduction in commitment to *UN Peacekeeping funding* as well as a slight increase in the *armed services personnel rate*. Moreover, while there was no change in the country's *nuclear and heavy weapons* indicator, the country started to produce enriched uranium at levels three times more than was allowed by the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

Iraq recorded the largest increase in peacefulness in the region and the second largest improvement overall, with its score improving by 4.3 per cent on the 2021 GPI. Iraq has recorded improvements in peacefulness for three of the past four years, although it remains one of the least peaceful countries in the world. The largest changes occurred on the *Militarisation* domain, with improvements in *military expenditure*, *UN Peacekeeping funding* and *weapons imports*. The level of *Militarisation* has fallen steadily in Iraq over the past five years, and is now at its lowest level since the inception of the index.

## NORTH AMERICA

North America recorded the largest deterioration of any region on the 2021 GPI, with the average level of peacefulness in the region falling by 1.8 per cent. However, despite this deterioration and ongoing civil unrest, it remains the second most peaceful region on average. There are only two countries in the North American region, with Canada recording a very slight increase in peacefulness, and the US experiencing a significant fall in peacefulness, with its overall score deteriorating by 3.0 per cent.

Although Canada's score did improve, it fell three places on the GPI as the countries closest to it in score had larger increases in peacefulness. There is a considerable disparity in peacefulness between the two countries in the region, with Canada being ranked in the ten most peaceful countries and the United States being ranked 122<sup>nd</sup>.

The COVID-19 pandemic had a significant impact on both the United States and Canada, with Canada recording over a million cases and the United States recording almost 32 million cases as of April 2021. This resulted in severe economic contractions in both countries, with Canada's economy shrinking by an estimated 5.4 per cent, and the United States economy shrinking by an estimated 3.5 per cent. The pandemic also led to increases in interpersonal violence across both countries. In Canada, there were reports of an increase in hate crimes in urban areas, with the number of recorded hate crimes against Asians in Vancouver increasing by 717 per cent.

Canada remains the most peaceful country in the region and is ranked as the 10<sup>th</sup> most peaceful country in the world overall, one of only two non-European countries in the top ten. Canada

TABLE 1.7  
**Middle East & North Africa**

Regional Rank	Country	Overall Score	Score Change	Overall Rank
1	Qatar	1.605	<span style="color:red">0.015</span>	29
2	Kuwait	1.688	<span style="color:red">-0.007</span>	36
3	United Arab Emirates	1.848	<span style="color:red">-0.053</span>	52
4	Jordan	1.916	<span style="color:red">-0.007</span>	63
5	Oman	1.982	<span style="color:red">-0.004</span>	73
6	Morocco	2.015	<span style="color:red">-0.038</span>	79
7	Tunisia	2.108	<span style="color:red">0.024</span>	98
8	Bahrain	2.121	<span style="color:red">-0.03</span>	102
9	Algeria	2.31	<span style="color:red">0.02</span>	120
10	Saudi Arabia	2.376	<span style="color:red">-0.014</span>	125
11	Egypt	2.397	<span style="color:green">-0.013</span>	126
12	Palestine	2.61	<span style="color:red">-0.074</span>	138
13	Iran	2.637	<span style="color:red">-0.013</span>	141
14	Israel	2.669	<span style="color:red">-0.074</span>	143
15	Lebanon	2.797	<span style="color:red">0.037</span>	147
16	Sudan	2.936	<span style="color:red">-0.028</span>	153
17	Libya	3.166	<span style="color:red">-0.006</span>	156
18	Iraq	3.257	<span style="color:red">-0.147</span>	159
19	Syria	3.371	<span style="color:red">-0.033</span>	161
20	Yemen	3.407	<span style="color:red">0.08</span>	162
<b>REGIONAL AVERAGE</b>		<b>2.459</b>	<b>-0.02</b>	

TABLE 1.8

## North America

Regional Rank	Country	Overall Score	Score Change	Overall Rank
1	Canada	1.33	-0.001	10
2	United States of America	2.337	0.067	122
<b>REGIONAL AVERAGE</b>		<b>1.834</b>	<b>0.033</b>	

recorded a very small increase in peacefulness from the 2020 to the 2021 GPI, with its overall score improving by 0.08 per cent. There were improvements in the *incarceration rate* and *terrorism impact*, as well as falls in the level of *weapons imports* and *weapons exports* per capita. Whilst there was an increase in *military expenditure* as a percentage of GDP, this was largely the result of the impact of the pandemic on Canada's economic performance.

The United States experienced a significant deterioration in peacefulness over the past year, the continuation of a trend that began in 2015. The level of peacefulness in the US is now lower than at any time since 2008. The primary driver of the deterioration in peacefulness in the US was an increase in civil unrest that led to *violent demonstrations* and a rise in *political instability*. The Black Lives Matter movement sparked protests nationwide over the summer of 2020. While the majority of protests were peaceful, there were instances of looting, vandalism and clashes with the police in several cities.

The US presidential elections were held in November 2020 amid heightened political uncertainty. President Trump's refusal to accept the outcome of the election led to a series of legal appeals across multiple states such as Wisconsin, Michigan and Pennsylvania. The increase in civil unrest and political polarisation in the United States culminated in the events of the 6<sup>th</sup> of January 2021, when a group of supporters of former president Donald Trump stormed the Capitol building in Washington D.C., leading to calls for crackdowns on domestic extremists.

## RUSSIA & EURASIA

Peacefulness deteriorated slightly in Russia and Eurasia on the 2021 GPI. This is the first time in the past five years that the region has recorded a deterioration in peacefulness. Five of the 12 countries in the region recorded improvements in peacefulness, including Ukraine, which recorded the largest increase in peacefulness globally. Seven countries recorded deteriorations, including Belarus and Azerbaijan, which had the second and fifth largest global deteriorations respectively. Changes within the region were driven by deteriorations within the *Militarisation* domain, with weapons imports per capita, *military expenditure* as a percentage of GDP, and the *armed services personnel rate* all recording increases over the past year.

Ukraine is the second least peaceful country in the region and ranks 142<sup>nd</sup> in the 2021 GPI. However, the country had the largest improvement in peacefulness in both the region and also globally. Indicators that improved included *violent crime*, *violent demonstrations*, *political instability* and the *intensity of internal conflict*. Although Ukraine had the largest increase in peacefulness, concerns remain about the outbreak of future conflict. Russia massed troops on its border with Ukraine in the early part of 2021, only to withdraw them in late April. The EU estimated that Russia had amassed almost 100,000 troops at the

TABLE 1.9

## Russia & Eurasia

Regional Rank	Country	Overall Score	Score Change	Overall Rank
1	Moldova	1.909	0.011	59
2	Kazakhstan	1.936	0.007	67
3	Kyrgyz Republic	1.998	-0.089	76
4	Georgia	2.054	0.029	89
5	Uzbekistan	2.062	0.003	90
6	Armenia	2.075	0.079	94
7	Tajikistan	2.095	-0.035	97
8	Turkmenistan	2.154	-0.018	109
9	Belarus	2.285	0.183	117
10	Azerbaijan	2.334	0.122	121
11	Ukraine	2.66	-0.22	142
12	Russia	2.993	-0.008	154
<b>REGIONAL AVERAGE</b>		<b>2.213</b>	<b>0.005</b>	

border. Despite the withdrawal of troops from the border region, tensions are likely to remain high for the foreseeable future.

Belarus recorded the largest deterioration in the region and the second largest deterioration globally. Overall peacefulness in the country declined by 8.7 per cent owing to changes on the *Ongoing Conflict* and *Safety and Security* domains. *Violent demonstrations* deteriorated as Belarus experienced the largest anti-government protests in its history, organised by the opposition in response to President Lukashenko seeking a sixth term in office.

Tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan spilled over into conflict in 2020, centred on the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh area. This region is part of Azerbaijan, but home to a large Armenian population. Fighting began in late September 2020. The number of people killed in the conflict is disputed, but most estimates suggest that at least 4,000 Armenian troops were killed, with almost 3,000 Azerbaijani casualties, including over 500 Syrians fighting on the Azerbaijani side. A ceasefire agreement was reached in November 2020, and Russian peacekeepers are now operating in some parts of the region.

Russia is the least peaceful nation in the region and is one of the least peaceful countries in the world on the 2021 GPI, with an overall rank of 154. However, despite its low ranking on the index, peacefulness in Russia has improved in recent years. This is the second successive year that Russia has recorded an overall improvement in peacefulness. The country improved on both the *Ongoing Conflict* and *Militarisation* domains, but recorded a deterioration in *Safety and Security*. There were deteriorations in both *violent demonstrations* and *political instability* as a result of the poisoning and detention of opposition leader Alexi Navalny. Over 8,500 people were detained in subsequent protests, with police attempting to disperse protesters with force. *Political instability* also deteriorated after a referendum was passed in June 2020 that would allow President Vladimir Putin to remain in office until 2036.<sup>9</sup>

TABLE 1.10  
**South America**

Regional Rank	Country	Overall Score	Score Change	Overall Rank
1	Uruguay	1.817	0.116	47
2	Chile	1.831	0	49
3	Argentina	1.945	-0.025	68
4	Paraguay	1.997	-0.013	75
5	Peru	2.034	-0.023	86
6	Ecuador	2.044	-0.023	88
7	Guyana	2.114	0.046	100
8	Bolivia	2.14	0.041	105
9	Brazil	2.43	0.021	128
10	Colombia	2.694	0.062	144
11	Venezuela	2.934	0.015	152
<b>REGIONAL AVERAGE</b>		<b>2.18</b>	<b>0.02</b>	

## SOUTH AMERICA

South America experienced the second largest regional deterioration on the 2021 GPI, owing to a deterioration on the *Safety and Security* domain. The average level of peacefulness in South America fell by 0.9 per cent over the past year, with six countries recording deteriorations, and four recording improvements. No country in South America is ranked amongst the 50 most peaceful in the world. The deterioration in peacefulness on the 2021 GPI in South America was driven by an increase in *violent demonstrations*, as well as worsening relations between countries in the region.

Uruguay is the most peaceful country in South America. However, it had the largest deterioration in peacefulness in the region, and now has its lowest levels of peacefulness since the inception of the index in 2008. Its overall score deteriorated by 6.8 per cent, driven by increasing *political instability*, violent crime, and *violent demonstrations*. Before the pandemic, labour unions announced they would resist the new Lacalle government's economic and labour reforms, leading to strikes and demonstrations. The economic effect of the pandemic has compounded the risks of these divisions growing.

Argentina recorded the largest increase in peacefulness in the region and is now ranked second in the region and 68<sup>th</sup> in the world. The improvement in peacefulness was driven by improvements in *terrorism impact*, a fall in the level of *political terror*, increased feelings of safety among citizens, and decreasing *political instability*. After the surprise election of President Alberto Fernandez in 2019, the political situation in Argentina has stabilised, with major political disruptions not expected before the next federal election in 2023.

Venezuela is the least peaceful country in the region and one of the least peaceful countries globally, with a ranking of 152 out of 163 countries. Peacefulness deteriorated in Venezuela over the past year, with a rise in *political terror* being the main driver. The country now scores a five on the Political Terror Scale, which is the highest possible score, and indicative of widespread civil and political rights violations and high levels of government corruption and repression. However, Venezuela did record improvements in both *terrorism impact* and its *homicide rate*. There was also a fall in the number of *deaths from internal conflict*.

TABLE 1.11  
**South Asia**

Regional Rank	Country	Overall Score	Score Change	Overall Rank
1	Bhutan	1.51	-0.013	22
2	Nepal	2.033	0.018	85
3	Bangladesh	2.068	-0.034	91
4	Sri Lanka	2.083	0.096	95
5	India	2.553	-0.017	135
6	Pakistan	2.868	-0.055	150
7	Afghanistan	3.631	-0.017	163
<b>REGIONAL AVERAGE</b>		<b>2.392</b>	<b>-0.003</b>	

Colombia is ranked tenth in the region and 144<sup>th</sup> overall on the 2021 GPI. The country recorded the second largest deterioration in overall score, owing to increases in *violent demonstrations* and *political terror*. Large scale protests across Bogota spread to multiple cities following the emergence of video footage of police using excessive force against a taxi driver during an arrest in September 2020. The protesters set 22 police stations on fire and police responded by firing live ammunition which killed at least 13. *Deaths from internal conflict* have also increased in recent years.

## SOUTH ASIA

South Asia was one of only three regions to record an improvement in peacefulness over the past year, although it remains the second least peaceful region overall. The average level of peacefulness in the region improved by 0.1 per cent, with improvements occurring in five of the seven countries in the region. South Asia recorded improvements on the *Militarisation* and *Safety and Security* domains. There is a wide disparity between the least and most countries in the region, with Bhutan being ranked 22<sup>nd</sup> overall, and Afghanistan being the least peaceful country in the world on the 2021 GPI.

Afghanistan remains the least peaceful country in the region and the world on the 2021 GPI, a position it has held for the past four years. However, it did record an improvement in peacefulness over the past year. The total number of *deaths from internal conflict* and *terrorism impact* have continued to fall, and the *homicide rate* has also fallen in the past few years. However, Afghanistan still has a higher *terrorism impact* than any other country in the world. The US government announced plans to withdraw all troops from Afghanistan by September 11 2021, leaving the future of the country uncertain.

Bhutan is the most peaceful country in South Asia and is ranked 22<sup>nd</sup> overall on the 2021 GPI. It is the highest ranking country on the GPI outside of Europe, Asia-Pacific, or North America. Bhutan's level of peacefulness increased by 0.9 per cent over the past year, driven by an improvement in the *homicide rate*. As of 2018, Bhutan had a *homicide rate* of 1.2 per 100,000 people. Bhutan is also one of the least militarised countries in the world, with the 12th lowest score on the *Militarisation* domain.

The largest improvement in peacefulness in South Asia occurred in Pakistan, which experienced a 1.9 per cent improvement in overall score on the 2021 GPI. This was driven by improvements for the *Ongoing Conflict* and *Safety and Security* domains. Pakistan was one of the few countries to record an improvement on the *violent demonstrations* indicator, although the overall risk of future civil unrest remains relatively high. Pakistan also

recorded improvements on its *homicide rate, terrorism impact, refugees and IDPs* and *perceptions of criminality* indicators.

India is the most populous country in the region and is ranked 150<sup>th</sup> on the 2021 GPI. The country experienced a slight improvement of 0.7 per cent in overall peacefulness over the past year, driven by an improvement in the *Ongoing Conflict* domain. However, India has been badly affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. A second wave of cases in October 2020 led to lockdowns across the country. Some estimates suggest that the Indian economy contracted by nearly ten per cent in 2020. A third wave of coronavirus cases in April 2021 has exacerbated the already fragile situation in the country.

## SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

Sub-Saharan Africa recorded a slight fall in peacefulness on the 2021 GPI, with the average country score deteriorating by 0.5 per cent. Of the 44 countries in the region, 21 improved, 22 deteriorated in score and one remained unchanged. The region is less peaceful than the global average on the *Safety and Security* and *Ongoing Conflict* domains, but more peaceful than the global average on the *Militarisation* domain. Echoing the results from last year, disputes over election results and allegations of corruption led to a rise in civil unrest and *political instability* across the region, with violent protests breaking out in many countries.

The most peaceful country in the region is Mauritius, which is ranked 28<sup>th</sup> on the 2021 GPI. The country only recorded a slight deterioration. The biggest change occurred on the *Safety and Security* domain, most notably on the *homicide rate* indicator. The *homicide rate* for Mauritius increased from 1.8 to 2.9 per 100,000 people. The country also experienced increased civil unrest after thousands protested the government's handling of a massive oil spill in August 2020.

South Sudan remains the least peaceful country in the region and one of the least peaceful countries in the world, despite an improvement in peacefulness on the 2021 GPI. Although levels of internal conflict in the country remain high, negotiations between government forces and a former rebel faction in late 2020 resulted in the appointment of an Upper Nile state governor, ending a month-long political deadlock with rebel groups.

The largest improvement in peacefulness in the region occurred in Gabon, which recorded a 4.2 per cent improvement in its GPI score. The improvement in Gabon was the result of a fall in the level of *political terror*, with both Amnesty International and the US State Department reporting that government human rights abuses had fallen in 2019. Gabon also recorded an improvement on its *armed services personnel rate*, and improved the timeliness of its financial commitment to *UN peacekeeping funding*.

The largest deterioration in peacefulness in the region occurred in Burkina Faso. This was also the single largest deterioration of any country on the 2021 GPI. The government's decision to fund and arm civilian auxiliary groups in its fight against insurgents led to an increase in the ease of *access to small arms*, worsened *perceptions of criminality*, and increased the *intensity of internal conflict*. Burkina Faso is now in a state of low level civil war, with one million people internally displaced according to the United Nations at the end of 2020.

Ethiopia experienced the third largest fall in peacefulness in the region, with deteriorations in all three domains. The largest

deteriorations occurred for the *violent demonstrations* and *neighbouring countries relations* indicators. Civil war broke out in the Tigray region with Eritrean troops entering the country in support of the government. This conflict has resulted in thousands of deaths and displaced over 100,000 people. Additionally, civil unrest also broke out in June 2020 after unidentified gunmen killed the popular Omoro singer Hachalu Hundessa. This resulted in 291 deaths and 5,000 arrests from the subsequent demonstrations. International relations between Ethiopia, Egypt and Sudan have also deteriorated due to disagreements over water rights, the Blue Nile, and the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.

TABLE 1.12  
**Sub-Saharan Africa**

Regional Rank	Country	Overall Score	Score Change	Overall Rank
1	Mauritius	1.592	<b>0.032</b>	28
2	Ghana	1.715	-0.047	38
3	Botswana	1.753	-0.019	41
4	Sierra Leone	1.813	-0.059	46
5	The Gambia	1.853	-0.061	53
6	Senegal	1.864	-0.007	54
7	Tanzania	1.892	<b>0.062</b>	58
8	Malawi	1.909	0	59
9	Equatorial Guinea	1.915	<b>0.059</b>	62
10	Namibia	1.927	<b>0.038</b>	65
11	Eswatini	1.955	-0.047	69
12	Madagascar	1.963	<b>0.023</b>	70
13	Zambia	1.964	<b>0.142</b>	71
14	Liberia	1.998	<b>0.115</b>	76
14	Angola	2.017	-0.015	80
16	Rwanda	2.028	<b>0.03</b>	83
17	Guinea	2.069	<b>0.009</b>	92
18	Gabon	2.074	-0.09	93
19	Benin	2.093	-0.068	96
20	Guinea-Bissau	2.113	-0.008	99
21	Cote d' Ivoire	2.123	-0.038	103
22	Mozambique	2.123	<b>0.007</b>	103
23	Djibouti	2.146	-0.037	106
24	Lesotho	2.202	<b>0.032</b>	112
25	Uganda	2.219	-0.002	114
26	Togo	2.239	<b>0.061</b>	115
27	Kenya	2.254	-0.09	116
28	Mauritania	2.29	<b>0.027</b>	118
29	Republic of the Congo	2.291	-0.039	119
30	South Africa	2.344	<b>0.014</b>	123
31	Burundi	2.434	-0.021	129
32	Chad	2.489	-0.003	132
33	Zimbabwe	2.49	<b>0.056</b>	133
34	Burkina Faso	2.527	<b>0.254</b>	134
35	Eritrea	2.555	-0.017	136
36	Niger	2.589	<b>0.031</b>	137
37	Ethiopia	2.613	<b>0.121</b>	139
38	Cameroon	2.7	<b>0.06</b>	145
39	Nigeria	2.712	-0.068	146
40	Mali	2.813	<b>0.088</b>	148
41	Central African Republic	3.131	-0.043	155
42	Democratic Republic of the Congo	3.196	<b>0.012</b>	157
43	Somalia	3.211	<b>0.034</b>	158
44	South Sudan	3.363	-0.033	160
<b>REGIONAL AVERAGE</b>		<b>2.263</b>	<b>0.011</b>	



## Improvements & Deteriorations



## FIVE LARGEST IMPROVEMENTS IN PEACE

### Ukraine

Rank: 142

CHANGE IN SCORE 2020–21:

-0.22

CHANGE IN RANK 2020–21:

↗ 6

Ukraine recorded the largest improvement in peacefulness on the 2021 GPI with its score improving by 7.6 per cent, leading to a rise of five places in the rankings to 142<sup>nd</sup>. Ukraine has recorded consistent increases in peacefulness since the outbreak of conflict in 2014, with its score improving for four out of the past five years. However, Ukraine still faces many challenges to peace, particularly in the *Safety and Security* domain.

The biggest improvement occurred in the *Ongoing Conflict* domain, which improved by just over ten per cent. This improvement was primarily driven by improvements on the *internal conflicts fought* and *intensity of internal conflict* indicators. However, *relations with neighbouring countries* remain strained due to *ongoing conflict* with Russia in the Donbas region. Russian troops performed drills near the Ukrainian border in early 2021, leading to a spike in tension in the region, before withdrawing in late April.

The largest improvements in peacefulness occurred on the *political terror* and *violent crime* indicators. Theft, robbery, vandalism and arson now pose only a moderate risk to businesses and the government. Ukraine also saw a major improvement in *political instability*. The presidential and parliamentary elections held in April and July 2019 respectively were judged free and fair. Observers from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) judged that the elections had been "competitive and held with respect for fundamental freedoms".

### Iraq

Rank: 159

CHANGE IN SCORE 2020–21:

-0.147

CHANGE IN RANK 2020–21:

↗ 2

Iraq recorded the second largest increase in peacefulness in the 2021 GPI, with its score improving by 4.3 per cent. The country is now ranked 159<sup>th</sup> overall, with improvements across all three GPI domains. The improvement in peacefulness is a continuation of the recent trend in the country, with Iraq recording improvements in three of the past four years.

The largest changes occurred on the *Militarisation* domain, with improvements in *military expenditure*, *UN Peacekeeping funding* and *weapons imports*. The level of *Militarisation* has fallen steadily in Iraq over the past five years, and is now at its lowest level since the inception of the index.

On the *Ongoing Conflict* domain, there was a significant improvement in the *internal conflicts fought* indicator, and a large fall in the number of deaths from internal conflict. The number of conflict-related deaths in Iraq has fallen from a peak of over 15,000 in 2014 to less than a thousand in 2019, with deaths from terrorism following a similar trajectory.

However, despite being one of the largest improvers in peacefulness, Iraq is still ranked among the four least peaceful countries in the world. It also recorded a deterioration in *political instability* and a fall in *relations with neighbouring countries* over the past year. Tensions with Turkey have increased after Turkey launched Operations Claw-Eagle and Claw-Tiger, a joint air and ground cross-border assault into the Independent Kurdistan Region (IKR), in northern Iraq. The campaign set out to target military positions associated with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a Kurdish political movement that Turkey classifies as a terrorist organisation.

### Poland

Rank: 24

CHANGE IN SCORE 2020–21:

-0.142

CHANGE IN RANK 2020–21:

↗ 9

Poland has the third largest increase in peacefulness on the 2021 GPI, with an 8.5 per cent improvement in its score. The country rose nine places in the GPI rankings and is now ranked 17<sup>th</sup> in Europe and 24<sup>th</sup> overall. Poland had the largest increase in peacefulness amongst the 25 most peaceful countries. This increase in peacefulness was driven by improvements on the *Safety and Security* domain.

The majority of indicators in the *Safety and Security* domain improved, with the largest improvement occurring on the violent crime indicator. Poland has one of the lowest violent crime rates in Europe, with particularly low levels of vandalism and arson. Its *homicide rate* is one of the lowest in the world as well.

The level of *violent demonstrations* in Poland also fell, with violent civil unrest remaining rare in the post-communist era. While the total number of demonstrations has increased since 2015, these demonstrations have remained non-violent. Large demonstrations occurred regarding legislation criminalising the abortion of foetuses with congenital deficits.

The *Militarisation* domain improved slightly, owing to a large improvement in Poland's commitment to *UN Peacekeeping Funding*. However, despite these improvements, Poland recorded deteriorations on *military expenditure* and *weapons imports*. Of the 35 countries in the European region, Poland has the fifth highest *military expenditure* as a percentage of GDP.

### Vietnam

Rank: 50

CHANGE IN SCORE 2020–21:

-0.102

CHANGE IN RANK 2020–21:

↗ 19

Vietnam recorded the fourth largest improvement in peacefulness on the 2021 GPI, improving by 5.3 per cent. This improvement

meant that Vietnam jumped 19 places in the overall rankings, and is now ranked 50<sup>th</sup> overall. It is the tenth most peaceful country in the Asia-Pacific region. The improvement in peacefulness was driven by changes on the *Militarisation* and *Safety and Security* domains.

Vietnam's improvement on the *Militarisation* domain resulted from an increased commitment to *UN Peacekeeping funding* while *Military Expenditure* as a percentage of GDP also decreased, falling from an estimated two per cent of GDP in 2019, to 1.67 per cent in 2020. Unlike most countries that experienced a relative fall in *military expenditure*, this was not the result of a fall in economic activity stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic, with Vietnam's economy projected to have grown by almost three per cent in 2020.

Vietnam also registered significant improvements on the *Safety and Security* domain, with falls in both *political terror* and *terrorism impact*. Feelings of safety within Vietnam have also been improving, with the percentage of people reporting that they don't feel safe walking home alone at night falling from just over 36 per cent in 2018, to less than 31 per cent in 2021.

Although the level of ongoing conflict remained unchanged, Vietnam has somewhat strained *relations with neighbouring countries*. Additionally, it also has moderate levels of *political terror*. The government has prosecuted individuals who made online posts criticising the government and pressured social media companies to censor politically sensitive information.

## North Macedonia

Rank: 40

CHANGE IN SCORE 2020–21:

-0.097

CHANGE IN RANK 2020–21:

↑ 11

North Macedonia had the fifth largest increase in peacefulness on the 2021 GPI, with a 5.2 per cent improvement in its score. The country rose 11 places in the GPI rankings and is now ranked 40<sup>th</sup> overall. The increase in peacefulness was largely driven by improvements in the *Ongoing Conflict* domain.

The *intensity of internal conflict* indicator had the largest improvement, and is now at its lowest level since 2016. Conflict with Greece has receded since the signing of the Prespa Agreement, though Bulgaria continues to block North Macedonia's EU membership negotiations. Despite some divisions in the country over the Prespa Agreement, the issue is not as polarising as it was a year ago.

On the *Safety and Security* domain, there were improvements in *political terror*, the *homicide rate*, *incarceration rate* and *terrorism impact*. Despite these improvements, North Macedonia recorded a deterioration in *perceptions of criminality*. This is the fourth consecutive year that North Macedonia has recorded improvements on the *Safety and Security* domain.

The *Militarisation* domain improved slightly owing to an improvement in Macedonia's commitment to *UN Peacekeeping Funding*. However, North Macedonia recorded a deterioration in *military expenditure*.

## FIVE LARGEST DETERIORATIONS IN PEACE

### Burkina Faso

Rank: 134

CHANGE IN SCORE 2020–21:

0.254

CHANGE IN RANK 2020–21:

↓ 13

Burkina Faso had the largest deterioration in peacefulness on the 2021 GPI, falling 13 places, and is now ranked 34<sup>th</sup> in the sub-Saharan Africa region and 134<sup>th</sup> globally. Burkina Faso's overall score deteriorated by just over 11 per cent, driven by increases in internal conflict that led to the displacement of over one million people by the end of 2020. The country now has its worst GPI score since the inception of the index in 2008. The largest deteriorations occurred on the *Ongoing Conflict* and *Safety and Security* domains.

Burkina Faso has entered a period of extreme instability. This has diverted the attention of the security forces towards combating an Islamist insurgency, weakening efforts to maintain law and order. Vigilante groups have been co-opted by the state to help fight the insurgencies, weakening the rule of law and the government's control of territory. In rural areas banditry has flourished, while the jihadist groups fighting the state have funded their struggle through robbery, extortion and control of the criminal economy. The security forces have also been implicated in extra-judicial executions, heightening inter-ethnic tensions.

It is estimated that over 4.6 per cent of the total population are now either refugees or internally displaced. In the prior year, this figure stood at just 0.3 per cent of the population. The conflict in Burkina Faso has led to an increase in *deaths from internal conflict* and the *intensity of internal conflict*. The government's decision to arm and train civilian and vigilante groups has led to increased ease of access to small arms throughout the country.

### Belarus

Rank: 117

CHANGE IN SCORE 2020–21:

0.183

CHANGE IN RANK 2020–21:

↓ 19

Belarus had the second largest deterioration in peacefulness on the 2021 GPI, with a deterioration in score of 8.7 per cent leading to a fall of 19 places in the overall rankings. Belarus is now ranked 117<sup>th</sup> on the 2021 GPI, and is ranked ninth of the 12 countries in the Russia and Eurasia region. The political crisis that followed the August 2020 elections led to large deteriorations on both the *Ongoing Conflict* and *Safety and Security* domains.

Anti-government protests have been running since the disputed presidential poll in August 2020. The security and police forces have clashed with the demonstrators and scores of people were

imprisoned or detained. This has led to a sharp deterioration in the *violent demonstrations* indicator. The EU, in December 2020, introduced a third round of sanctions against 88 individuals and seven entities in Belarus. Unrest stemming from demonstrations has led to an increase in the *intensity of internal conflict* and a rapid deterioration in *political instability*.

The political crisis has led to spill-over effects with regards to neighbouring country relations. The EU sanctions against the Belarusian government included travel bans and asset freezes. Relations with both the EU and the US have deteriorated and more sanctions are likely to follow.

## Honduras

Rank: 124

CHANGE IN SCORE 2020-21:

**0.158**

CHANGE IN RANK 2020-21:

▼ 8

Honduras had the third largest deterioration in peacefulness on the 2021 GPI, with its overall score deteriorating by 7.1 per cent. It is now ranked 124<sup>th</sup> globally, and is ranked tenth of the 12 countries in the Central America and Caribbean region. Peace is now at its lowest level in Honduras in the past decade. Increases in *political instability* and the ongoing impact of organised criminal violence are the major drivers of the fall of peacefulness in the country.

Political polarisation and increasing social tensions led to a deterioration in *political instability* over the past year. The re-election of the president, Juan Orlando Hernández, in January 2018 was approved by the electoral authorities, but this led to social unrest, which was followed by UN-sponsored cross-party dialogue. However, this failed to yield any concrete agreement among the parties, heightening polarisation and raising the risk of further protests.

Honduras has one of the highest *homicide rates* in the world. As of 2018, only Lesotho, Jamaica, and El Salvador had higher *homicide rates* than the 38.9 homicides per 100,000 people recorded in Honduras. The primary driver of this high *homicide rate* is organised criminal activity, which has led to high levels of *organised internal conflict*, and has had a destabilising effect on the country's institutions, leading to a wave of deadly violence in 2020. Its maximum-security prisons, which are already well over capacity, were affected by various riots, massacres and targeted killings. Moreover, authorities also recorded the first-ever massacre inside a female prison, when six women with suspected links to the MS-13 were murdered by rival Barrio 18 members in mid-June.

## Zambia

Rank: 71

CHANGE IN SCORE 2020-21:

**0.142**

CHANGE IN RANK 2020-21:

▼ 24

Zambia had the fourth largest deterioration in peacefulness on the 2021 GPI and the second largest in the sub-Saharan African

region. Its overall score deteriorated by 7.8 per cent, with peacefulness in the country now at its lowest level since the inception of the GPI. Zambia fell 24 places in the rankings and is now ranked 71<sup>st</sup> overall. The fall in peacefulness was driven by a deterioration on the *Ongoing Conflict* domain.

Border skirmishes erupted between the Democratic Republic of Congo and Zambia, which left two troops dead in mid-2020, and promoted a flurry of diplomatic activity by the Southern African Development Community to resolve the dispute. This led to a severe deterioration on the *neighbouring country relations* indicator. The border area has previously been the site of clashes between the two countries over the past three decades, but tensions were driven to new heights in 2020 when Zambia deployed troops in a disputed border area, leading to claims from the government of the DRC that the Zambian government was trying to annex part of the disputed territory.

The *Militarisation* domain also deteriorated owing to increased *weapons imports* and significantly increased *military expenditure*. As a percentage of GDP, *military expenditure* in Zambia increased from 1.62 per cent in 2019, to 1.94 per cent in 2020. However, despite the deterioration in the *Ongoing Conflict* and *Militarisation* domains, there was a slight improvement in the *Safety and Security* domain, owing to an improvement in the *terrorism impact* indicator and a small increase in the percentage of people who state that they feel safe walking alone at night.

## Azerbaijan

Rank: 121

CHANGE IN SCORE 2020-21:

**0.122**

CHANGE IN RANK 2020-21:

▼ 6

Azerbaijan recorded the fifth largest deterioration on the 2021 GPI, with its overall score falling 5.6 per cent. The country is now ranked 121<sup>st</sup> globally on the index after falling six places in the rankings. Azerbaijan's deterioration in peacefulness was driven by an escalation in its conflict with Armenia over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region. The country's score deteriorated across all three GPI domains.

The deterioration in the *Ongoing Conflict* domain was primarily the result of a fall in the *neighbouring countries relations* indicator. Relations between Azerbaijan and Armenia significantly deteriorated due to the violent escalation of tensions over the breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh, internationally recognised as part of Azerbaijan, but with a 95 per cent ethnic Armenian population. The conflict spanned from September 27<sup>th</sup> 2020 to November 9<sup>th</sup> 2020 when it was ended with a trilateral ceasefire agreement between Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia. The armed confrontation resulted in more than 6,000 casualties from both sides, including civilians.

The conflict in the Nagorno-Karabakh region also resulted in a significant increase in the number of *refugees and IDPs* in Azerbaijan, and a resulting deterioration on the *Safety and Security* domain. It is estimated that over 6.5 per cent of Azerbaijan's population are either internally displaced or refugees.


# The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Peace



The COVID-19 pandemic had a significant impact on the level of conflict and violence in the world in 2020, with some of these effects likely to last for years to come. While it was initially thought that the main impact of the pandemic would be to reduce violence around the world, this proved to be true for only some indicators of violence. Although key indicators of internal conflict did decrease in 2020, the impact of the pandemic on active conflicts was short-lived, and the total level of political and civil unrest rose over the past year.

FIGURE 1.4


Map of COVID-19 related violent incidents, January 2020 to April 2021



Source: ACLED COVID-19 Disorder Tracker ([acleddata.com](http://acleddata.com)), IEP calculations

Figure 1.4 shows a map of COVID-19 related violent incidents from January 2020 to April 2021. There were over 5,000 pandemic-related incidents during this period that involved some form of violence, ranging from violent demonstrations and riots in response to lockdown measures, to physical

assaults targeted at people of Asian descent. There were at least 158 countries that recorded one or more violent incidents directly related to the pandemic during this time.




Violent events related to the pandemic peaked in April 2020, as shown in Figure 1.5. However, although the number of events had declined significantly by August of the same year, the number of violent events per month has remained consistent since that time. There was an average of 200 violent pandemic-related events per month from August 2020 to April 2021. There were also 805 pandemic-related fatalities from January 2020 to April 2021.

This sub-section outlines the impact that the pandemic has had on different types of violence and conflict. While COVID-19 had the biggest impact on civil unrest and political instability, it also had a significant impact on feelings of safety and interpersonal violence.

**FIGURE 1.5**  
**COVID-19 violent incidents and fatalities, January 2020 to April 2021**

Violent incidents related to the pandemic peaked in April 2020.



Source: ACLED COVID-19 Disorder Tracker, IEP calculations

### Civil Unrest

Although there was an initial fall in civil unrest and demonstrations at the start of the pandemic, the number of demonstrations worldwide surged after this initial lull. The total number of protest events worldwide increased in 2020, and although not every demonstration was directly related to the pandemic, it was a key driver of civil unrest across many countries, most notably in Europe.

In the Netherlands, the government imposed a curfew which sparked riots described as the worst in more than 40 years.<sup>10,11</sup> In one instance, protestors used a pipe bomb to damage a COVID-19 testing centre.<sup>12</sup> Spain, Italy, Germany and Ireland also saw violent anti-lockdown demonstrations in which protesters threw objects at police, broke storefront windows, set bins on fire and ignited smoke bombs.<sup>13,14,15,16</sup>

Not every pandemic-related demonstration has had an anti-lockdown motivation. In some countries, a perceived lax response from governments to the pandemic became the trigger for anti-government demonstrations. In Belarus, the

government's refusal to acknowledge the severity of the COVID-19 pandemic and subsequent impact on the healthcare system was a key driver of civil unrest. Likewise, riots broke out in Chile after a swift rise in the unemployment rate.<sup>17</sup> In Lebanon, the lack of sufficient economic support from the government was one of the key drivers of unrest.

The pandemic has been used as a pretext for government repression and *political terror* in some countries. In Russia, several protest organisers have been placed under house arrest for violating public health measures related to COVID-19.<sup>18</sup> Hundreds of individuals have been prosecuted for allegedly spreading false information about the pandemic.<sup>19</sup> In Egypt, several medical staff were detained for spreading fake news under terrorism laws for speaking about the lack of personal protective equipment and lack of COVID-19 testing for medical staff.<sup>20</sup> In India, police detained an oncologist for posting pictures of medical staff wearing raincoats due to a lack of personal protective gear.<sup>21</sup> In Uganda, security forces arrested opposition leader Robert Kyagulanyi for breaching COVID-19 restrictions. They also used tear gas and live bullets against anti-government protesters, killing 54 and injuring 45.<sup>22</sup>

Excessive force has also been used to enforce lockdowns and movement restriction laws. In Kenya, police killed seven people in attempts to enforce a curfew.<sup>23</sup> In South Africa, an individual was killed by the military for alleged breaches of lockdown restrictions,<sup>24</sup> and in another instance, police used rubber bullets to disperse loitering individuals on the first day of quarantine. Security forces killed 16 in Ethiopia amid protests against the arrest of local leaders who allegedly held a meeting in defiance of COVID-19 restrictions. Instances of police violence directly related to COVID-19 have also sparked further violence. Violent demonstrations broke out in Honduras and Mexico after the deaths of individuals in police custody for allegedly breaching COVID-19 restrictions.<sup>25</sup>

### Homicide and Violent Crime

Although data for homicide and violent crime in 2020 is only available for a select number of countries, the same pattern has been observed across a number of regions. There were sharp reductions in homicide and street level violent crime, such as robbery in the immediate aftermath of lockdown measures in Colombia, Guatemala and Honduras. Smaller falls were observed in a number of European countries, and the number of homicide victims in South Africa fell by almost 50 per cent, and by almost 80 per cent in Kazakhstan.<sup>26</sup> However, in most countries the number of homicides per month returned to the same level as previous years once lockdown measures were relaxed. In Mexico, crimes typically associated with people's everyday movements, such as robberies, assaults, kidnappings and extortion, all experienced notable improvements in 2020.

Not every country saw drops in homicide and violent crime.

In Mexico and Brazil, lockdowns did not have a significant impact on the number of homicides, with the number of homicides per month falling only slightly. In Chile there was an initial drop in the number of homicides, which was quickly followed by a sharp increase in the six months after lockdown measures were brought in.

### ***Suicide***

The exact impact of the pandemic on suicide is unclear. However, it has clearly exacerbated many of the risk factors for suicide such as social isolation and financial stress. Unemployment is associated with a twofold to threefold increase in the risk of suicide and changes in levels of unemployment are often accompanied by corresponding changes in the suicide rate.<sup>27</sup> However, there is often a short-term decrease in suicide following a disaster, followed by an increase in the suicide rate.<sup>28</sup> This pattern appears to be holding in countries like Japan, where the suicide rate has begun to increase after initially decreasing.<sup>29</sup> Other indicators of increased suicide risk have seen large increases. In the US, calls to crisis hotlines increased by 891 per cent from 2019 to 2020.<sup>30</sup>

The full impact of the pandemic on suicide may not fully subside for years or even decades. It is estimated that suicide rates may persist at 25 per cent above their pre-pandemic levels for many years to come,<sup>31</sup> although this will be affected by the strength of the economic recovery. In other disaster situations, long-term increases in depression and anxiety for strongly affected populations have persisted for decades.

### ***Feelings of Safety and Hate Crime***

There has been a sharp increase in violent crime targeting the Chinese diaspora and other people of Asian descent as a result of the pandemic.<sup>32</sup> The attacks have ranged in severity from verbal harassment, vandalism, spitting to physical assault.<sup>33</sup> In Vancouver, there was a 717 per cent increase in recorded hate crimes from 2019 to 2020, with a third of

Chinese-Canadians reporting that they had been physically harassed during the pandemic.<sup>34</sup> In Australia, nearly 85 per cent of Asian-Australians reported at least one instance of discrimination throughout 2020. Overt anti-Asian sentiment also surged on social media platforms over the past year.

Although the pandemic has primarily led to an increase in discrimination targeted at Asians, reports are emerging that other minority groups are becoming the victims of hate. For example, in India and Sri Lanka, Muslims are increasingly becoming targets of COVID-19 discrimination. Likewise, in China, many Africans have been forcefully evicted or forced to self-isolate and quarantine, while individuals belonging to other ethnic groups have not.<sup>35</sup>

### ***Domestic Violence***

There have been significant increases in domestic violence across a number of countries following the implementation of pandemic-related lockdown orders.<sup>36</sup> The implementations of lockdowns and other restriction of movement policies have meant that victims and perpetrators have remained in close proximity for extended periods of time, with victims cut-off from support services. It is estimated that 243 million people experienced domestic violence in 2020.

The exact extent to which domestic violence has increased is difficult to assess. Some indicators of domestic violence such as emergency room admissions decreased, as visiting healthcare facilities became more difficult owing to movement restrictions. By contrast, calls to domestic violence helplines increased by 20 to 50 percent in many countries,<sup>37</sup> with internet searches related to domestic violence support services also increasing. This pattern of increasing domestic violence mirrors the trend often seen in the wake of large scale catastrophes such as bushfires, earthquakes, or hurricanes.<sup>40</sup>

# 2 | TRENDS



## KEY FINDINGS

- Since 2008, the level of global peacefulness has deteriorated by two per cent, with 75 countries recording a deterioration, while 86 improved.
- The average level of global peacefulness has deteriorated for nine of the past 13 years.
- The gap between the least and most peaceful countries continues to grow. Since 2008, the 25 least peaceful countries declined on average by 12.1 per cent, while the 25 most peaceful countries improved by 4.3 per cent.
- Conflict in the Middle East has been the key driver of the global deterioration in peacefulness since 2008.
- Of the three GPI domains, two recorded a deterioration, while one improved. *Ongoing Conflict* deteriorated by 6.2 per cent and *Safety and Security* deteriorated by 2.5 per cent. However, *Militarisation* improved by 4.2 per cent.
- The improving trend in *Militarisation* was widespread, with 111 of the 163 countries covered in the GPI improving. Eighty-seven countries reduced their *military expenditure* as a percentage of GDP, although military spending increased in absolute terms.
- However, since 2014 there has been little improvement and there are now signs that militarisation is increasing.
- The number of forcibly displaced people increased from just over 40 million in 2007, to over 84 million in 2020.
- The indicator with the largest deterioration globally was the *terrorism impact* indicator. Ninety countries recorded an increase in terrorist activity since 2008. However, the total number of deaths from terrorism has been falling globally since 2014.
- Although the number of conflicts and deaths from conflict have been falling, the long-term impact of conflict remains high.
- Demonstrations, general strikes, and riots rose 244 per cent between 2011 and 2019, with 61 countries recording a deterioration, while 27 countries recorded an improvement.
- 2021 was the first year since 2010 that the indicators for intensity of conflict and number of conflicts improved. Since 2010, the number of conflicts globally has increased by 88 per cent.

# GPI Trends



The world is considerably less peaceful now than it was in 2008, with the average level of country peacefulness deteriorating by two per cent over the last decade. Peacefulness has declined year-on-year for nine of the last thirteen years.

Since 2008, 75 countries have become less peaceful, compared to 86 that have improved. Figure 2.1 highlights the overall trend in peacefulness from 2008 to 2021, as well as the year-on-year percentage change in score.

Most of the deterioration in peacefulness over the last decade occurred in the MENA region. If this region was excluded from the analysis, the average level of peace would have improved. This improvement also takes into account the positive flow-on effects in other countries, such as less forced migration and less terrorism.

Even within the MENA region, the deterioration in the last decade was concentrated in a handful of countries, most notably Syria, Yemen and Libya, whose overall scores deteriorated by more than


40 per cent. However, although there has been relatively little variation in peacefulness outside of MENA, there are some concerning trends in the more peaceful regions of the world.

Europe is ranked as the most peaceful region in the world and is slightly more peaceful now than in 2008. However, over this period the *Safety and Security* and *Ongoing Conflict* domains have deteriorated. *Militarisation* was the only domain to improve. Most strikingly, just under half of the countries in Western Europe and most of the Nordic countries are less peaceful now than in 2008. Despite its high level of peacefulness overall, Europe has seen significant deteriorations in the *intensity of internal conflict, terrorism impact, neighbouring country relations, violent demonstrations and political instability*.

FIGURE 2.1

## GPI overall trend and year-on-year percentage change, 2008–2021


Peacefulness has declined year-on-year for nine of the last thirteen years.



Source: IEP

### KEY FINDINGS

#### DETERIORATED & IMPROVED COUNTRIES SINCE 2008



#### DETERIORATIONS IN PEACE ARE LARGER THAN IMPROVEMENTS.

**12.1% ↑**  
**4.3% ↓**

Since 2008, the 25 least peaceful countries declined on average by 12.1 per cent, while the 25 most peaceful countries improved by 4.3 per cent.

The gap in peace between the most and least peaceful countries has widened since 2012, as shown in Figure 2.2. The deterioration in peacefulness has been considerably larger in countries that fell into war. Except for Russia, the bottom ten countries are all affected by substantial conflicts. Once countries are stuck in a conflict trap it is very difficult to substantially improve.


While there has been some fluctuation in the level of peacefulness of the world's most peaceful countries, on average they improved in peacefulness, recording a 4.3 per cent improvement.

By contrast, the world's least peaceful countries have experienced a clear and sustained deterioration in peacefulness over the last decade, with the average level of peacefulness deteriorating by almost 12 per cent. However, they did record an improvement in peacefulness over the past year, for the first time since 2011.

FIGURE 2.2

### Trend in peace, 2008–2021, 25 most and 25 least peaceful countries

The 25 least peaceful countries deteriorated in peacefulness by an average of 12.1 per cent, while the most peaceful improved by 4.3 per cent.



Source: IEP

#### PEACE DETERIORATION



The average level of global peacefulness has deteriorated by 2 per cent since 2008.

#### MILITARISATION DOMAIN



**63%**

The improving trend in Militarisation was widespread, with 111 of the 163 countries covered in the GPI improving.

#### DETERIORATIONS IN OVERALL PEACEFULNESS



Conflict in the Middle East and North Africa has been the key driver of the global deterioration in peacefulness since 2008.

# Domain Trends



The Global Peace Index (GPI) measures peacefulness across three domains: **Safety and Security**, **Ongoing Conflict** and **Militarisation**. While the world has become less peaceful over the last decade, there have been some notable improvements in peace. The average country score on the **Militarisation** domain improved by 4.2 per cent, driven largely by reductions in military spending as a percentage of GDP and the size of the armed forces in many countries. However, there has been little improvement in this domain since 2014, and there are some signs that the level of **Militarisation** is now beginning to increase. The **Safety and Security** domain deteriorated by 2.5 per cent, and the **Ongoing Conflict** domain also deteriorated, falling by 6.2 per cent, as shown in Figure 2.3.

Figure 2.4 shows the percentage change in score for each indicator from the 2008 to the 2021 GPI. Of the 23 GPI indicators, 15 recorded a deterioration with the remaining eight recording an improvement. Only four indicators had an overall change of more than ten per cent. *Terrorism impact, refugees and IDPs, and violent demonstrations* all deteriorated by more than ten per cent, while *UN peacekeeping funding* was the only indicator to record an improvement of that magnitude.


“

Of the three GPI domains, two recorded a deterioration, while one improved. Ongoing Conflict deteriorated by 6.2 per cent and Safety and Security deteriorated by 2.5 per cent. However, Militarisation improved by 4.2 per cent.

FIGURE 2.3

## Indexed trend in peacefulness by domain, 2008 to 2021 (2008=1)

Militarisation was the only domain to record an improvement since 2008.




Source: IEP

FIGURE 2.4

## Percentage change by indicator, 2008–2021

The terrorism impact indicator had the largest deterioration from 2008 to 2021.



Source: IEP

## SAFETY & SECURITY

The *Safety and Security* domain deteriorated 2.5 per cent between 2008 and 2021. Of the 11 domain indicators, nine deteriorated and two improved. The largest deterioration occurred on the *terrorism impact* indicator, with 90 countries seeing the impact of terrorism increase between 2008 and 2021.

The *homicide rate* indicator had the largest improvement, with 116 countries recording an improvement. The average homicide rate fell from 7.8 to 6.5 per 100,000 over the past thirteen years.

After *terrorism impact*, the *refugees and IDPs* indicator had the second most significant deterioration, with the total number of forcibly displaced people increasing from just over 40 million in 2007, to over 84 million in 2020. The impact was felt most in a relatively small number of countries, with the biggest increases in Syria, the Central African Republic and Yemen. In all of these countries the number of refugees or IDPs increased by over ten percentage points.

There was also a considerable increase in the number of *violent demonstrations*, which rose 244 per cent between 2011 and 2019. Europe recorded the largest number of protest events globally with 1600 protest events recorded between 2011 and 2018. Figure 2.5 shows the trend for key indicators on the *Safety and Security* domain.

The *homicide rate* indicator had the largest improvement of any *Safety and Security* indicator over the past decade, with 116 countries reducing their homicide rate since 2008. This occurred despite substantial increases in homicides for some countries, especially in Central America. There are now 28 countries globally

that have a homicide rate of less than one per 100,000 people, and 57 which have a rate under two per 100,000. The largest improvements in homicide occurred in Guatemala, Jamaica, Russia and Colombia, with the largest deteriorations occurring in Mexico, Uruguay, Brazil and Costa Rica.

Although the impact of terrorism surged between 2008 and 2014, deaths from terrorism have been falling for the past six years. Total deaths from terrorism rose from 8,374 in 2008 to just over 35,500 in 2014. However, preliminary estimates for 2020 indicate that deaths from terrorism have now dropped to less than 10,000. The fall in deaths from terrorism has been mainly driven by the military defeat of ISIL in Iraq and Syria and the military interventions against Boko Haram in Nigeria.

The epicentre of terrorism has now shifted out of the MENA region and into sub-Saharan Africa, with countries as far south as Mozambique seeing surges in terrorism in the past two years. Terrorism is also still a global concern. In the 2021 GPI, only 30 countries had not experienced any terrorism in the preceding five years, down from 48 in the 2008 GPI.


Despite the improvements in homicide, terrorism and other indicators of *Safety and Security* over the past five years, the number of forcibly displaced people has continued to climb, having risen almost every year since 2008. There are now over 84 million refugees, internally displaced people, asylum seekers, and other populations that have been forcibly displaced in some way by conflict. The number of forcibly displaced people more than doubled between 2007 and 2020.

When measured as a percentage of the population, there are now 16 countries where at least five per cent of the population are either refugees or internally displaced. Somalia and the

FIGURE 2.5

## Trends in key safety and security indicators

Over 80 million people globally have been forcibly displaced.



Source: EIU, UNHCR, IDMC, UNODC, IEP Calculations

Central African Republic both have more than 20 per cent of their population displaced, while South Sudan has over 35 per cent of its population displaced. However, the extent of displacement is greatest in Syria, where the impact and aftermath of the Syrian civil war has led to almost 80 per cent of the entire population being either internally displaced or refugees at the end of the war. Regionally, displacement has had the broadest impact in sub-Saharan Africa. Over one per cent of the population has been forcibly displaced in 17 of the 43 sub-Saharan African countries.

The level of civil unrest has also risen substantially since 2008. The number of anti-government demonstrations, general strikes and riots rose by 244 per cent between 2011 and 2019, and 61 countries had a deterioration on the *violent demonstrations* indicator from 2008 to 2021, compared to just 27 countries that recorded an improvement over the same period. Central America and the Caribbean was the only region to record an improvement since 2008.

It seems likely that the trend of increasing *violent demonstrations* will continue in the near future. Lockdowns and other movement restrictions stemming from the COVID-19 pandemic initially led to a fall in the number of demonstrations. However, the level of protest activity surged shortly after and has remained at pre-pandemic levels or higher in most countries. Several countries saw record numbers of people protesting in 2020, most notably in the United States.

### ONGOING CONFLICT

*Ongoing Conflict* had the largest deterioration of any domain on the GPI, deteriorating by 6.2 per cent between 2008 and 2021. Five of the six *Ongoing Conflict* indicators deteriorated, with only *deaths from external conflict* recording an improvement. In total, 83 countries recorded a deterioration in this domain, with 65 recording an improvement and 13 registering no change.

More countries are now involved in at least one conflict as well. In 2008, 12 countries were not involved in any conflicts and had no disputes with neighbouring countries. This number had fallen to nine countries by 2021. Figure 2.6 shows the trend for three key conflict indicators: the total number of battle deaths, total number of conflicts, and the average score on the *intensity of internal conflict* indicator.

The indicator with the most notable variation in the past few years

on the *Ongoing Conflict* domain has been the number of conflict deaths, which first increased and then fell. Conflict deaths rose by 632 per cent between 2006 and the peak in 2014, when over 144,000 deaths were recorded. However, the number of deaths has fallen 47 per cent since then, to just over 76,000 in 2019.

The dramatic increase was concentrated in a handful of countries, with the majority of the deaths attributable to the war in Syria. There were also significant increases in deaths in Afghanistan, Iraq and Yemen.

The largest fall in deaths since 2015 occurred in Syria, Nigeria, Pakistan, Iraq and the Central African Republic. Afghanistan is one of the few countries where the number of deaths has not decreased over the past few years, with the scope and intensity of the conflict there actually increasing since 2014. Afghanistan is now the country with the highest total number of *deaths from internal conflict*.

While the number of deaths from conflict has been declining since 2015, the total number of conflicts has continued to rise, from 90 in 2006 to 152 in 2019. This includes state-based violence, non-state violence and one-sided violence. Non-state violence is conflict between two armed groups within a country, neither of which is a state. One-sided violence is the organised use of armed force by the state against civilians, excluding extra-judicial killings.

While the number of one-sided conflicts remained relatively constant, both state-based and non-state conflicts increased significantly. State-based conflicts rose from 33 to 54, while non-state violent conflicts increased by over 100 per cent, rising from 29 in 2006 to 67 in 2019. However, the total number of conflicts has begun to fall over the past few years, most notably non-state conflicts, which are now at their lowest level since 2013.

The average *intensity of internal conflict* has also been rising, even as the total number of *deaths from internal conflict* has been declining. This has been driven by conflict becoming more widespread, even as the intensity of major conflicts such as those in Syria and Iraq continues to decrease.

The average *intensity of internal conflict* indicator score increased from 2.29 to 2.51. A score of one on this indicator for a single country indicates that there is no conflict. A score of two indicates that there is a strong ideological conflict within that country, while a score of three indicates open conflict, with the existence

FIGURE 2.6

## Trends in key ongoing conflict indicators

While battle deaths have fallen since 2014, the number and intensity of conflicts continued to increase.



Source: UCDP, EIU, IEP Calculations

of explicit threats of violence between different groups in that country. In 2008, 104 countries had a score of two or less on this indicator, suggesting no conflict or only latent conflict. By 2021, this number had fallen to 89. The number of countries with a score of four or higher, which indicates the existence of openly violent internal conflict, rose from 29 in 2008 to 35 in 2021.

## MILITARISATION

The *Militarisation* domain was the only one of the three GPI domains to record an improvement from 2008 to 2021. The average score on this domain improved by 4.2 per cent over this period, with 111 countries recording an improvement and 50 deteriorating. Five of the six indicators on the *Militarisation* domain improved, with only the *weapons imports* indicator recording a deterioration.

The most noticeable improvements occurred on the *military expenditure as % of GDP* indicator, where 100 countries improved, and the *armed forces rate* indicator, where 111 countries improved. Figure 2.7 shows the trend for the *armed forces rate* and *military expenditure* indicators, as well as the average weapons imports per capita indicator score.

The improvements in both the *armed forces rate* and *military expenditure* were particularly notable in some of the largest militaries in the world. Of the five countries with the largest total military expenditure – the United States, China, Saudi

Arabia, India, and Russia – all five had falls in their armed service personnel rates, and China and the US also had concurrent reductions in military expenditure as a percentage of GDP. From 2008 to 2021, the average *armed forces rate* fell from 463 to 394 soldiers per 100,000 people.

*Military expenditure* as a percentage of GDP improved in 87 countries between 2008 and 2021. It improved on average for five of the nine regions, with the biggest average improvement occurring in the Asia-Pacific region, where average *military expenditure* fell 1.2 percentage points. The largest increase by region occurred in the MENA region and South Asia, where average military expenditure as a percentage of GDP rose 1.4 percentage points from 2008 to 2021. *Military expenditure* has also fallen when measured as a percentage of total government spending. In 2020, spending on the military accounted for more than five per cent of government spending in 67 countries, down from 81 in 2008.


While military expenditure has fallen on average as a percentage of GDP, it has risen in absolute terms and on a per capita basis. Total global military spending rose from 1.63 trillion in 2008 to 1.96 trillion in 2020, measured in constant \$US 2019 dollars. This is an increase of almost 20 per cent. This is the sixth consecutive year that total global military expenditure has increased.

There was a slight deterioration in *weapons imports* indicator, the only *Militarisation* indicator to show a deterioration over the

FIGURE 2.7

## Trends in key militarisation indicators

Both the armed forces rate and average military expenditure as a percentage of GDP have fallen since 2008.



Source: IISS, SIPRI, IEP Calculations

past decade. The number of countries that recorded no weapons imports in 2008 was 29. By 2021, that number had fallen to 17. The average per capita value of weapons imports increased the most in MENA. Six of the ten countries with the largest per capita weapons imports are in the MENA region.

*Weapons exports* remain highly concentrated, with 85 countries registering no exports at all from 2008 to 2020. A number of otherwise highly peaceful countries also performed poorly on this indicator, with Sweden, the Netherlands, Switzerland and Norway all ranking among the ten highest weapons exporters per capita in each the last five years. Seven of the ten largest exporters on a per capita basis are western democracies. However, by total export

value, just five countries account for over 75 per cent of total weapons exports: the US, Russia, Germany, France and China, with the US alone accounting for over 30 per cent.

There are some signs that the trend of improving *Militarisation* is beginning to plateau or even reverse. There has been virtually no change in the average *armed forces rate* since 2016, and the average level of *military expenditure* as a percentage of GDP has increased since 2012. The likelihood of some form of conflict between military superpowers has increased considerably over the past few years, which has further raised incentives for countries to increase military spending and expand their military capabilities.

# 3 | THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE



## HIGHLIGHTS

- The global economic impact of violence was \$14.96 trillion PPP in 2020, equivalent to 11.6 per cent of global GDP or \$1,942 per person. The year-on-year increase was primarily due to higher levels of military expenditure.
- The global economic impact of violence worsened for the second year in a row, increasing by 0.2 per cent or \$32 billion from 2019 to 2020. However, it is still \$535.9 billion lower than in 2007.
- In 2020, the economic impact of *Armed Conflict* decreased by 7.6 per cent to \$448.1 billion. The decline was driven by improvements in the number of deaths from terrorism and GDP losses from conflict, which fell by 17.5 per cent and 13.7 per cent, respectively. This is the lowest impact since 2013.
- Syria, South Sudan and Afghanistan incurred the highest relative economic cost of violence in 2020, equivalent to 81.7, 42.1 and 40.3 per cent of GDP, respectively.
- In the ten countries most economically affected by violence, the average economic cost was equivalent to 35.7 per cent of GDP. In the ten most peaceful countries, the average economic cost of violence was equal to just 4.2 per cent of GDP.
- The economic impact of refugees and internally displaced persons was more than three times higher than the GDP losses from conflict.
- North Korea, Cuba and Burkina Faso were the countries with the steepest increases, all recording increases above 80 per cent, while Equatorial Guinea, Venezuela and Libya recorded the largest decreases, all above 30 per cent.
- From 2007 to 2020, 81 countries decreased their economic cost of violence while 82 increased their cost.
- The economic impact of suicide was \$683.9 billion and represented 4.6 per cent of the global total. This is higher than all of the *Armed Conflict* indicators combined and increased by 0.9 per cent from the prior year.
- In 2020, the economic impact of violence improved across four regions — MENA, South America, Central America and the Caribbean and Russia and Eurasia.
- Central America and the Caribbean region recorded the largest improvement in its economic impact in 2020, improving by 7.6 per cent, mainly driven by reductions in the number of refugees and displacements. However, since 2007 its overall deterioration of 46.2 per cent is the largest of any region.

# The Economic Value of Peace



**In 2020, the economic impact of violence on the global economy amounted to \$14.96 trillion in constant purchasing power parity (PPP) terms. This is equivalent to 11.6 per cent of global GDP or \$1,942 per person. In 2020, the economic impact of violence increased for the second year in a row, rising by 0.2 per cent or \$32.5 billion from the previous year.**

The global economic impact of violence is defined as the expenditure and economic effect related to "containing, preventing and dealing with the consequences of violence." The economic impact of violence provides an empirical basis to better understand the economic benefits resulting from improvements in peace.

Violence and the fear of violence create significant economic disruptions. Violent incidents incur costs in the form of property damage, physical injury or psychological trauma. Fear of violence also alters economic behaviour, primarily by changing investment and consumption patterns. Expenditure on preventing and dealing with the consequences of violence diverts public and private resources away from productive activities and towards protective measures. Violence generates significant economic losses in the form of productivity shortfalls, foregone earnings and distorted expenditure. Measuring the scale and cost of violence and violence containment, therefore, has important implications for assessing the effects it has on economic activity.

The model contains 18 indicators. Many contain multiple components, for example, internal security expenditure consists of police services, law courts, prisons, and other national public safety expenditures and costs from violence.

The economic impact of violence includes many indicators that are contained in the GPI, such as military expenditure, conflict deaths and homicides. However, the model also includes costs that are not incorporated into the GPI, such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) expenditure on refugees and IDPs, losses from conflict, suicide and internal security expenditure.

The total economic impact is broken down into three categories: direct costs, indirect costs and a multiplier effect.

The direct costs associated with violence include the immediate consequences on the victims, perpetrators, and public systems including health, judicial and public safety. The indirect cost of violence refers to longer-term costs such as lost productivity, resulting from the physical and psychological effects and the impact of violence on the perception of safety and security in society. The multiplier effect represents the economic benefits that would be generated by the diversion of expenditure away from sunk costs, such as incarceration spending, into more productive alternatives that would better improve the economy. For more details on the peace multiplier, see Box 3.1. A comprehensive explanation of how the economic impact of violence is calculated is provided in Appendix B.


## THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF PEACE 2020

The economic impact of violence increased by 0.2 per cent over the last year, mainly driven by increases in military expenditure. Table 3.1 presents a full breakdown of the costs included in the 2020 economic impact estimate and the difference from the previous year. A fall in the severity of armed conflict in the MENA region resulted in positive flow-on effects on the economic impact of conflict, terrorism, and refugees and IDPs, all of which had a lower impact in 2020 compared to the previous year.

Figure 3.1 displays the breakdown of the total economic impact of violence by category for 2020. The single largest component was global military expenditure at \$6.4 trillion, representing 42.9 per cent of the total impact. Globally, military expenditure increased by 3.7 per cent in 2020, the equivalent of \$226.2 billion.<sup>1</sup> However, this was primarily driven by increases from the US, China, and India. In 2020, more countries increased their military expenditure from the previous year, with 112 countries increasing, while 48 countries reduced spending.

**FIGURE 3.1  
Breakdown of the global economic impact of violence, 2020**

Government spending on the military and internal security comprises almost three-quarters of the global economic impact of violence.



Source: IEP

Internal security expenditure was the second largest component, comprising 31.3 per cent of the global economic impact of violence, at \$4.7 trillion. Internal security expenditure includes spending on the police and judicial systems as well as the costs associated with incarceration. Internal security spending decreased by 2.3 per cent in 2020, the equivalent of \$112.7 billion.<sup>2</sup> In 2020, more countries increased their internal security expenditure from the previous year, with 84 countries increasing, while 79 countries reduced spending.

Expenditure on private security is the third largest category in the model and comprises 7.9 per cent of the total. Private security incorporates the cost of security personal globally. In 2020, the impact was \$1.2 trillion.

Homicide is the fourth largest component comprising 6.7 per cent of the global economic impact of violence at one trillion, improving by 4.5 per cent or \$47.6 billion. Improvements in many national *homicide rates* have resulted in a fall in its economic impact. Russia and Brazil both had significant reductions, recording a \$15.1 and \$47.7 billion decline from 2019, respectively.

Suicide, classified as self-inflicted violence resulting in death by the World Health Organization, is included in the model. The economic impact of suicide amounted to \$683.9 billion in 2020 and represented 4.6 per cent of the global total. The economic cost of suicide is higher than all of the *Armed Conflict* indicators combined. It improved by 0.9 per cent in 2020.

The economic impact of violent crime slightly deteriorated in 2020, increasing by 0.2 per cent to \$462.7 billion. Violent crime

comprises violent assault and sexual assault and makes up 3.1 per cent of the total economic impact of violence.

The impact of *Armed Conflict* consists of five categories:

- Internal and external conflict deaths
- GDP losses from conflict
- Country contributions to peacebuilding and receipts from peacekeeping
- The losses from refugees and IDPs
- Deaths and injuries from terrorism.

The impact of *Armed Conflict* was the sixth largest component, comprising three per cent of the global total at \$448.1 billion. In 2020, the impact of *Armed Conflict* improved by 7.6 per cent from the previous year, the equivalent of \$37.1 billion. Of the indicators contained in this domain, the economic impact of terrorism recorded the largest percentage improvement, falling by 17.5 per cent or \$14.9 billion. GDP losses and the economic impact of refugees and IDPs, decreased by 13.7 per cent and 12.5 per cent, respectively.

Small arms, fear of violence, and insecurity are categorised as 'Other' in Figure 3.1. In 2020, these indicators accounted for the remaining 0.6 per cent of the total economic impact of violence.

TABLE 3.1

### **Composition of the global economic impact of violence and year-on-year change, billions PPP, 2020**

Military expenditure is the largest cost in the economic impact of violence.

INDICATOR	DIRECT COSTS	INDIRECT COSTS	THE MULTIPLIER EFFECT	TOTAL	TOTAL 2019	TOTAL 2020	CHANGE (BILLIONS) 2019-2020	CHANGE (%) 2019-2020
Conflict deaths	5.2	0	5.2	10.4	9.9	10.4	0.5	4.50%
Fear	0	64.4	0	64.4	68.8	64.4	-4.3	-6.30%
GDP losses	0	80.3	0	80.3	93.1	80.3	-12.8	-13.70%
Homicide	86.4	826.8	86.4	999.6	1,047.20	999.6	-47.6	-4.50%
Incarceration	73	0	73	145.9	149.3	145.9	-3.4	-2.30%
Internal security expenditure	2,271.30	0	2,271.30	4,542.50	4,651.90	4,542.50	-109.3	-2.40%
Military expenditure	3,209.00	0	3,209.00	6,418.00	6,191.80	6,418.00	226.2	3.70%
Peacebuilding	28.1	0	28.1	56.3	52.4	56.3	3.9	7.40%
Peacekeeping	12.3	0	12.3	24.5	12.8	24.5	11.7	91.80%
Private security	587.3	0	587.3	1,174.70	1,174.40	1,174.70	0.2	0.00%
Refugees and IDPs	3.8	258.5	3.8	266.1	304.3	266.1	-38.2	-12.50%
Small arms	10.2	0	10.2	20.5	19.9	20.5	0.5	2.70%
Suicide	0.9	682	0.9	683.9	677.8	683.9	6.2	0.90%
Terrorism	0.9	8.7	0.9	10.5	12.7	10.5	-2.2	-17.50%
Violent crime	34.9	392.9	34.9	462.7	461.7	462.7	1.1	0.20%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>6,323.40</b>	<b>2,313.60</b>	<b>6,323.40</b>	<b>14,960.40</b>	<b>14,927.90</b>	<b>14,960.40</b>	<b>32.5</b>	<b>0.20%</b>

Source: IEP

## GLOBAL TRENDS IN THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE

Since 2007, the economic impact of violence has decreased by 3.5 per cent. In this period, 82 countries increased their economic cost of violence, whereas 81 decreased. The average increase was 4.5 percentage points, whereas the average decrease was 2.5 percentage points. The average rate of deterioration being higher than the average rate of improvement is expected due to the difficulty in improving and maintaining peace. Furthermore, deteriorations in peacefulness, such as war, can have long-lasting consequences that are still present years after the conflict has subsided.

Additionally, between 2012 and 2017 the economic impact of violence rose by 6.5 per cent peaking at \$15.03 trillion. This increase coincided with the start of the Syrian war and rising violence in Libya, Yemen and other parts of the MENA region. The economic impact of violence began to fall again in 2018, with the defeat of ISIL in Iraq and Syria leading to an improvement in the security situation in the region.

The economic impact of violence has increased for the past two years. However, this has been the result of increased government spending on violence containment as well as increasing private security expenditure, rather than increases in violent conflict. Figure 3.2 illustrates the trend in the global economic impact of violence from 2007 to 2020.

In 2020, the economic impact of violence increased by 0.2 per cent from the previous year. This was the second consecutive year that the impact increased. The economic impact of violence was at its lowest levels in 2015 and 7.3 per cent lower than in 2020. The impact of *Armed Conflict* was 23.8 per cent lower in 2020 compared to 2015. This was driven by decreases in the costs from conflict deaths, terrorism, GDP losses from conflict and the losses from refugees and IDPs. Iraq, Turkey, Pakistan and Syria recorded the largest decrease in the economic impact of *Armed Conflict*, decreasing by \$173.7 billion since 2015.

Expenditure on the military and internal security has increased by \$920.8 billion since 2015 and is the primary reason for the higher impact in 2020. The economic impact of *Armed Conflict* was at its highest levels from 2015 to 2017. This coincided with the height of ISIL. Given that the impact of *Armed Conflict* ranges from three to four per cent of the total economic impact, slight changes in other components of the model such as military expenditure can offset large changes in the impact of *Armed Conflict*. For example, in 2015 the impact of *Armed Conflict* was 31.2 per cent above 2020, the equivalent of \$139.9 billion. However, military expenditure and internal security expenditure were 5.5 and 12.1 per cent below today's level, the equivalent of \$920.8 billion. Consequently, the economic impact of violence was at its lowest level in 2015, primarily driven by lower levels of government expenditure.

FIGURE 3.2

### Trend in the global economic impact of violence and the year-on-year percentage change, 2007–2020

Since 2018, increases in government and private spending on securitisation have driven the rise in the economic impact of violence.



Source: IEP

Table 3.2 shows the change in the economic impact of violence by indicator from the inception of the index to 2020. Since 2007, the economic impact of violence has decreased 3.5 per cent, the equivalent of \$535.9 billion. Due to the difference in indicators, the impact of violence may not replicate the improvements or deteriorations in peacefulness as measured in the GPI.

The trend in the economic impact over time is shown in Figure 3.3. The 18 indicators in the model can be divided into three categories of violent impact: *Interpersonal and Self-Inflicted Violence, Armed Conflict, and Violence Containment*. Box 3.1 shows how the 18 indicators are distributed across these three domains.

*Armed Conflict* has recorded the largest percentage increase having increased by 13.4 per cent from 2007. In contrast, *Interpersonal and Self-Inflicted Violence* decreased by 10.8 per cent over the period and *Violence Containment* decreased by 2.5 per cent. Since 2007, expenditures on private security and internal security have declined by 28.3 and 9.7 per cent. However, increases in military expenditure have offset the decrease in other forms of violence containment expenditure.

“

The global economic impact of violence worsened for the second year in a row, increasing by 0.2 per cent or \$32 billion from 2019 to 2020. However, it is still \$535.9 billion lower than in 2007.

#### BOX 3.1

#### The economic impact of violence by domain

Violence Containment	Armed Conflict	Interpersonal and Self-Inflicted Violence
Military expenditure	Conflict deaths	Homicide
Internal security expenditure	Terrorism deaths and injuries	Violent assault
Security agency	Indirect costs of conflict (GDP losses due to conflict)	Sexual assault
Private security	Losses from status as refugees and IDPs	Fear of crime
Small arms imports	UN Peacekeeping	Suicide
Incarceration Costs	ODA peacebuilding expenditure	
	UNHCR expenditure	

TABLE 3.2

#### Change in the economic impact of violence and percentage change, billions PPP, 2007–2020

The impact of military expenditure is 11.1 per cent higher in 2020 compared to 2007, while internal security expenditure has decreased by 10.3 per cent over the same period.


INDICATOR	2007	2020	CHANGE (BILLIONS) 2007-2020	CHANGE (%) 2007-2020
Conflict deaths	10.7	10.4	-0.3	-3.1%
Fear	71.4	64.4	-7.0	-9.8%
GDP losses	43.8	80.3	36.6	83.5%
Homicide	1,183.3	999.6	-183.7	-15.5%
Incarceration	129.5	145.9	16.4	12.6%
Internal security expenditure	5,062.0	4,542.5	-519.5	-10.3%
Military expenditure	5,775.4	6,418.0	642.5	11.1%
Peacebuilding	62.7	56.3	-6.4	-10.2%
Peacekeeping	9.8	24.5	14.7	149.9%
Private security	1,639.4	1,174.7	-464.8	-28.3%
Refugees and IDPs	246.2	266.1	19.9	8.1%
Small arms	16.7	20.5	3.8	22.9%
Suicide	689.6	683.9	-5.7	-0.8%
Terrorism	22.2	10.5	-11.7	-52.7%
Violent crime	533.5	462.7	-70.7	-13.3%
<b>Total</b>	<b>15,496.2</b>	<b>14,960.4</b>	<b>-535.9</b>	<b>-3.5%</b>

Source: IEP

FIGURE 3.3

### Indexed trend in the economic impact by domain, 2007–2020

In 2020, *Interpersonal and Self-Inflicted Violence* and *Violence Containment* were both lower relative to 2007.



Source: IEP

## THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF INTERPERSONAL AND SELF-INFILCTED VIOLENCE, AND ARMED CONFLICT

The economic impact of *Interpersonal and Self-Inflicted Violence* is the aggregate of homicide, violent and sexual assault, suicide and fear of violence. In 2020, the economic impact of *Interpersonal Violence and Self-Inflicted Violence* on the global economy amounted to \$2.21 trillion. This is equivalent to 1.7 per cent of global GDP, or \$287 per person. Compared to the previous year, it improved by two per cent or \$44.7 billion.

Homicide accounts for approximately 45 per cent of the domain's economic impact, followed by suicide at 31 per cent and assault at 14 per cent. Figure 3.4 provides a detailed breakdown of the economic impact of the domain.

The economic impact of *Armed Conflict* on the global economy in 2020 amounted to \$448.1 billion. The *Armed Conflict* domain includes the costs associated with violence caused by larger groups such as nation-states, militia groups and terrorist organisations in order to achieve political, economic or social objectives or security.<sup>3</sup>

This collective violence includes armed conflict within and between states, violent political repression, genocide and terrorism. The domain also includes the costs associated with the consequences of armed conflict, such as UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding funding. The economic impact of *Armed Conflict* is concentrated across three regions — sub-Saharan Africa, MENA and South America.

FIGURE 3.4

### Composition of the economic impact of Interpersonal Violence and Self-Inflicted Violence, 2020

Homicide comprises almost half of the global economic impact of *Interpersonal and Self-Inflicted Violence*.




Source: IEP

FIGURE 3.5

## Breakdown of the global economic impact of Armed Conflict, 2020

Forced displacement accounts for nearly two thirds of the global economic impact of Armed Conflict.



Source: IEP

In 2020, three countries suffered exceptionally high costs of *Armed Conflict* — Syria, South Sudan and the Central African Republic. At 75 per cent of GDP, Syria recorded the largest economic cost of *Armed Conflict*. South Sudan followed at 37 per cent and the Central African Republic at 31 per cent of GDP. Afghanistan's losses were 28 per cent of GDP.

Refugees and IDPs is the largest component, accounting for approximately 59 per cent of the economic impact of *Armed Conflict*, followed by the GDP losses from conflict at 18 per cent. Figure 3.5 provides a detailed breakdown of the indicators contained in the domain.

## THE COUNTRIES WITH THE HIGHEST ECONOMIC IMPACT

The economic cost of violence for the ten most affected countries ranged from 21 to 82 per cent of their GDP. These countries have high levels of armed conflict, large numbers of internally displaced persons, high levels of interpersonal violence or large militaries. In the ten most peaceful countries, the average economic cost was 4.2 per cent of GDP. Table 3.3 lists the ten most affected countries as a percentage of GDP.

High-intensity conflict-affected countries, such as Syria, Libya, Afghanistan, Somalia, suffer from higher costs from conflict deaths, terrorism, losses from refugees and IDPs and GDP losses from conflict. Additionally, the Central African Republic and Yemen — countries affected by medium-intensity conflict — suffer similar conflict costs, particularly the losses from refugees and IDPs. Colombia and Cyprus also suffered high costs from the losses from refugees and displacements.

El Salvador and Jamaica recorded the highest cost of homicide globally, equivalent to 9.3 and 7.8 per cent of GDP, respectively. Overall, these two countries have the 15<sup>th</sup> and 26<sup>th</sup> highest cost globally.

Equatorial Guinea, Venezuela and Libya were the countries with the steepest decreases, all recording reductions above 30 per cent. All of these countries recorded significant drops in their military expenditure.

TABLE 3.3

## The ten countries with the highest economic cost of violence, percentage of GDP, 2020

In Syria, South Sudan and Afghanistan the economic cost of violence was more than 40 per cent of GDP.

COUNTRY	ECONOMIC COST OF VIOLENCE AS PERCENTAGE OF GDP
Syria	81.7%
South Sudan	42.1%
Afghanistan	40.3%
Central African Republic	37.0%
Somalia	34.9%
North Korea	27.4%
Colombia	27.3%
Yemen	22.7%
Libya	22.0%
Cyprus	21.6%

Source: IEP

North Korea, Cuba and Burkina Faso recorded the largest increases, all above 80 per cent. All of these countries recorded increases in their military expenditure, homicide and internal security expenditure. The economic impact of *Armed Conflict* increased five-fold in Burkina Faso, driven by the costs of terrorism, displacements and conflict deaths.

## THE REGIONAL ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE

Regionally, North America recorded the highest economic impact at \$3.9 trillion, followed by Asia-Pacific and Europe at \$3.3 and \$2.5 trillion, respectively. These three regions have significantly higher levels of expenditure on internal security and the military, which in 2020, made up roughly 80 per cent of each region's total.

In 2020, the economic impact of violence improved across four regions — MENA, South America, Central America and the Caribbean and Russia and Eurasia.

Central America and the Caribbean recorded the largest yearly improvement equal to 7.6 per cent and was driven by a reduction in the number of refugees and displacements. Within the region, the economic impact of violence of Mexico decreased by \$35 billion, which also contributed to the region's improvement. Figure 3.6 displays the total 2020 economic impact by region and the percentage change in the economic impact from 2019.

The economic impact deteriorated in five regions in 2020, most notably, sub-Saharan Africa. The deterioration in sub-Saharan Africa can be attributed to the rising homicide rate, which subsequently led to an eight per cent increase in the region's overall economic impact. Nigeria recorded the largest increase in its economic impact, which increased by \$40.6 billion in 2020 compared to 2019.

Four regions have increased their economic impact of violence since 2007. Over the 14 years to 2020, no region experienced an increase in its economic impact greater than Central America and the Caribbean, which rose by 46.2 per cent from its 2007 levels.

This was followed by Asia-Pacific, which recorded an 18.1 per cent increase from 2007. Figure 3.7 shows the trend in the economic impact of violence for Central America and the Caribbean compared to the base year 2007.


The composition of violence varies substantially by region, as shown in Figure 3.8. The greatest variation between regions is

military expenditure. This represents 59 per cent of the economic impact for the MENA region and only ten per cent in the Central America and Caribbean region, a difference of 48 per cent. Violent crime, homicide and suicide has the second greatest variation across regions representing more than 30 per cent of the impact of South America and Central America and the Caribbean compared to five per cent in MENA

FIGURE 3.6

### Total economic impact (2020) and change (2019 to 2020) by region

Five of the nine GPI regions recorded an increase in their economic impact of violence.




Source: IEP

FIGURE 3.7

### The regional economic impact of violence indexed to 2007, 2007–2020

Between 2007 and 2019, Central America and the Caribbean recorded the largest increase in the economic impact of violence.




Source: IEP

FIGURE 3.8

## Composition of the regional economic cost of violence, 2020

At the regional level, military expenditure accounts for between ten and 59 per cent of the economic impact of violence.



Source: IEP

Note: Other includes the economic impact from fear and small arms; The composition for each region may not add to 100 per cent due to rounding


### KEY FINDINGS



#### GLOBAL ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE

The global economic impact of violence was \$14.96 trillion PPP in 2020, equivalent to 11.6 per cent of global GDP, or \$1,942 per person.

 **\$1,942** OR  
PER PERSON



#### TEN MOST VS LEAST AFFECTED COUNTRIES

**35.7%** VS **4.2%**

Avg GDP Avg GDP

In the ten countries most economically affected by violence, the average economic cost was equivalent to 35.7 per cent of GDP. In the ten most peaceful countries the average economic cost was 4.2 per cent of GDP.

#### THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF REFUGEES

The economic impact of refugees and internally displaced persons was more than three times higher than the GDP losses from conflict.

# SPENDING ON VIOLENCE CONTAINMENT

Regionally, the per person expenditure on *Violence Containment* is highest in Russia & Eurasia, Europe and North America.


Europe and North America, the two most peaceful regions, spend the most on *Violence Containment* per person. However, they are the two regions with the highest per capita income. At \$3,685 per person, North America far exceeds the per capita spend on *Violence Containment* expenditure than any other region.

Central America and the Caribbean, South Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa have the lowest per capita expenditure. On average, countries in sub-Saharan Africa spend ten times less on violence containment than in MENA. Figure 3.9 shows per capita violence containment spending by region.<sup>4</sup>

FIGURE 3.9

## Per capita containment spending (military and internal security) by region, 2020

Per capita violence containment spending is almost ten times higher in MENA than in sub-Saharan Africa.



Source: IEP

Note: Includes expenditure on private security, internal security and the military

TABLE 3.4

## Military expenditure: total, per capita, percentage of GDP, 2020

Total military expenditure in the US is higher than the next ten highest countries combined.

Country	Military Expenditure (Total, US\$ Billions)	Country	Military Expenditure (Per Capita, US\$)	Country	Military Expenditure (% of GDP)
United States	\$731.8	Qatar	\$2,304.95	North Korea*	24.0%
China	\$261.1	Israel	\$2,218.18	Lebanon	13.5%
India	\$71.1	United States	\$2,217.39	Oman	10.8%
Russia	\$65.1	Singapore	\$1,943.00	Libya	10.5%
Saudi Arabia	\$61.9	United Arab Emirates	\$1,789.14	Saudi Arabia	9.1%
France	\$50.1	Saudi Arabia	\$1,779.62	Palestinian Territories	8.2%
Germany	\$49.3	Kuwait	\$1,578.90	Kuwait	7.1%
United Kingdom	\$48.7	Oman	\$1,557.76	Algeria	7.0%
Japan	\$47.6	Norway	\$1,299.58	Syria	6.1%
South Korea	\$43.9	Australia	\$1,007.32	United Arab Emirates	5.6%

Source: SIPRI, IEP calculations

Note: \*estimated, Veterans affairs spending and interest on military-related debt is excluded

Table 3.4 contains three lists of ten countries highlighting the highest military expenditure for 2020 as a total, per capita, and as a percentage of GDP.

The US spends the most of any country annually on its military. However, from a per capita perspective, the US is only the third-largest spender, spending US\$2,217 per person, the equivalent of 3.5 per cent of its GDP. The countries with the highest per capita spending are Qatar and Israel. Both spend over US\$2,200 per citizen on their militaries. North Korea and Lebanon have the highest percentage of their GDP spent on the military.

# Methodology at a Glance



**The global economic impact of violence is defined as the expenditure and economic effects related to "containing, preventing and dealing with the consequences of violence." The estimate includes the direct and indirect costs of violence, as well as an economic multiplier. The multiplier effect calculates the additional economic activity that would have accrued if the direct costs of violence had been avoided.**

Expenditure on containing violence is economically efficient when it prevents violence for the least amount of spending. However, spending beyond an optimal level has the potential to constrain a nation's economic growth. Therefore, achieving the right levels of spending on public services such as the military, judicial and security is important for the most productive use of capital.

This study includes two types of costs: direct and indirect. Examples of direct costs include medical costs for victims of violent crime, capital destruction from violence and costs associated with security and judicial systems. Indirect costs include lost wages or productivity due to physical and emotional trauma. There is also a measure of the impact of fear on the economy, as people who fear that they may become a victim of violent crime alter their behaviour.<sup>5</sup> Table 3.5 outlines the indicators.

An important aspect of IEP's estimation is the international comparability of the country estimates, thereby allowing cost/benefit analysis of country interventions. The methodology uses constant purchasing power parity international dollars which allows for the costs of various countries to be compared with one another.

IEP estimates the economic impact of violence by aggregating the costs related to violence, armed conflict and spending on military and internal security services. The GPI is the initial point of reference for developing the estimates.

The 2020 version of the economic impact of violence includes 18 variables in three groups.

The analysis presents conservative estimates of the global economic impact of violence. The estimation only includes variables of violence for which reliable data could be obtained. The following are examples of some of the items not counted in the economic impact of violence:

- the cost of crime to business
- judicial system expenditure
- domestic violence
- household out-of-pocket spending on safety and security
- spillover effects from conflict and violence.

The total economic impact of violence includes the following components:

1. **Direct costs** are the cost of violence to the victim, the perpetrator, and the government. These include direct expenditures, such as the cost of policing, military and medical expenses.
2. **Indirect costs** accrue after the violent event and include indirect economic losses, physical and psychological trauma to the victim and lost productivity.
3. **The multiplier effect** represents the flow-on effects of direct costs, such as the additional economic benefits that would come from investment in business development or education, instead of the less productive costs of containing or dealing with violence. Box 3.1 provides a detailed explanation of the peace multiplier used.

TABLE 3.5

## Variables included in the economic impact of violence, 2020

VIOLENCE CONTAINMENT	ARMED CONFLICT	INTERPERSONAL AND SELF-INFILCTED VIOLENCE
1. Military expenditure	1. Direct costs of deaths from internal violent conflict	1. Homicide
2. Internal security expenditure	2. Direct costs of deaths from external violent conflict	2. Violent assault
3. Security agency	3. Indirect costs of violent conflict (GDP losses due to conflict)	3. Sexual assault
4. Private security	4. Losses from status as refugees and IDPs	4. Fear of crime
5. UN peacekeeping	5. Small arms imports	5. Indirect costs of incarceration
6. ODA peacebuilding expenditure	6. Terrorism	6. Suicide



The term **economic impact of violence** covers the combined effect of direct and indirect costs and the multiplier effect, while the **economic cost of violence** represents the direct and indirect cost of violence. When a country avoids the economic impact of violence, it realises a **peace dividend**.

#### BOX 3.1

### The multiplier effect

The multiplier effect is a commonly used economic concept, which describes the extent to which additional expenditure improves the wider economy. Every time there is an injection of new income into the economy this will lead to more spending which will, in turn, create employment, further income and additional spending. This mutually reinforcing economic cycle is known as the “multiplier effect” and is the reason that a dollar of expenditure can create more than a dollar of economic activity.

Although the exact magnitude of this effect is difficult to measure, it is likely to be particularly high in the case of expenditure related to containing violence. For instance, if a community were to become more peaceful, individuals would spend less time and resources protecting themselves against violence. Because of this decrease in violence there are likely to be substantial flow-on effects for the wider economy, as money is diverted towards more productive areas such as health, business investment, education and infrastructure.

When a homicide is avoided, the direct costs, such as the money spent on medical treatment and a funeral, could be

A dollar of expenditure can create more than a dollar of economic activity.

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spent elsewhere. The economy also benefits from the lifetime income of the victim. The economic benefits from greater peace can therefore be significant. This was also noted by Brauer and Tepper-Marlin (2009), who argued that violence or the fear of violence may result in some economic activities not occurring at all. More generally,

there is strong evidence to suggest that violence and the fear of violence can fundamentally alter the incentives for business. For instance, analysis of 730 business ventures in Colombia from 1997 to 2001 found that with higher levels of violence, new ventures were less likely to survive and profit. Consequently, with greater levels of violence it is likely that we might expect lower levels of employment and economic productivity over the long-term, as the incentives faced discourage new employment creation and longer-term investment.

This study assumes that the multiplier is one, signifying that for every dollar saved on violence containment, there will be an additional dollar of economic activity. This is a relatively conservative multiplier and broadly in line with similar studies.

# 4 | PEACE AND PERCEPTIONS OF RISK



## KEY FINDINGS

- One in seven people globally cite crime, violence, or terrorism as the greatest risk to their safety in their daily lives. Only road accidents are cited as a bigger risk.
- Nearly 20 per cent of people surveyed have experienced serious harm from violent crime, or know someone personally who has experienced serious harm, in the past two years.
- Violence is seen as the biggest risk to daily safety in 49 of the 142 countries surveyed by the World Risk Poll. Over 50 per cent of people in Afghanistan, Brazil, South Africa, Mexico, and the Dominican Republic see violence as the greatest risk they face in their daily lives.
- Over 60 per cent of people globally are worried about sustaining serious harm from violent crime in the future.
- Despite the majority of people fearing sustaining harm from violent crime, most people also feel the world is getting safer. Nearly 75 per cent of people globally feel as safe or more safe today than they did five years ago.
- Authoritarian regimes have the highest reported rates of increased feelings of safety, with 35 per cent of people reporting that they felt safer in 2019 than they did in 2014.
- South America had the worst result with over 50 per cent of people surveyed feeling less safe now than five years ago, the highest of any region.
- By contrast, over 50 per cent of people in the Asia-Pacific region feel safer now than five years ago. China had the highest increase in feelings of safety.
- In most countries, perceptions of violence match the risk of being a victim of violence. There is a strong correlation between feeling unsafe and having been a victim of violence or knowing someone who has been a victim.
- The five countries with the largest proportion of people who have experienced violence or know someone who had are all in sub-Saharan Africa. Namibia has the highest rate in the world at 63 per cent, followed by South Africa, Lesotho, Liberia, and Zambia.
- Singapore has the lowest fear of violence in the world. Less than five per cent of Singaporeans report being very worried about being the victim of violent crime.
- Globally, Rwanda has the highest proportion of people who feel safer today than they did five years ago at 67 per cent.

# Introduction



**More than one in seven people globally cite violence, crime, or terrorism as the greatest risk to their safety.**  
**This section of the 2021 GPI report examines the relationship between perceptions of risk, safety, and peacefulness and how these perceptions have changed over time.**

The data in this section have been provided by Lloyd's Register's World Risk Poll. IEP and Lloyd's Register have entered into a multi-year partnership to examine perceptions of risk across the world, particularly those related to violence and conflict. The World Risk Poll is the first global study of worry and risk. It was conducted by Gallup as part of its World Poll and is based on interviews with over 150,000 people, including those living in places where little or no official data exists yet where reported risks are often highest.

The poll, which was conducted in 2019, provides a baseline of global perceptions of risk before the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. The next iteration of the World Risk Poll will be published later this year, providing insight into how people's


perception of their safety and security has changed as a result of COVID-19.

Figure 4.1 gives a summary of the five countries with the highest and lowest responses to each of the four questions from the poll. There are large differences across countries with regard to each of the four questions.

FIGURE 4.1

## World Risk Poll questions on violence, top five and bottom five country responses

Violence is a serious concern in Afghanistan, Brazil, and South Africa.



Source: World Risk Poll, IEP calculations

#### BOX 4.1

#### The World Risk Poll and peacefulness

The World Risk Poll asked over 150,000 people in 142 countries 75 questions relating to their experience and perceptions of risks to their safety. The poll covers a broad range of risk topics, from workplace health and safety to people's experience and fear of political violence. This section of the GPI report focuses on a subset of the full poll, looking in particular at people's perception of the risk of violence. It uses the following questions from the poll to examine people's perceptions of safety and risk. The short names for the questions used in the section are given in parenthesis:

- *Overall, do you feel more safe, less safe, or about as safe as you did five years ago?* (feelings of safety)
- *In your own words, what is the greatest source of risk to your safety in your daily life?* (greatest risk)
- *In general, are you very worried, somewhat worried, or not worried that violent crime could cause you serious harm?* (fear of violence)

- *Have you or someone you know personally experienced serious harm from violent crime in the past two years?* (experience of violence)

In addition, one question from the Gallup World Poll was used:

- *Do you feel safe walking alone in your town or neighbourhood?* (safe walking alone)

In almost every country, researchers spoke to a nationally representative sample of around 1,000 people aged 15 or above. These samples closely matched demographic characteristics of the country's adult population, including age, gender, income, and level of education.

The World Risk Poll is a ten-year project. The next set of interviews, which are currently being conducted, will show how COVID-19 has influenced people's perceptions and experiences of risk.

## GLOBAL PERCEPTIONS OF SAFETY AND RISK

Just under 15 per cent of people globally cite crime, violence, or terrorism as the *greatest risk* to their safety in their daily lives. This is the second most commonly recorded risk, closely following road-related accidents or injuries, as shown in Figure 4.2.


Figure 4.3 shows the global distribution of people who feel that violence is the *greatest risk* to their safety. This feeling is highest in South America, where nearly 50 per cent of people feel that crime, violence, or terrorism is the greatest risk to their safety. The feeling that violence is the *greatest risk* is lowest in the Asia-Pacific region.

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One in seven people globally cite crime, violence, or terrorism as the greatest risk to their safety in their daily lives. Only road accidents are cited as a bigger risk.

FIGURE 4.2  
The greatest risk to people's safety in their daily lives globally

Fifteen per cent of people globally feel that crime, violence, or terrorism is the greatest risk to their safety.




Source: World Risk Poll, IEP Calculations

FIGURE 4.3

## Greatest Risk - Proportion of people who cite crime, violence or terrorism as the greatest threat to their safety in their daily lives

The fear of violence is highest in South America and Southern Africa.




Although many people identify crime, violence, or terrorism as the *greatest risk* to their safety, the majority of poll respondents globally do not think their *feelings of safety* have fallen over the past five years. Over 70 per cent of people feel as safe or safer now than they did five years ago, with only 25 per cent feeling less safe over the same period, as shown in Figure 4.4.

FIGURE 4.4

## Feelings of Safety - Proportion of people who feel less safe, about as safe, or more safe today than they did five years ago

Globally, one quarter of people feel less safe today than they did five years ago.



Source: World Risk Poll, IEP calculations

## EXPERIENCE OF VIOLENCE AND PERCEPTION OF RISK

Around 18 per cent of poll respondents suffered from an *experience of violence*, meaning that they or someone they know had experienced serious harm from violent crime at some point in the last two years. There were significant differences in the *experience of violence* across countries, ranging from just over one per cent of people in Turkmenistan to over 63 per cent of people in Namibia.

Of the 142 countries with data, just six had *experience of violence* rates lower than five per cent, while six countries reported having *experience of violence* rates higher than 50 per cent.


In most countries, perceptions of violence closely match the risk of being a victim of violence. There is a strong correlation between the *fear of violence* and *experience of violence*, as shown in Figure 4.5.

However, in some regions and countries in the world, there is a disproportionate fear of violence that does not match the actual risk of being a victim of violence. For example, 33 per cent of people in Japan are very worried about sustaining harm from violent crime despite only three per cent of people citing that they, or someone they know personally, have experienced serious harm from violent crime. Conversely, in some countries there is a very low fear of violence given the percentage of people who have experienced it. For example, in Sweden nearly 25 per cent of the population recorded an *experience of violence*, but only 11 per cent of Swedes reported feeling very worried about being a victim of violent crime.

FIGURE 4.5

## Experience of violence vs fear of being a victim of violence

There is a strong relationship between experience of violence and fear of violence.



Source: World Risk Poll, IEP Calculations

### PERCEPTIONS OF VIOLENCE

In most countries, perceptions of violence match the risk of being a victim of violence. There is a strong correlation between feeling unsafe and having been a victim of violence, or knowing someone who has been a victim.

# Perceptions by Government Type



**There are significant differences in perceptions of safety across different types of government. A full description of the four government types used in this section is given in Box 4.2.**

### BOX 4.2

#### Government types

IEP uses the government type definitions provided by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), based on country scores from its annual Democracy Index.

The four types of regimes are defined as:

**Full democracies:** Countries in which basic political freedoms and civil liberties are respected by the government, the people and the culture. Elections are free and fair. The government is generally well-functioning and mostly free from bias and corruption due to systems of checks and balances.

**Flawed democracies:** Countries in which elections are free and fair and basic civil liberties are respected. There may be significant weaknesses in other areas of democracy, such as problems in governance, minimal political participation or infringement on media freedom.

**Hybrid regimes:** States that hold elections that are not necessarily free and fair. There may be widespread corruption and weak rule of law, with problems regarding government functioning, political culture and political participation. The media and the judiciary are likely to be under government influence.

**Authoritarian regimes:** Countries in which political pluralism is absent or severely limited, many of which can be characterised as dictatorships. Corruption, infringement of civil liberties, repression and censorship are common. The media and the judiciary are not independent of the ruling regime.

Figure 4.6 summarises the perceptions of risk across the four government types. Flawed democracies have, on average, the highest proportion of people who feel violence is the greatest risk to their safety, with just under 21 per cent of people reporting it as the greatest risk. However, the *experience of violence* is highest among hybrid regimes, where over 25 per cent of people report having had some experience with violent crime.

*Fear of violence* is highest amongst hybrid regimes and flawed democracies, with close to 42 per cent of people in both types of government reporting that they are very worried about being the victim of violent crime. The *fear of violence* is lowest amongst full democracies, where just under 31 per cent of people report feeling very worried.

Hybrid regimes and flawed democracies have also seen the greatest decrease in *feelings of safety*. Thirty-four per cent of people in both these government types report feeling less safe in 2019 than in 2014, with a slightly higher percentage of people in hybrid regimes reporting they felt more safe over the same period.

*Feelings of safety* increased the most in authoritarian regimes with over half of the people reporting that they felt safer now than five years prior. In full democracies, *feelings of safety* were very stable, with 58 per cent of people reporting that they felt about as safe as five years earlier.

## FULL DEMOCRACY


*Feelings of safety* recorded little change amongst full democracies. They also have the smallest proportion of people of any government type who cite crime, violence, or terrorism as the *greatest risk* to their safety, with only 14 per cent of the population identifying it as the greatest daily threat. However, it is still the second most cited risk overall amongst fully democratic countries, with only road accidents cited more often.

*Fear of violence* is lower in full democracies than in any other government type, with 31 per cent of people reporting that they are very worried about being a victim of violence. However, Norway is the only full democracy where less than ten per cent of people report being very worried about violence.

*Experience of violence* is also lower on average in fully democratic countries than any other government type. However, Japan is the only full democracy where the *experience of violence* rate was lower than ten per cent, with Uruguay, Costa Rica, the United States, and Sweden all having experience of violence rates of 25 per cent or more.

FIGURE 4.6

### Summary of perceptions of risk and violence by government type



Source: World Risk Poll, IEP calculations

## FLAWED DEMOCRACY

*Feelings of safety* in flawed democracies has hardly changed compared to five years ago. Thirty-three per cent of people reported that they felt less safe than they did five years ago, compared to 25 per cent who feel more safe. However, the most common response among flawed democracies was feeling as safe as five years ago, at 42 per cent. In 29 of the 47 flawed democracies, over 30 per cent of the population reported feeling less safe in 2019 than they did in 2014.

Violence is a bigger concern to people who live in flawed democracies than in any other government type. Over 20 per cent of people in flawed democracies report that the *greatest risk* to their safety in daily life is violence. In Brazil, South Africa and Mexico, this percentage is over 50 per cent, with Brazil having the highest percentage of people in the world who report that violence is the greatest risk to their safety.

*Fear of violence* in flawed democracies is higher than in full democracies and authoritarian regimes, with 42 per cent of people stating that they are very worried about being a victim of violent crime. Over 50 per cent of people are very worried about violence in more than a third of the 47 countries classified as flawed democracies.

*Experience of violence* is also high amongst flawed democracies. Namibia, South Africa and Lesotho have the largest *experience of violence* rates of any countries in the world. Sixty-three per cent of Namibians have, or know someone personally who has, experienced serious harm from violent crime in the past two years.

## HYBRID REGIME

People in hybrid regimes had the most varied changes in *feelings of safety*. Just over 34 per cent of people feel less safe now than they did five years ago, with 33 per cent feeling as safe, and 28 per cent people feeling more safe. Lebanon, a hybrid regime, has the largest percentage of people globally who feel less safe today than they did five years ago, at 81 per cent.

Violence is reported as the *greatest risk* in hybrid regimes, with 16 per cent of people reporting that it is their greatest threat to safety in daily life. Amongst those countries, Venezuela has the highest percentage of people who view it as the *greatest risk*, at 45 per cent. Safety and security in Venezuela has decreased significantly since 2014, with its score on the *Safety and Security* domain on the GPI deteriorating by 32 per cent over this period.

*Fear of violence* is higher in hybrid regimes than any other government type, with 42 per cent of people reporting that they are very worried about violent crime. However, there is a great deal of variance between hybrid regimes on the *fear of violence*. Over 75 per cent of people in Malawi report feeling very worried about violent crime however, Singapore has the lowest percentage of people who are very worried in the world, at less than five percent.

More people have had an *experience of violence* in hybrid regimes than any other government type, at 26 per cent. However, there was considerable variance between countries in this category, ranging from 57 per cent of people in Liberia, to just four per cent of people in Singapore.

## AUTHORITARIAN REGIME

Authoritarian regimes have the highest reported rates of increases in *feelings of safety*, with 35 per cent of people reporting that they felt safer in 2019 than they did in 2014. Rwanda has the largest proportion of people globally who feel safer today than they did five years ago at 67 per cent, closely followed by China at 65 per cent. Only 5.5 per cent of people in China reported that they feel less safe, the lowest proportion of any country in the world.

Just over 17 per cent of people in authoritarian regimes see violence as the *greatest risk* to their daily safety, the second highest of the four government types. Violence was the most commonly cited *greatest risk* among authoritarian regimes, ahead of road accidents and health concerns. However, in over a third of countries classified as authoritarian regimes, less than ten per cent of people identified violence as their *greatest risk* to safety.

Only full democracies have a lower *fear of violence* than authoritarian regimes, with 36 per cent of people being very worried about being a victim of violent crime. Authoritarian regimes also have the highest percentage of people who report being not worried about violence, at 32 per cent. In Uzbekistan, 69 per cent of people state that they are not worried about being the victim of violent crime, which is the highest proportion of any country across all government types.

Despite the increase in *feelings of safety* and the low *fear of violence*, the *experience of violence* remains high in most authoritarian regimes, with 24 per cent of people reporting that they or someone they know had suffered serious harm from violence in the past two years. However, Turkmenistan has the lowest reported *experience of violence* rate in the world, at one per cent. Afghanistan was the only authoritarian regime with an *experience of violence* rate higher than 50 per cent.

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Authoritarian regimes have the highest reported rates of increased feelings of safety, with 35 per cent of people reporting that they felt safer in 2019 than they did in 2014.

# Perceptions by Region



**Perceptions of violence differ greatly across regions. The contrast is greatest when comparing South America to the Asia-Pacific region, the two regions with the highest and lowest levels of violence-related risk. South America has the highest number of people whose feelings of safety have decreased. It also has the largest proportion of people who do not feel safe walking alone at night and the highest percentage of people who cite violence as the greatest risk to their daily safety.**

By contrast, the Asia-Pacific region has the largest percentage of people who feel safer now than five years ago, and the second lowest percentage of people who report violence as the *greatest risk* to their daily safety.

Figure 4.7 summarises perceptions of violence and risk by region. In most regions, most people feel about as safe today as they did five years ago. However, in South America, Central America and the Caribbean, and sub-Saharan Africa the most common response to the *feelings of safety* question was less safe, with over 50 per cent of people in South America reporting feeling less safe.

*Fear of violence* is highest in South America, where over 60 per cent of people report feeling very worried about becoming a

victim of violent crime. By contrast, in Russia and Eurasia only 21 per cent of people feel very worried.


Violence is most likely to be seen as the *greatest risk* in South America, followed closely by Central America, with 44 and 38 per cent of people respectively reporting it as the greatest risk to their safety. Violence is not considered the *greatest risk* by more than a quarter of the population in any other region.

Although concerns about violence are highest in South America, the actual experience of violence is highest in sub-Saharan Africa, where just under 38 per cent of people have experienced violent crime, or know someone who has, in the past two years.

FIGURE 4.7

## Summary of perceptions of risk and violence by region

Flawed democracies have the highest proportion of people who cite violence as the greatest threat to their safety.




Source: World Risk Poll, IEP calculations

FIGURE 4.8

## Proportion of people who do not feel safe walking home alone at night, by region, 2006–2019

Fear of local violence is increasing in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa.



Source: Gallup World Poll, IEP calculations

The regional trend of the proportion of people who do not feel safe *walking alone* is shown in Figure 4.8. This percentage is highest in South America, where nearly 60 per cent of people feel unsafe walking alone at night in their neighbourhood.

Both South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa recorded increases in the number of people who feel unsafe, with only Russia and Eurasia seeing a significant rise in the number of people who feel *safe walking alone* between 2008 and 2020.

### ASIA-PACIFIC

The Asia-Pacific region has the largest proportion of people globally whose *feelings of safety* have improved, at 36 per cent. The increase in *feelings of safety* was highest in China at 65 per cent, followed by Laos with 61 per cent, and Vietnam with 48 per cent.

Just under nine per cent of people in the Asia-Pacific region cite crime, violence, or terrorism as the *greatest risk* to their safety in their daily lives, the lowest of any region other than Russia and Eurasia. Most people are more concerned about health-related issues and road-related accidents or injuries. Malaysia has the highest proportion of people in the region, who view violence as the *greatest risk* to their safety, at 27 per cent. No other country in the region has more than 20 per cent of its respondents that see violence as their *greatest risk*.

*Fear of violence* in the Asia-Pacific is the fourth lowest of any region, with 30 per cent of respondents reporting that they are very worried about violence. Singapore has the lowest *fear of violence*, with just five per cent of people reporting that they feel very worried. By contrast, although Japan is one of the most peaceful countries in the region and the world, 33 per cent of

people feel very worried about being the victim of violent crime.

*Experience of violence* is also low in the region. Just under 12 per cent of people have had an *experience of violence* in the last two years. Although violence is seen as the greatest risk in Malaysia, the actual *experience of violence* is highest in the Philippines, where just over 28 per cent of people reported suffering serious harm from violent crime, or knowing someone who had, in the last two years.

### CENTRAL AMERICA AND CARIBBEAN

*Feelings of safety* have deteriorated in the Central America and the Caribbean region. Just under 42 per cent of respondents reported that they feel less safe in 2019 compared to 2014, the second highest regional proportion after South America. Costa Rica recorded the largest fall in *feelings of safety*, with 49 per cent of people reporting that they felt less safe.

Violence is perceived as the *greatest risk* to daily safety in the region. Over 38 per cent of people report that crime, violence, or terrorism is the biggest risk they face in their daily lives.

Mexico has the largest proportion of people who cite violence as the largest risk, at 49 per cent. This fear of violence matches the actual increase in violence in Mexico over the past decade, where the homicide rate has been rising steadily over much of the past twenty years.

Fifty-two per cent of people in the region are very worried about being the victim of violent crime, the third highest *fear of violence* rate of any region. Nicaragua is the only country in the region where the percentage of people who are very worried is less than 40 per cent. Almost 69 per cent of Jamaicans report feeling very worried, the highest proportion in the region.

Thirty per cent of people in the region have, or know someone who has, experienced serious harm from violent crime in the last two years. Although total levels of homicide and other types of violence were higher elsewhere, the actual *experience of violence* was most widespread in Jamaica. Forty-seven per cent of Jamaicans reported being the victims of violence, or knowing someone who has been, in the past two years.

## EUROPE

*Feelings of safety* have been relatively stable in Europe. The majority of people in Europe feel about as safe today as they did five years ago, with 57 per cent recording no change in *feelings of safety* between 2014 and 2019. However, there were notable decreases in *feelings of safety* in some countries. Despite being ranked as one of the most peaceful countries in the world on the 2021 GPI, 38 per cent of Swedes reported feeling less safe in 2019 than 2014. There were similar sized falls in *feelings of safety* in Belgium, Greece, and Italy.

Just over 12 per cent of people in the region view violence as the *greatest risk* to their everyday safety. It is the third most identified risk following road-related accidents or injuries and health-related issues. Sweden has the largest proportion of people in Europe who report violence as the greatest risk to their safety, at 26 per cent.

Although Europe is the most peaceful region in the world, the *fear of violence* is higher on average than in North America and Russia and Eurasia, with just over a quarter of European respondents reporting that they are very worried about being a victim of violent crime. The *fear of violence* is lowest in the Nordic countries, with eight per cent of people in Norway and 11 per cent of people in Sweden reporting that they feel very worried.

Despite the low levels of the *fear of violence* in the Nordic countries, the *experience of violence* in Sweden is higher than in any other European country, with 25 per cent of people reporting that they have been or know someone who has been seriously harmed by violent crime in the past two years. Overall, fifteen per cent of European respondents had an *experience of violence* in the past two years.

## MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

*Feelings of safety* in the Middle East and North Africa vary considerably between countries. An equal number of respondents reported that they felt less safe, as safe, and more safe in 2019 compared to 2014.

Lebanon has the largest proportion of people globally who felt less safe in 2019 than they did in 2014, at 81 per cent. *Feelings of safety* also fell in Yemen, with 51 per cent reporting that they felt less safe. Yemen is now the least peaceful country in the region according to the 2021 GPI. By contrast, 58 per cent of people in the UAE reported feeling more safe, the highest proportion in the region.

Although the region has suffered from high levels of conflict over the past decade, violence is not seen as the *greatest risk* by most people with only 14 per cent reporting that violence, crime, or terrorism is the *greatest risk* to their safety in their daily lives. However, there is considerable variation across countries in the region. Over 25 per cent of people in Iraq, Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya see violence as the *greatest risk*, while just five per cent of

the population in Kuwait sees it as the greatest threat to their safety.

Despite being the least peaceful region in the world on the 2021 GPI, the *fear of violence* in the Middle East and North Africa is only the fourth highest of any region. Just over 38 per cent of people report being very worried about violent crime. Although Yemen is the least peaceful country in the region, the *fear of violence* is considerably higher in Morocco, where 64 per cent of people report being very worried, which is the highest percentage of any country in the region.

*Experience of violence* in the region is high, with almost 27 per cent of people in the Middle East and North Africa being victims of violence, or knowing someone was a victim, in the past two years. No country in the region has an *experience of violence* rate lower than 15 per cent, and in Libya, a country that is still suffering from strong civil unrest and political instability, nearly 45 per cent of people have had an *experience of violence* in the past two years.

## NORTH AMERICA

*Feelings of safety* in North America were very stable prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, despite rising civil unrest and political instability over this period. Sixty per cent of people in the region felt as safe in 2019 as in 2014, the highest percentage of any region. This level of stability was higher in Canada than the US, with 65 per cent of Canadians and 55 per cent of Americans reporting no change in their *feelings of safety* over this period.

More people in the US than Canada reported violence as being the *greatest risk* to their safety, with 12 per cent of Americans reporting it as the highest risk, compared to nine per cent of Canadians. This is the lowest of any region in the world except for Asia-Pacific and Russia and Eurasia.

There is also a slight difference between the two countries with regards to *fear of violence*, with 65 per cent of Americans reporting that they are somewhat or very worried about being the victim of violent crime, compared to 58 per cent of Canadians.

*Experience of violence* in both the US and Canada is in line with other countries with similar levels of socio-economic development. Just under 20 per cent of Canadians have had an *experience of violence* or known someone who has in the past two years, compared to 25 per cent of Americans.

## RUSSIA AND EURASIA

Most people in Russia and Eurasia experienced no change in *feelings of safety*, with 48 per cent of people reporting that they felt as safe now as they did five years ago. Turkmenistan was the most stable country in the region with regards to *feelings of safety*, with 75 per cent of people reporting no change in feelings of safety. No country in the region recorded more than 30 per cent of people feeling less safe in 2019 than 2014.

Fewer people in Russia and Eurasia cite violence as their *greatest risk* to safety than any other region, at just six per cent. Russia and Ukraine are the only countries in the region where more than ten per cent of people report that violence is the *greatest risk*, and no country has more than 15 per cent of people cite it as the *greatest risk*.

Despite being one of the least peaceful regions in the world on the 2021 GPI, there is generally a low *fear of violence* in the region. 21 per cent of people report being very worried about being the victim of violent crime, the lowest of any region. In Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, this number drops to less than ten per cent.

Moldova has the highest *fear of violence* in the region, with 38 per cent of people feeling very worried about being a victim of violent crime.

The *experience of violence* in Russia and Eurasia is closely correlated with the *fear of violence*, with most countries having very low reported rates of violence. Every country other than Moldova has an *experience of violence* rate lower than 15 per cent, with just one per cent of people in Turkmenistan reporting that they or someone they know had suffered serious harm from violent crime in the past two years.

## SOUTH AMERICA

*Feelings of safety* fell more in South America than any other region, with over 50 per cent of South American reporting that they felt less safe in 2019 compared to 2014. Over half of the population in Venezuela, Brazil, Paraguay, Argentina, and Chile reported feeling less safe, with no country recording more than 30 per cent of the population feeling more safe.

Over 44 per cent of South Americans report that violence is the *greatest risk* to their safety in their daily lives, the highest proportion of any region. It is by far the most cited risk to safety, and is the most cited risk in every single country in the region. The percentage of people who feel that violence is the *greatest risk* is higher than the global average in every country in the region.

The region also has the highest results for *fear of violence*, with 84 per cent of people being either very or somewhat worried that they will be the victim of violent crime. Brazil had the worst result in the region with just under 95 per cent of Brazilians being either somewhat or very worried about suffering from violence. The fear of violence is lowest in Paraguay, with 68 per cent of people being somewhat or very worried, the only country in the region where the *fear of violence* is lower than the global average.

Although the *fear of violence* is highest in South America, the region does not have the highest *experience of violence*, with a higher percentage of people in Central America and sub-Saharan Africa reporting that they have been the victims of violence, or know someone who has, in the past two years.

However, the *experience of violence* rate in South America is still high, at just under 29 per cent. Over 40 per cent of Brazilians report an *experience of violence* in the past two years, with no country in the region having a rate lower than 20 per cent.

## SOUTH ASIA

*Feelings of safety* vary considerably across South Asia, with a third of the population feeling more safe, as safe, and less safe respectively. Nepal has the highest percentage of people who felt safer in 2019, at 44 per cent. By contrast, 79 per cent of respondents from Afghanistan recorded that they feel less safe in 2019 than they did in 2014. There was a considerable rise in violence and conflict in Afghanistan over that five-year period, with a marked increase in deaths from conflict and terrorism.

Although there is a high level of violence in some parts of South

Asia, it is not seen as the *greatest risk* to safety in the region. More people see road-related accidents or injuries as the greatest risk to their daily safety. The proportion of people who see violence as the *greatest risk* is highest in Afghanistan, at 52 per cent.

Bangladesh and India have the lowest *fear of violence* rates in the region, with 25 and 23 per cent of people respectively being very worried about violent crime. Afghanistan has the highest *fear of violence* in the region, with 53 per cent of people being very worried.

Afghanistan is also the outlier with regards to *experience of violence* in the region. Over 52 per cent of poll respondents from Afghanistan reported suffering or knowing someone suffering serious harm from violent crime, more than double the regional average. Pakistan had the next highest level of *experience of violence*, at 31 per cent.

## SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

*Feelings of safety* have been decreasing in sub-Saharan Africa. 40 per cent of people in the region feel less safe today than they did five years ago, the highest percentage outside of Central and South America. Zambia is the country where *feelings of safety* have decreased the most, with 60 per cent of Zambians feeling less safe. However, there are a number of countries in the region where feelings of safety have increased considerably. Rwanda has the highest proportion of people globally who feel more safe today than they did five years ago, at 67 per cent.

Nearly a quarter of people in sub-Saharan Africa cite crime, violence, or terrorism as the *greatest risk* to their safety in their daily lives, making it the most commonly cited risk in the region. South Africa has the highest proportion of people who cite it as the *greatest risk*, at 52 per cent. There is no country in the region where less than ten per cent of the population identify violence as the *greatest risk* to their daily safety.

*Fear of violence* is higher in sub-Saharan Africa than any other region except South America, with 55 per cent of people reporting that they are very worried about being a victim of violent crime. Madagascar is the only country where less than 20 per cent of people are very worried, with over half of the population being very worried in 21 of the 34 countries in the region.

*Experience of violence* is also higher in sub-Saharan Africa than any other region. Nearly 38 per cent of sub-Saharan Africans have experienced or know someone who has suffered serious harm from violent crime in the past two years. The five countries with the largest proportion of people globally to answer yes to the *experience of violence* question are all in sub-Saharan Africa. The percentage is highest in Namibia, where 63 per cent of respondents had an *experience of violence*. Mauritania was the only country in the region where the *experience of violence* rate was under 20 per cent.

# 5 | POSITIVE PEACE



## KEY FINDINGS

- Countries that have a higher rank in Negative Peace than in Positive Peace are said to have a Positive Peace deficit. This is where a country records a higher level of peacefulness than can be sustained by its level of socio-economic development. Most countries found to be in deficit subsequently record increasing levels of violence.
- Sixty-nine per cent of countries with a Positive Peace deficit of 20 places or more in 2009 had substantial deteriorations in peace between 2009 and 2019.
- When the threshold is raised to 50 places this percentage increases to 90 per cent.
- The ten largest deteriorations in the GPI ranking from 2009 to 2019 were recorded by Libya, Nicaragua, Burkina Faso, Egypt, Syria, Bahrain, Mozambique, Cameroon, Tunisia and Ukraine. Of these countries, seven had large Positive Peace deficits in 2009. This underscores the predictive power of the Positive Peace deficit model.
- On average, deficit countries that recorded increases in violence saw their GPI Internal Peace score deteriorate by 17.8 per cent from 2009 to 2019. This is compared to a 0.3 per cent deterioration for the median country on the GPI.
- Looking forward, 30 countries recorded substantial Positive Peace deficits in 2019, and may deteriorate further into violence in the coming years. Of particular concern, Eritrea and Equatorial Guinea combine large Positive Peace deficits with a long trend of PPI deteriorations over the past decade.
- Other nations in deficit in 2019 – such as Liberia, Zambia, Guinea-Bissau, Bangladesh, Qatar, and Rwanda – have also recorded PPI deteriorations in recent years.
- Countries IEP identified as having a Positive Peace surplus in 2009 on average improved in the GPI by 1.9 per cent over the past decade.
- *Low Levels of Corruption, Acceptance of the Rights of Others, Sound Business Environment, Well-Functioning Government and Good Relations with Neighbours* are the most important Pillars requiring improvement in countries suffering from high levels of violence.
- *Free Flow of Information, Equitable Distribution of Resources and High Levels of Human Capital* become more important as countries move away from very low levels of peace.
- *Low Levels of Corruption* is the only Pillar that is strongly correlated with the GPI across all levels of peacefulness. Improvements in this Pillar are associated with reductions in violence in low-peace, medium-peace and high-peace countries.
- Uneven improvements in the Pillars of Peace can lead to increased violence, highlighting the importance of a holistic, systemic approach to building Positive Peace. This is especially true for premature development in Pillars such as *High Levels of Human Capital, Sound Business Environment* and *Free Flow of Information*.



# What is Positive Peace?

Positive Peace is defined as the *attitudes, institutions and structures that create and sustain peaceful societies* (Figure 5.1). The same factors also lead to many other desirable socio-economic outcomes. Higher levels of Positive Peace are statistically linked to greater income growth, better environmental outcomes, higher levels of wellbeing, better developmental outcomes and stronger resilience.

IEP has empirically derived the Positive Peace Index (PPI) through the analysis of almost 25,000 economic and social progress indicators to determine which ones have statistically significant relationships with peace as measured by the Global Peace Index (GPI).

The Pillars of Positive Peace interact systemically to support a society's *attitudes, institutions and structures* that underpin development and peacebuilding (Figure 5.2). High levels of Positive Peace occur where attitudes make violence less tolerated, institutions are resilient and more responsive to society's needs and structures create the environment for the nonviolent resolution of grievances.

The Pillars also offer a practical framework for the implementation of small-scale Positive Peace projects. In cooperation with its global partners, IEP implements and supports a number of projects in local communities around the world using the Pillars of Positive Peace as the main framework to plan action and design measurement.

FIGURE 5.1

## What is Positive Peace?


Positive Peace is a complementary concept to negative peace.



FIGURE 5.2

## The Pillars of Positive Peace

A visual representation of the factors comprising Positive Peace. All eight factors are highly interconnected and interact in varied and complex ways.



## THE PILLARS OF POSITIVE PEACE

Positive Peace is predicated on eight key factors, or Pillars, that describe the workings of the socio-economic system:

### **WELL-FUNCTIONING GOVERNMENT**

A well-functioning government delivers high-quality public and civil services, engenders trust and participation, demonstrates political stability and upholds the rule of law.

### **SOUND BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT**

The strength of economic conditions as well as the formal institutions that support the operation of the private sector. Business competitiveness and economic productivity are both associated with the most peaceful countries.

### **ACCEPTANCE OF THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS**

Peaceful countries often have formal laws that guarantee basic human rights and freedoms, and the informal social and cultural norms that relate to behaviours of citizens.

### **GOOD RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBOURS**

Peaceful relations with other countries are as important as good relations between groups within a country. Countries with positive external relations are more peaceful and tend to be more politically stable, have better functioning governments, are regionally integrated and have lower levels of organised internal conflict.

### **FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION**

Free and independent media disseminates information in a way that leads to greater knowledge and helps individuals, businesses and civil society make better decisions. This leads to better outcomes and more rational responses in times of crisis.

### **HIGH LEVELS OF HUMAN CAPITAL**

A skilled human capital base reflects the extent to which societies educate citizens and promote the development of knowledge, thereby improving economic productivity, care for the young, political participation and social capital.

### **LOW LEVELS OF CORRUPTION**

In societies with high levels of corruption, resources are inefficiently allocated, often leading to a lack of funding for essential services and civil unrest. Low corruption can enhance confidence and trust in institutions.

### **EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF RESOURCES**

Peaceful countries tend to ensure equity in access to resources such as education, health, and to a lesser extent, equity in income distribution.


# Positive Peace and the GPI



FIGURE 5.3

## Largest deteriorations in the Global Peace Index, 2009–2019

The higher the GPI Internal Peace rank is in relation to Positive Peace, the more likely a deterioration in peace will occur. A Positive Peace deficit is where the GPI rank is much higher than the PPI rank.



Source: IEP

This section of the report analyses the Positive Peace factors associated with transitions in peace. The research highlights the most important factors, which vary depending on the prevailing state of peace and the country's level of development. It uses systems thinking to describe the dynamics of how countries operate and how Positive Peace affects their Global Peace Index (GPI) scores and trends.

A central question behind understanding national systems is what makes nations transition from one level of development and peace to another. To answer this, IEP assesses both the GPI and the Positive Peace Index (PPI) to identify different characteristics of national systems and how they operate at varying levels of peacefulness.


The analysis in this section focuses explicitly on peacefulness, as gauged by the GPI. However, similar dynamics apply to social and economic development. Indeed, countries that develop in the PPI and the GPI tend to progress also in economic prosperity, well-being and development.

## POSITIVE PEACE DEFICITS AS A PREDICTOR OF VIOLENCE

Comparing changes in the PPI with the GPI over time highlights that improvements in Positive Peace may precede improvements on the GPI and vice versa.

Figure 5.3 compares the ranks of the PPI and the GPI in 2009. When countries rank higher in the GPI than in the PPI they have what is termed a Positive Peace deficit. This indicates that the country's peacefulness is higher than its underlying social structures would indicate it should be. It also means that a country is comparatively more vulnerable to internal or external shocks and runs a higher risk of increased levels of violence.

Conversely, when a country ranks higher in the PPI than in the GPI it is said to have a Positive Peace surplus. This indicates the



institutional capacity to support lower levels of violence than the country currently experiences. Figure 5.3 shows that most countries with large deteriorations in the GPI from 2009 to 2019 had Positive Peace deficits. The diagram in the figure plots the changes in the position of countries on both the PPI and GPI from 2009 to 2019. The red arrows represent the changes in countries that deteriorated on the GPI. Note that nearly all countries that deteriorated on the GPI also deteriorated on the PPI. Countries high in both Positive Peace and negative peace cluster towards the bottom left hand side of the graphic, while countries that are poor in Positive Peace and negative peace cluster towards the top right hand side of the graphic.

Expanding on Figure 5.3, countries can be grouped into three categories below:

- **Positive Peace deficit:** when countries rank at least 20 places higher on the GPI than the PPI.
- **Positive Peace surplus:** when countries rank at least 20 places lower on the GPI than the PPI.
- **Stable:** countries have a rank difference between the GPI and PPI of less than 20 places.

Countries in Positive Peace deficit are those with a level of socio-economic resilience that is inferior to and incompatible with the country's actual peacefulness. Sometimes, Positive Peace deficit

countries may be ruled by strict regimes that suppress individual freedoms and socio-economic development, but which maintain artificially high levels of peace by forcefully imposing social order. This state of peacefulness is fragile because the underlying social tensions and grievances are simply smothered instead of being heard and resolved. Once there is any weakness in the government or security apparatus, the situation will often deteriorate into violence as a result of protests, civil unrest or inter-group tensions.

One illustration of this process is Egypt, which in 2009 held a PPI rank of 115, or 52 places behind its GPI placing of 63. At that time, Egyptian security forces responding to the then President Hosni Mubarak repressed demonstrations, prevented strikes and restricted the press. The suppressed social tensions eventually erupted in the so-called Egyptian Revolution of 2011, when Mubarak's health deteriorated and the Arab Spring erupted in other countries in the region. Country-wide protests and violent unrest led to the fall of the Egyptian government. This episode was one of the high-profile events of the Arab Spring. Similar events were taking place in many other nations in the Middle East and North Africa. Grievances within Egypt fuelled the rise of groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, a transnational organisation whose Egyptian branch eventually took the power in that country in 2012. Violent protests continued in the country as groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood, the Soldiers of Egypt, the Popular Resistance Movement and others vied for power. From

2009 to 2019, Egypt's GPI Internal Peace score deteriorated by 30.5 per cent – one of the steepest deteriorations recorded in the GPI.

It is also possible that in some unusual cases, countries may have Positive Peace deficits because their societies are homogenous and non-violent, but still lack a greater degree of economic and technological development. Nations such as Bhutan, Nepal and Timor-Leste are possible examples for this category. Despite substantial deficits in 2009, Bhutan's and Nepal's GPI Internal Peace scores improved over the subsequent decade and Timor-Leste's was broadly unchanged.

However, in most cases the peacefulness enjoyed by countries in Positive Peace deficit will deteriorate over time. Like Egypt, these

countries lack the socio-economic resilience that would allow them to absorb negative shocks without falling back into turmoil and violence. These countries generally lack the social infrastructure – such as representative governments, transparent and accessible legal systems, free press and other factors – that would allow internal groups to resolve their grievances through non-violent means.

Of the 39 countries with Positive Peace deficits in 2009, 27 – or 69 per cent – had recorded deteriorations in the GPI Internal Peace score by 2019. This is shown in Table 5.1. Many of the most extreme examples of collapse into violence over the past decade – countries such as Syria, Libya, Yemen, Nicaragua, Egypt, Burkina Faso and others – were deficit countries one decade ago.

TABLE 5.1

### **Positive Peace deficits in 2009 and changes in the GPI from 2009 to 2019**

Of the 39 nations in Positive Peace deficit in 2009, 27 – or 69 per cent – recorded deteriorations in peace in the subsequent decade.

COUNTRY	PPI RANK 2009	GPI INTERNAL PEACE RANK 2009	POSITIVE PEACE DEFICIT 2009	CHANGE IN GPI INTERNAL PEACE 2009-2019 (%)	CHANGE IN GPI INTERNAL PEACE 2009-2019 (%)
Sierra Leone	137	53	84	-2.2	Improvement
Equatorial Guinea	140	62	78	6.9	Deterioration
Timor-Leste	125	55	70	0.7	Deterioration
Angola	153	83	70	7.0	Deterioration
Burkina Faso	120	54	66	30.0	Deterioration
Eritrea	152	91	61	11.5	Deterioration
Libya	108	50	58	92.7	Deterioration
Zambia	113	56	57	5.4	Deterioration
Tanzania	111	57	54	6.5	Deterioration
Egypt	115	63	52	30.5	Deterioration
Liberia	131	81	50	-2.1	Improvement
Syria	114	64	50	84.6	Deterioration
Malawi	117	69	48	-2.5	Improvement
Viet Nam	81	33	48	4.4	Deterioration
Djibouti	126	80	46	9.2	Deterioration
Laos	129	84	45	-9.6	Improvement
Togo	134	89	45	8.7	Deterioration
Mozambique	106	67	39	21.1	Deterioration
Indonesia	105	68	37	-5.9	Improvement
Bhutan	65	28	37	-12.0	Improvement
Nicaragua	93	58	35	39.0	Deterioration
Tajikistan	146	112	34	-0.5	Improvement
The Gambia	109	75	34	-5.2	Improvement
Cameroon	132	99	33	27.7	Deterioration
Republic of the Congo	148	117	31	8.7	Deterioration
Bangladesh	136	109	27	-0.8	Improvement
Rwanda	103	77	26	1.6	Deterioration
Turkmenistan	139	114	25	1.8	Deterioration
Azerbaijan	119	94	25	6.7	Deterioration
Swaziland	112	87	25	0.6	Deterioration
Yemen	156	131	25	34.4	Deterioration
Madagascar	121	98	23	-8.2	Improvement
Guinea	157	134	23	-13.3	Improvement
Qatar	41	18	23	8.0	Deterioration
Niger	141	119	22	14.3	Deterioration
Myanmar	149	128	21	7.6	Deterioration
Kuwait	50	29	21	10.1	Deterioration
Nepal	124	104	20	-11.2	Improvement
Papua New Guinea	130	110	20	1.1	Deterioration

Source: IEP

The ten largest deteriorations in the GPI ranking from 2009 to 2019 were recorded by Libya (-78 places), Nicaragua (-65), Burkina Faso (-60), Egypt (-57), Syria (-56), Bahrain (-54), Mozambique (-54), Cameroon (-45), Tunisia (-45) and Ukraine (-40). Of these countries, seven had large Positive Peace deficits in 2009, as can be seen in Table 5.1. Bahrain, Tunisia and Ukraine did not have deficits at the minimum 20-rank place level. This underscores the predictive power of the Positive Peace deficit model.

As seen above, 69 per cent of countries with a PPI deficit in 2009 deteriorated in the GPI by 2019. This is a higher proportion than for surplus and stable countries. For countries with a surplus in 2009, half had deteriorated in peace in the subsequent ten years. The average score of deficit countries deteriorated by 10.5 per cent from 2009 to 2019. Surplus countries improved in internal peace (Figure 5.4). This suggests that countries in Positive Peace deficit are more likely to fall into a vicious cycle of violence than the other categories.


It is not just the proportion of deteriorations that is higher among deficit countries. The extent of such deteriorations is also materially greater for deficit countries than any other category. Deficit countries that fell into further violence from 2009 to 2019 saw their GPI Internal Peace scores deteriorate by 17.8 per cent (Figure 5.5). This compares with 9.4 per cent for stable countries and 6 per cent for surplus countries.

Taken together, the proportion of deteriorations among deficit countries and the size of such deteriorations show that the

FIGURE 5.4

### **Positive Peace and deteriorations in the GPI**

Countries that were in deficit in 2009 on average deteriorated in the GPI by 10.5 per cent from 2009 to 2019. Surplus countries recorded an improvement.



Source: IEP

Positive Peace deficit model is a good predictor of future deteriorations in peace. If the threshold of materiality is increased to a 50 place difference between the GPI and the PPI ranks, then the model has a 90 per cent predictive rate of large deteriorations in peace. The model is not as accurate in predicting large improvements in peace. To predict countries that will improve in peace mapping improvements in the PPI provides a better approach, please refer to section 'Positive Peace at Different Levels of the GPI' below.


The Positive Peace deficit model can be seen as one tool, among others, that stakeholders and supranational agencies could use to anticipate and prepare for possible increases in violence in the future. Table 5.2 displays the 30 countries in Positive Peace deficit in 2019. It is possible that most of these countries will experience higher levels of violence over the next decade or so.

Of particular concern, Eritrea and Equatorial Guinea combine large Positive Peace deficits with a long-deteriorating trend in the PPI since at least 2009. These countries saw their PPI overall score deteriorate by 6.3 per cent and 5 per cent respectively over the past decade and recorded deteriorations in five out of the eight Pillars of Positive Peace in the period. More recently, other nations recorded substantial PPI deteriorations over the past five years, which unwound previous gains earlier in the decade. This is the case of Liberia, Zambia, Guinea-Bissau, Bangladesh, Qatar, Rwanda and Zimbabwe. These countries are also at higher risks of increases in violence.

FIGURE 5.5

### **Positive Peace deficits and the size of deteriorations in peace, 2009–2019**

For deficit countries that deteriorated from 2009 to 2019, the average GPI Internal Peace score change was 17.8 per cent – substantially higher than for surplus and stable countries.



Source: IEP

TABLE 5.2

## Countries in Positive Peace deficit in 2019

Countries in this list are more likely to experience increasing levels of violence over the next decade.

COUNTRY	PPI RANK 2019	GPI INTERNAL PEACE RANK 2019	POSITIVE PEACE DEFICIT 2019
Equatorial Guinea	155	73	82
Sierra Leone	129	48	81
Laos	125	55	70
Timor-Leste	121	53	68
Malawi	119	54	65
Liberia	132	69	63
Madagascar	131	70	61
Zambia	120	63	57
Nepal	122	67	55
Angola	145	95	50
Vietnam	87	41	46
Eritrea	160	115	45
Bhutan	62	18	44
Haiti	149	105	44
The Gambia	102	59	43
Cambodia	127	85	42
Guinea-Bissau	152	110	42
Guinea	143	102	41
Indonesia	90	49	41
Tanzania	107	66	41
Bangladesh	139	100	39
Ghana	80	46	34
Tajikistan	140	107	33
Senegal	85	60	25
Bolivia	105	84	21
Qatar	43	22	21
Papua New Guinea	129	109	20
Romania	49	29	20
Rwanda	97	77	20
Zimbabwe	153	133	20

Source: IEP

### ROBUSTNESS OF THE POSITIVE PEACE DEFICIT MODEL

The results above are consistent across different time windows. For example, the Positive Peace deficit model can be used to help predict which countries will deteriorate into higher levels of violence within the following five years. Of the countries that were in deficit in 2014, 68 per cent recorded deteriorations in their GPI Internal Peace score from 2014 to 2019. This compares with 49 per cent for stable countries and 31 per cent for surplus countries.

The Positive Peace deficit model is also robust for changes in the threshold used to calculate whether a deficit country is considered at risk. As seen above, when deficits are calculated based on a minimum rank difference of 20 places, the proportion of deficit countries that deteriorated in the GPI from 2009 to 2019 is 69 per cent. This proportion increases as the rank threshold is raised (Figure 5.6). If the set of countries in deficit is calculated using PPI scores 50 rank places below the


GPI, the proportion of deficit countries that deteriorate in peace rises to 90 per cent.

However, although increasing the threshold boosts predictive power, it also reduces the overall number of countries that can be assessed as having deficits. When the threshold is raised to a 50-place difference between the GPI and the PPI, then 10 countries are rated as high risk.

FIGURE 5.6

### Positive Peace deficit thresholds

Higher rank difference thresholds boost the predictive power of the model but reduce the overall number of countries that can be assessed as being in deficit.



Source: IEP

### POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE PEACE SYSTEMS DYNAMICS MODEL

These findings indicate that the future levels of peace in any country depend on the interplay between the levels of Positive Peace and negative peace. Certain combinations of Positive and negative peace appear to be more stable than others, while some specific configurations have historically been unstable. Countries that rank near the boundaries between stability and instability are susceptible to tipping points where small disturbances can lead to radically different peace trajectories.

The eight Pillars of Positive Peace represent a system of factors that interact to create and sustain peaceful societies. However, the efficacy of these Pillars depends on the context of violence in which they operate. For example, Europe – currently the most peaceful region in the world – has highly evolved and effective Positive Peace mechanisms to address grievances. However, this is the result of centuries of intense conflict in which the nature of violence continuously shifted. Violence and Positive Peace co-evolve and as such operate as a system.

By tracking changes in the GPI and the PPI for all countries over the past decade, it is possible to build a dynamical systems model of peace transitions. Figure 5.7 shows the outputs of this model.

The diagram has areas of red and blue. The arrows highlight the likely shifts over time based on the historical performance of the last decade. Red areas represent combinations of Positive and negative peace that have been historically unstable leading to large future deteriorations in the GPI score. In 2009, Syria, Libya, Nicaragua and Egypt were all in this region and have since had large deteriorations in the GPI. Countries in the region colored blue on a given year have tended to have subsequent improvements in the GPI. Areas of yellow have shown relatively little movement over the period. The large yellow area in the bottom-left of the figure represent states where the combinations of high Positive Peace and negative peace tend to be more stable. In systems theory there is a concept known as attractor basins, where a country arrives at a position from which it is hard to change. Both the combinations


of high PPI with high GPI scores and low PPI with low GPI scores are attractor basins.

The bottom-left area could be seen as a ‘Sustainable Peace’ region, characterised by institutional stability and social wellbeing.<sup>1</sup> Conversely, the top-right corner represents states of low levels of both negative and Positive Peace. This region can be called the ‘Conflict Trap’.

This graphic is commonly known as a *phase plane* and is a representation of potential transitions between states of a system. There are areas of stability where the system operates with little change over the period. These are represented by the yellow areas with very short arrows and are the attractor basins. As countries approach these regions they tend towards periods of stability. Areas of rapid change – represented by long arrows – are referred to as transition regions. Points on the boundary between attractor basins and transition regions are highly sensitive, small fluctuations can lead to widely different development paths.

**FIGURE 5.7  
IEP systems dynamics of GPI and PPI trajectories**

Based on empirical evidence, Positive and negative peace change more rapidly depending on starting levels in the PPI and GPI.



Source: IEP

In the phase plane above, the regions labelled Sustainable Peace and Conflict Trap act as attractor basins for countries. Countries can fall into the Conflict Trap region rapidly. The historical data however suggests that through strengthening Positive Peace, countries over time tend towards the Sustainable Peace region. In the decade of data analysed, no country in the Sustainable Peace region has seen a large deterioration in the GPI. There are also large areas, coloured yellow, where change is gradual. These are large areas reflecting that change of countries in these regions has been small in the last decade. If the analysis were repeated for multiple decades or even centuries, the areas with the least change would likely concentrate around the Sustainable Peace and Conflict Trap regions.

By using historical data to build this phase-plane model, IEP's approach is empirically derived and does not need to make assumptions about how individual components of the system behave.

Standard dynamical systems modelling relies on assumptions on how individual components of the system behave. This approach to modelling is very useful in the study of engineering or biological systems, where researchers can isolate individual components and understand how they behave. Unfortunately, this approach is impossible in the study of social systems because individual components cannot be analysed in isolation without arbitrary assumptions on how different components interact with each other.

## TIPPING POINTS IN THE POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE PEACE SYSTEMS DYNAMICS MODEL

IEP's dynamical model highlights the non-linear behavior of complex systems. Small differences in the initial conditions of two countries can have large impacts on a country's future pathway towards peace.

Figure 5.8 indicates that countries in the Positive Peace deficit region can work towards sustainable peace by improving Positive Peace. However, they are also at risk of deteriorating into a Conflict Trap. Countries that improve in Positive Peace at different rates in this region may have large divergences from each other. This is highlighted in Figure 5.8, which shows the divergence in the actual historical paths of Egypt and Syria. While both countries were very close in both PPI and GPI in 2009, their trajectories since have been very different. In this case Syria could be thought of in 2008 as on the verge of a tipping point towards a Conflict Trap. In 2009, Egypt scored much stronger than Syria in *Well-Functioning Government, Low Levels of Corruption and Sound Business Environment*.

Tipping points can also be beneficial to a country. Figure 5.9 shows how countries can overtake peers in developing in peacefulness and wellbeing. In 2009, Venezuela was more peaceful than Colombia. However, Colombia had stronger Positive Peace. The larger reserves of Positive Peace placed


Colombia closer to the region of the phase plane map in which improvements in the GPI are generally produced. By 2019, Venezuela had deteriorated in the GPI while Colombia had improved. In the Global Peace Index Report 2019, Colombia had overtaken Venezuela in the GPI, with ranks of 143 and 144 respectively.

This also highlights the significance of shocks to a country. A shock can push a country from one trajectory into another region of the phase plane. If any country experienced a shock that pushed it closer to the Positive Peace deficit region, it could alter the path from one that was directed to sustainable peace, to one that tends toward a Conflict Trap.

FIGURE 5.8

### Tipping points in the Positive Peace deficit region

Tipping points in the Positive and negative peace system can result in countries that are relatively close to each other on the PPI and GPI experiencing widely diverging trajectories.




Source: IEP

FIGURE 5.9

### Tipping points in the Positive Peace surplus region

Despite starting at a lower level of peacefulness in 2009, by 2019 Colombia had overtaken Venezuela in the GPI.



Source: IEP

## POSITIVE PEACE AT DIFFERENT LEVELS OF THE GPI

IEP's research finds that building peace in fragile and less peaceful contexts requires a specific emphasis on:

- *Low Levels of Corruption*
- *Acceptance of the Rights of Others*
- *Sound Business Environment*
- *Well-Functioning Government*
- *Good Relations with Neighbours*

Building strength in other areas of Positive Peace is also important as all Pillars work as a system.

Figure 5.10 highlights the correlations for each of the eight Pillars of Positive Peace at each level of peace. A correlation coefficient of greater than  $r=0.4$  is considered strongly significant, and above  $r=0.3$  is considered moderately significant. The transition to high Positive Peace is gradual; as countries improve in peace, the correlations become stronger, highlighting the need to focus on all Pillars.

By contrast, *Free Flow of Information*, *Equitable Distribution of Resources* and *High Levels of Human Capital* are not as strongly associated with peace in low-peace countries, as indicated by the low correlation coefficients in Figure 5.10.

Some of the world's least peaceful countries struggle with issues of resource equity or low human capital, but it is not a consistent feature of all countries facing low levels of peacefulness.

The core requirement of governments in low-peace environments is to provide security to its citizens, without which a country cannot develop. In order for governments to function well and be trusted, corruption needs to be controlled. Poor relations with neighbours can lead to other countries attempting to interfere through direct interventions or funding militias, while group grievances (*Acceptance of the Rights of Others*) can create the identity basis for conflict.

However, this is not to say that improvements in the other Pillars are not important in improving peacefulness. As countries become more peaceful, the strength of the correlation of each Pillar increases, highlighting the importance of building these Pillars. Due to the systemic nature of societies, successes are likely to positively compound as countries progress, so building strength in the other four Pillars will also help to progress peace.

Mid-peace countries have a different profile. Correlations tend to be weaker for this group, but more Pillars are moderately correlated, suggesting that to make progress at moderate levels of peacefulness it is important to understand the strength of the individual Pillars before developing a strategy.

*Low Levels of Corruption* is the only Pillar to maintain a strong statistical correlation across all levels of peace.


To better understand how different aspects of Positive Peace may be more important at different levels of peace the 163 countries were broken up into overlapping groups of sixty and then correlated to determine at what stage of peace the various PPI indicators start to contribute to GPI improvements.

Research shows that the indicators that comprise Positive Peace correlate with peace more strongly in nations that have already achieved a minimum level of peacefulness (e.g. GPI rank 110 or higher).

*Free Flow of Information*, *Sound Business Environment*, *Good Relations with Neighbours* and *High Levels of Human Capital* only correlate with internal peace for nations that rank highly in the GPI – rank 90 and above. This suggests that a nation must have achieved a minimum level of internal security for equity and education to make meaningful contributions to further peacefulness. In contrast, *Acceptance of the Rights of Others*, *Well-Functioning Government*, *Equitable Distribution of Resources* and *Low Levels of Corruption* start making meaningful contributions at earlier stages of development – at rank 110 and above. This suggests that depending on a nation's negative peace status, authorities would have different menus of policy options to foster social development.

**FIGURE 5.10  
Correlation coefficients between Positive Peace and internal GPI score in High, Mid, and Low Peace countries 2019**

Low Levels of Corruption is the only Pillar that is significant across all three levels of peacefulness.



Source: IEP

# Positive Peace as a Predictor of Economic Outperformance



Previous research has shown how high levels of Positive Peace are associated with superior economic performance. Other things being equal, countries that score well in the PPI tend to have higher growth in GDP per capita, greater corporate profitability, stronger household consumption and less volatile inflation. These results have been discussed in the Positive Peace Report 2020, and some key findings are reproduced in Figure 5.11.

FIGURE 5.11

## Positive Peace and growth in GDP per capita, 2009 – 2019

Countries that improved in Positive Peace from 2009 to 2019 recorded an average annual growth rate in per capita GDP almost three percentage points above nations in which the PPI had deteriorated.



Source: World Bank, IEP

## PREDICTING ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE

This section discusses how Positive Peace can be used to signal future superior economic performance, thereby acting as a predictor of better economic and corporate outcomes. Positive Peace outcomes are autoregressive. This means that once a PPI score improves for a country or region in a given year, it will tend to continue improving for some time in the future. Positive Peace and economic processes are also self-reinforcing. A better PPI outcome in a given year will increase the probability of favorable economic results in the future, which will in turn, contribute to further improvements in Positive Peace.

These dynamics mean that Positive Peace and economic cycles tend to have long durations and be intermeshed with one another.

Because of this, nation states or regions that improve in the PPI up to a certain time, can expect to record superior economic performance beyond that time. This is at the heart of the PPI's ability to predict the economic outperformance of countries and regions. This ability can be used by businesses and investors to help guide their commercial and financial sovereign exposures.

A simple illustration of this ability is the process whereby the PPI is employed to select countries that will outperform the global average real GDP growth for the subsequent year. This simplified procedure is depicted in Table 5.3 and Figure 5.12.

TABLE 5.3

## Procedure for predicting future economic outperformance using the PPI


This recursive procedure using the PPI predicts future outperformance of many economic variables.

STEP	DESCRIPTION	COMMENTS AND EXAMPLES
1	Select a given year T	For example, T = 2015
2	Create a portfolio of countries that improved substantially in Positive Peace in the five years to T	Select all countries whose PPI score decreased by 0.2 index points or more from 2010 to 2015
3	Estimate the average growth of this portfolio in a given economic variable from T to T+1	Calculate the average real GDP growth between 2015 and 2016 for these countries that improved in Positive Peace from 2010 to 2015
4	Compare item 3 above with the global average of economic variable from T to T+1	Compare item 3 above with the average real GDP growth between 2015 and 2016 for all countries
5	Increase T by 1 and go to step 2 above	Select year T = 2016 and go to step 2 above

FIGURE 5.12

### Procedure for predicting future economic outperformance using the PPI

This recursive procedure using the PPI predicts future outperformance of many economic variables.



## AGGREGATE ECONOMIC ACTIVITY

The recursive process described above allows the construction of an annually re-calibrated portfolio of countries whose real GDP growth outperforms future growth in global real GDP. For example, by selecting those countries that improved materially in Positive Peace up to a specific year, say 2018, an investor will have a portfolio of nations whose real GDP growth will be higher than the global average in 2019.


The methodology can be further developed and adapted for different time lags and different predictive windows.

The combined GDP of the annually re-calibrated portfolio of PPI improvers rose by 48 per cent from 2010 to 2019 (Figure 5.13). This is 12 percentage points higher than the global average growth of 36 per cent in the same period, amounting to an outperformance of 33.3 per cent.

FIGURE 5.13

### Real GDP outperformance by Positive Peace improvers

Starting from an indexed level of 100 in 2010, the aggregated GDP of PPI improvers reached 148 by 2019 – or a 33 per cent higher return than the global average of 136.



Source: IEP, World Bank

# 6 | APPENDICES



## APPENDIX A

# GPI methodology

Peace is notoriously difficult to define. The simplest way of approaching it is in terms of the harmony achieved by the absence of violence or the fear of violence, which has been described as Negative Peace. Negative Peace is a complement to Positive Peace which is defined as the attitudes, institutions and structures that create and sustain peaceful societies.

The GPI was founded by Steve Killelea, an Australian technology entrepreneur and philanthropist. It is produced by the Institute for Economics and Peace, a global think tank dedicated to developing metrics to analyse peace and to quantify its economic benefits.

The GPI measures a country's level of Negative Peace using three domains of peacefulness. The first domain, *Ongoing Domestic and International Conflict*, investigates the extent to which countries are involved in internal and external conflicts, as well as their role and duration of involvement in conflicts.

The second domain evaluates the level of harmony or discord within a nation; ten indicators broadly assess what might be described as *Societal Safety and Security*. The assertion is that low crime rates, minimal terrorist activity and violent demonstrations, harmonious relations with neighbouring countries, a stable political scene and a small proportion of the population being internally displaced or made refugees can be equated with peacefulness.

Seven further indicators are related to a country's *Militarisation*—reflecting the link between a country's level of military build-up and access to weapons and its level of peacefulness, both domestically and internationally. Comparable data on military expenditure as a percentage of GDP and the number of armed service officers per head are gauged, as are financial contributions to UN peacekeeping missions.

## The expert panel

An international panel of independent experts played a key role in establishing the GPI in 2007—in selecting the indicators that best assess a nation's level of peace and in assigning their weightings. The panel has overseen each edition of the GPI; this year, it included:

### **Professor Kevin P. Clements, chairperson**

Foundation Chair of Peace and Conflict Studies and Director, National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Otago, New Zealand

### **Dr Sabina Alkire**

Director, Oxford Poverty & Human Development Initiative (OPHI), University of Oxford, United Kingdom

### **Dr Ian Anthony**

Research Coordinator and Director of the Programme on Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-proliferation, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Sweden

### **Dr Manuela Mesa**

Director, Centre for Education and Peace Research (CEIPAZ) and President, Spanish Association for Peace Research (AIPAZ), Madrid, Spain

### **Dr Ekaterina Stepanova**

Head, Unit on Peace and Conflict Studies, Institute of the World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Russian Academy of Sciences, Russia

## THE INDICATORS

The GPI comprises 23 indicators of the absence of violence or fear of violence. The indicators were originally selected with the assistance of the expert panel in 2007 and have been reviewed by the expert panel on an annual basis. All scores for each indicator are normalised on a scale of 1-5, whereby qualitative indicators are banded into five groupings and quantitative ones are scored from 1 to 5, to the third decimal point.

ONGOING DOMESTIC & INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT	SOCIETAL SAFETY & SECURITY	MILITARISATION
<b>Number and duration of internal conflicts</b> Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Battle-Related Deaths Dataset, Non-State Conflict Dataset and One-sided Violence Dataset; Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP)	<b>Level of perceived criminality in society</b> Gallup World Poll, IEP estimates	<b>Military expenditure as a percentage of GDP</b> The Military Balance, IISS, EIU Estimates
<b>Number of deaths from external organised conflict</b> UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset	<b>Number of refugees and internally displaced people as a percentage of the population</b> Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) Mid-Year Trends; Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC)	<b>Number of armed services personnel per 100,000 people</b> The Military Balance, IISS
<b>Number of deaths from internal organised conflict</b> UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset	<b>Political instability</b> Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts	<b>Volume of transfers of major conventional weapons as recipient (imports) per 100,000 people</b> Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Arms Transfers Database
<b>Number, duration and role in external conflicts</b> UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset; IEP	<b>Political Terror Scale</b> Gibney, Mark, Linda Cornett, Reed Wood, Peter Haschke, Daniel Arnon, and Attilio Pisanò. 2021. The Political Terror Scale 1976-2019. Date Retrieved, from the Political Terror Scale website: <a href="http://www.politicalterrorscale.org">http://www.politicalterrorscale.org</a> .	<b>Volume of transfers of major conventional weapons as supplier (exports) per 100,000 people</b> SIPRI Arms Transfers Database
<b>Intensity of organised internal conflict</b> Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts	<b>Impact of terrorism</b> IEP Global Terrorism Index (GTI)	<b>Financial contribution to UN peacekeeping missions</b> United Nations Committee on Contributions; IEP
<b>Relations with neighbouring countries</b> Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts	<b>Number of homicides per 100,000 people</b> United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Surveys on Crime Trends and the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems (CTS); EIU estimates	<b>Nuclear and heavy weapons capabilities</b> The Military Balance, IISS; SIPRI; UN Register of Conventional Arms; IEP
	<b>Level of violent crime</b> Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts	<b>Ease of access to small arms and light weapons</b> Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts
	<b>Likelihood of violent demonstrations</b> Qualitative assessment by EIU analysts	
	<b>Number of jailed population per 100,000 people</b> World Prison Brief, Institute for Criminal Policy Research at Birkbeck, University of London	
	<b>Number of internal security officers and police per 100,000 people</b> UNODC CTS; EIU estimates	

## METHODOLOGICAL NOTES

## **WEIGHTING THE INDEX**

When the GPI was launched in 2007 the advisory panel of independent experts apportioned scores based on the relative importance of each of the indicators on a scale of 1-5. Two sub-component weighted indices were then calculated from the GPI group of indicators:

1. A measure of how at peace internally a country is;
  2. A measure of how at peace externally a country is (its state of peace beyond its borders).

The overall composite score and index was then formulated by applying a weight of 60 per cent to the measure of internal peace and 40 per cent to external peace. The heavier weight applied to internal peace was agreed upon by the advisory panel, following robust debate. The decision was based on the notion that a greater level of internal peace is likely to lead to, or at least correlate with, lower external conflict. The weights have been reviewed by the advisory panel prior to the compilation of each edition of the GPI.

## MEASURING THE ROBUSTNESS OF THE INDEX

- Robustness is an important concept in composite index analysis. It is a measure of how often rank comparisons from a composite index are still true if the index is calculated using different weightings. For example, if the GPI is recalculated using a large number of different weighting schemes and Country A ranks higher than Country B in 60 per cent of these recalculations, the statement "Country A is more peaceful than Country B" is considered to be 60 per cent robust.
  - IEP finds that the Global Peace Index (GPI) is at the same level of absolute robustness as the Human Development Index (HDI), a leading measure of development since it was first constructed by the United Nations Development Programme in 1990.
  - Technically, the robustness of the GPI is measured by the fact that 70 per cent of pairwise country comparisons are independent of the weighting scheme chosen. In other words, regardless of the weights attributed to each component of the index, 70 per cent of the time the pairwise comparisons between countries are the same.

TABLE A.1

## **Indicator weights in the GPI**

Internal Peace 60% / External Peace 40%

INTERNAL PEACE (Weight 1 to 5)		EXTERNAL PEACE (Weight 1 to 5)	
Perceptions of criminality	3	Military expenditure (% GDP)	2
Security officers and police rate	3	Armed services personnel rate	2
Homicide rate	4	UN peacekeeping funding	2
Incarceration rate	3	Nuclear and heavy weapons capabilities	3
Access to small arms	3	Weapons exports	3
Intensity of internal conflict	5	Refugees and IDPs	4
Violent demonstrations	3	Neighbouring countries relations	5
Violent crime	4	External conflicts fought	2.28
Political instability	4	Deaths from external conflict	5
Political terror	4		
Weapons imports	2		
Terrorism impact	2		
Deaths from internal conflict	5		
Internal conflicts fought	2.56		

The GPI is a composite index of 23 indicators weighted and combined into one overall score. The weighting scheme within any composite index represents the relative importance of each indicator to the overall aim of the measure, in the GPI's case, global peace. To fully understand the representative nature or accuracy of any measure it is necessary to understand how sensitive the results of the index are to the specific weighting scheme used. If the analysis holds true for a large subset of all possible weighting schemes then the results can be called robust. While it is expected that ranks will be sensitive to changes in the weights of any composite index, what is more important in a practical sense is the robustness of country comparisons. One of the core aims of the GPI is to allow for Country A to be compared to Country B. This raises the question that for any two countries, how often is the first ranked more peaceful than the second across the spectrum of weights. The more times that the first country is ranked more peaceful than the second, the more confidence can be invested in the statement "Country A is more peaceful than Country B".

To avoid the computational issue of evaluating every possible combination of 23 indicators, the robustness of pairwise country comparisons has been estimated using the three GPI domains *militarisation, societal safety and security and ongoing conflict*. Implementing an accepted methodology for robustness, the GPI is calculated for every weighting combination of three weights from 0 to 1 at 0.01 intervals. For computational expedience only weighting schemes that sum to one are selected, resulting in over 5100 recalculated GPI's. Applying this it is found that around 70 per cent of all pairwise country comparisons in the GPI are independent of the weighting scheme, i.e. 100 per cent robust. This is a similar level of absolute robustness as the Human Development Index.

#### **QUALITATIVE SCORING: THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT APPROACH**

The EIU's Country Analysis team plays an important role in producing the GPI by scoring six qualitative indicators and filling

in data gaps on quantitative indicators when official data is missing. The EIU employs more than 100 full-time country experts and economists, supported by 650 in-country contributors. Analysts generally focus on two or three countries and, in conjunction with local contributors, develop a deep knowledge of a nation's political scene, the performance of its economy and the society in general. Scoring follows a strict process to ensure reliability, consistency and comparability:

1. Individual country analysts score qualitative indicators based on a scoring methodology and using a digital platform;
2. Regional directors use the digital platform to check scores across the region; through the platform they can see how individual countries fare against each other and evaluate qualitative assessments behind proposed score revisions;
3. Indicator scores are checked by the EIU's Custom Research team (which has responsibility for the GPI) to ensure global comparability;
4. If an indicator score is found to be questionable, the Custom Research team, and the appropriate regional director and country analyst discuss and make a judgment on the score;
5. Scores are assessed by the external advisory panel before finalising the GPI;
6. If the expert panel finds an indicator score to be questionable, the Custom Research team, and the appropriate regional director and country analyst discuss and make a final judgment on the score, which is then discussed in turn with the advisory panel.

Because of the large scope of the GPI, occasionally data for quantitative indicators do not extend to all nations. In this case, country analysts are asked to suggest an alternative data source or provide an estimate to fill any gap. This score is checked by Regional Directors to ensure reliability and consistency within the region, and by the Custom Research team to ensure global comparability. Again, indicators are assessed by the external advisory panel before finalisation.

## APPENDIX B

# GPI indicator sources, definitions & scoring criteria

The information below details the sources, definitions, and scoring criteria of the 23 indicators that form the Global Peace Index. All scores for each indicator are banded or normalised on a scale of 1-5, whereby qualitative indicators are banded into five groupings and quantitative ones scored continuously from 1 to 5 at the third decimal place. The Economist Intelligence Unit has provided imputed estimates in the rare event there are gaps in the quantitative data.

### INTERNAL PEACE INDICATORS

#### Level of Perceived Criminality in Society

Indicator type	Quantitative
Indicator weight	3
Indicator weight (% of total index)	3.8%
Data source	Gallup World Poll
Measurement period	2020

**Definition:** This indicator uses a question from the Gallup World Poll as the basis for perceptions of criminality. The exact wording of the question is: “*Do you feel safe walking alone at night in the city or area where you live?*” IEP calculates the indicator score based on the percentage of people who answer ‘no’ to this question.

Where data is not available, IEP uses multivariate imputation by chained equations to create country-level estimates.

#### Scoring Bands:

1/5	2/5	3/5	4/5	5/5
0-19.9%	20-39.9%	40-59.9%	60-79.9%	> 80%

#### Number of Internal Security Officers and Police per 100,000 People

Indicator type	Quantitative
Indicator weight	3
Indicator weight (% of total index)	3.8%
Data source	UNODC Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems
Measurement period	2018

**Alternative Source:** EIU. Where data is not provided, the EIU’s analysts have filled them based on likely scores from the set bands of the actual data.

**Definition:** This indicator is sourced from the UNODC Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems and refers to the civil police force. Police refers to personnel in public agencies whose principal functions are the prevention, detection and investigation of crime and the apprehension of alleged offenders. It is distinct from national guards or local militia.

#### Scoring Bands

1/5	2/5	3/5	4/5	5/5
0-199.8	199.9-399.8	399.9-599.8	599.9-799.8	> 799.9

#### Number of Homicides per 100,000 People

Indicator type	Quantitative
Indicator weight	4
Indicator weight (% of total index)	5%
Data source	UNODC Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems
Measurement period	2018

**Alternative Source:** EIU. Where data is not provided, the EIU's analysts have filled them based on likely scores from the set bands of the actual data.

**Definition:** This indicator comes from the UNODC Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems. Intentional homicide refers to death deliberately inflicted on a person by another person, including infanticide. The figures refer to the total number of penal code offences or their equivalent, but exclude minor road traffic and other petty offences, brought to the attention of the police or other law enforcement agencies and recorded by one of those agencies.

#### Scoring Bands

1/5	2/5	3/5	4/5	5/5
0-1.99	2-5.99	6-9.99	10-19.99	> 20

#### Number of Jailed Population per 100,000 People

Indicator type	Quantitative
Indicator weight	3
Indicator weight (% of total index)	3.8%
Data source	Institute for Criminal Policy Research at Birkbeck, University of London, World Prison Brief
Measurement period	2020

**Definition:** Figures are from the Institute for Criminal Policy Research and are compiled from a variety of sources. In almost all cases the original source is the national prison administration of the country concerned, or else the Ministry responsible for the prison administration. Prison population rates per 100,000 people are based on estimates of the national population. In order to compare prison population rates, and to estimate the number of persons held in prison in the countries for which information is not available, median rates have been used by the Institute for Criminal Policy Research to minimise the effect of countries with rates that are untypically high or low. Indeed, comparability can be compromised by different practice in different countries, for example with regard to pre-trial detainees and juveniles, but also psychiatrically ill offenders and offenders being detained for treatment for alcoholism and drug addiction.

#### Scoring Bands

1/5	2/5	3/5	4/5	5/5
0-126.405	126.406-252.811	252.812-379.217	379.218-505.624	>505.625

**Additional Notes:** The data provided by the Institute for Criminal Policy Research are not annual averages but indicate the number of jailed population per 100,000 inhabitants in a particular month during the year. The year and month may differ from country to country.

#### Ease of Access to Small Arms and Light Weapons

Indicator type	Qualitative
Indicator weight	3
Indicator weight (% of total index)	3.8%
Data source	EIU
Measurement period	16 March 2020 to 15 March 2021

**Definition:** Assessment of the accessibility of small arms and light weapons (SALW), ranked from 1-5 (very limited access to very easy access) by the EIU's Country Analysis team. Country analysts are asked to assess this indicator on an annual basis, for the period from March to March.

#### Scoring Criteria:

- 1 = Very limited access:** The country has developed policy instruments and best practices, such as firearm licences, strengthening of export controls, codes of conduct, firearms or ammunition marking.
- 2 = Limited access:** The regulation implies that it is difficult, time-consuming and costly to obtain firearms; domestic firearms regulation also reduces the ease with which legal arms are diverted to illicit markets.
- 3 = Moderate access:** There are regulations and commitment to ensure controls on civilian possession of firearms, although inadequate controls are not sufficient to stem the flow of illegal weapons.
- 4 = Easy access:** There are basic regulations, but they are not effectively enforced; obtaining firearms is straightforward.
- 5 = Very easy access:** There is no regulation of civilian possession, ownership, storage, carriage and use of firearms.

#### Intensity of Organised Internal Conflict

Indicator type	Qualitative
Indicator weight	5
Indicator weight (% of total index)	6.3%
Data source	EIU
Measurement period	16 March 2020 to 15 March 2021

**Definition:** Assessment of the intensity of conflicts within the country, ranked from 1-5 (no conflict to severe crisis) by the EIU's Country Analysis team. Country analysts are asked to assess this indicator on an annual basis, for the period March to March.

#### Scoring Criteria:

- 1 = No conflict.**
- 2 = Latent conflict:** Positional differences over definable values of national importance.
- 3 = Manifest conflict:** Explicit threats of violence; imposition of economic sanctions by other countries.
- 4 = Crisis:** A tense situation across most of the country; at least one group uses violent force in sporadic incidents.
- 5 = Severe crisis:** Civil war; violent force is used with a certain continuity in an organised and systematic way throughout the country.

## Likelihood of Violent Demonstrations

Indicator type	Qualitative
Indicator weight	3
Indicator weight (% of total index)	3.8%
Data source	EIU
Measurement period	16 March 2020 to 15 March 2021

**Definition:** Assessment of the likelihood of violent demonstrations ranked from 1-5 (very low to very high) by the EIU's Country Analysis team, based on the question, "Are violent demonstrations or violent civil/labour unrest likely to pose a threat to property or the conduct of business over the next two years?" Country analysts assess this question on a quarterly basis. The score provided for 16 March 2020 to 15 March 2021 is the average of the scores given for each quarter.

### Scoring Criteria

*"Are violent demonstrations or violent civil/labour unrest likely to pose a threat to property or the conduct of business over the next two years?"*

1/5	Strongly no
2/5	No
3/5	Somewhat of a problem
4/5	Yes
5/5	Strongly yes

## Level of Violent Crime

Indicator type	Qualitative
Indicator weight	4
Indicator weight (% of total index)	5%
Data source	EIU
Measurement period	16 March 2020 to 15 March 2021

**Definition:** Assessment of the likelihood of violent crime ranked from 1 to 5 (very low to very high) by the EIU's Country Analysis team based on the question, "Is violent crime likely to pose a significant problem for government and/or business over the next two years?" Country analysts assess this question on a quarterly basis. The score provided for 16 March 2020 to 15 March 2021 is the average of the scores given for each quarter.

### Scoring Criteria

*"Is violent crime likely to pose a significant problem for government and/or business over the next two years?"*

1/5	Strongly no
2/5	No
3/5	Somewhat of a problem
4/5	Yes
5/5	Strongly yes

## Political Instability

Indicator type	Qualitative
Indicator weight	4
Indicator weight (% of total index)	5%
Data source	EIU
Measurement period	16 March 2020 to 15 March 2021

**Definition:** Assessment of political instability ranked from 0 to 100 (very low to very high instability) by the EIU's Country Analysis team, based on five questions. This indicator aggregates five other questions on social unrest, orderly transfers, opposition stance, excessive executive authority and an international tension sub-index. Country analysts assess this question on a quarterly basis. The score provided for 16 March 2020 to 15 March 2021 is the average of the scores given for each quarter.

### Specific Questions:

- What is the risk of significant social unrest during the next two years?
- How clear, established and accepted are constitutional mechanisms for the orderly transfer of power from one government to another?
- How likely is it that an opposition party or group will come to power and cause a significant deterioration in business operating conditions?
- Is excessive power concentrated or likely to be concentrated in the executive so that executive authority lacks accountability and possesses excessive discretion?
- Is there a risk that international disputes/tensions will negatively affect the economy and/or polity?

## Scoring Bands

1/5	2/5	3/5	4/5	5/5
0-20.4	20.5-40.4	40.5-60.4	60.5-80.4	80.5-100

## Political Terror Scale

Indicator type	Qualitative
Indicator weight	4
Indicator weight (% of total index)	5%
Data source	Gibney, Mark, Linda Cornett, Reed Wood, Peter Haschke, Daniel Arnon, and Attilio Pisanò. 2018. The Political Terror Scale 1976-2018. Date Retrieved, from the Political Terror Scale website: <a href="http://www.politicalterrorscale.org">http://www.politicalterrorscale.org</a> .
Measurement period	2019

**Definition:** The Political Terror Scale (PTS) measures levels of political violence and terror that a country experiences in a given year based on a 5-level "terror scale" originally developed by Freedom House. The data used in compiling this index comes from two different sources: the yearly country reports of Amnesty International and the US Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. The average of the two scores is taken.

## Scoring Criteria

- 1 = Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their view, and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare.
- 2 = There is a limited amount of imprisonment for nonviolent political activity. However, few persons are affected, torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder is rare.
- 3 = There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Execution or other political murders and brutality may be common. Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political views is accepted.
- 4 = Civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the population. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects those who interest themselves in politics or ideas.
- 5 = Terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals.

## Volume of Transfers of Major Conventional Weapons, as recipient (imports) per 100,000 people

Indicator type	Quantitative
Indicator weight	2
Indicator weight (% of total index)	2.5%
Data source	SIPRI Arms Transfers Database
Measurement period	2016-2020

**Definition:** Measures the total volume of major conventional weapons imported by a country between 2014 and 2018, divided by the average population in this time period at the 100,000 people level (population data supplied by the EIU). The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database covers all international sales and gifts of major conventional weapons and the technology necessary for their production. The transfer equipment or technology is from one country, rebel force or international organisation to another country, rebel force or international organisation. Major conventional weapons include: aircraft, armoured vehicles, artillery, radar systems, missiles, ships, engines.

### Scoring Bands

1/5	2/5	3/5	4/5	5/5
0-7.233	7.234-14.468	14.469-21.702	21.703-28.936	>28.937

## Impact of Terrorism

Indicator type	Quantitative
Indicator weight	2
Indicator weight (% of total index)	2.5%
Data source	IEP Global Terrorism Index (GTI)
Measurement period	1 Jan 2016 to 20 March 2021

**Definition:** Terrorist incidents are defined as “intentional acts of violence or threat of violence by a non-state actor.” This means an

incident has to meet three criteria in order for it to be counted as a terrorist act:

- A The incident must be intentional – the result of a conscious calculation on the part of a perpetrator.
- B The incident must entail some level of violence or threat of violence, including property violence as well as violence against people.
- C The perpetrators of the incidents must be sub-national actors. This database does not include acts of state terrorism.

For all incidents listed, at least two of the following three criteria must be present:

1. The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious or social goal.
2. There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims.
3. The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare activities.

**Methodology:** Using the comprehensive, event-based Global Terrorism Database, the GTI combines four variables to develop a composite score: the number of terrorist incidents in a given year, the total number of fatalities in a given year, the total number of injuries caused in a given year and the approximate level of property damage in a given year. The composite score captures the direct effects of terrorist-related violence, in terms of its physical effect, but also attempts to reflect the residual effects of terrorism in terms of emotional wounds and fear by attributing a weighted average to the damage inflicted in previous years. As of the date of publication, the Global Terrorism Database only logs events up to 31 December 2019. To assess the impact of terrorism between this date and 20 March 2021 cutoff, IEP uses data from publicly available third party sources to estimate terrorist activity in that period.

### Scoring Bands

1/5	2/5	3/5	4/5	5/5
0-13.479	13.48-181.699	181.7-2,449.309	2,449.31-33,015.949	>33,015.95

## Number Of Deaths From Organised Internal Conflict

Indicator type	Quantitative
Indicator weight	5
Indicator weight (% of total index)	6.3%
Data source	UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset
Measurement period	2018-2019

**Definition:** This indicator uses the UCDP’s definition of conflict. UCDP defines conflict as: “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year.”

## Scoring Bands

1/5	2/5	3/5	4/5	5/5
0–23 deaths	24–998 deaths	999–4,998 deaths	4,999–9,998 deaths	> 9,999 deaths

## Number and Duration of Internal Conflicts

Indicator type	Quantitative
Indicator weight	2.56
Indicator weight (% of total index)	3.2%
Data sources	IEP; UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset, Non-State Conflict Dataset and One-sided Violence Dataset
Measurement period	2015–2019

**Definition:** This indicator measures the number and duration of conflicts that occur within a specific country's legal boundaries. Information for this indicator is sourced from three datasets from Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP): the Battle-Related Deaths Dataset, Non-State Conflict Dataset and One-sided Violence Dataset. The score for a country is determined by adding the scores for all individual conflicts which have occurred within that country's legal boundaries over the last five years.

*Each individual conflict score is based on the following factors:*

### Number:

- The number of interstate armed conflicts, internal armed conflict (civil conflicts), internationalised internal armed conflicts, one-sided conflict and non-state conflict located within a country's legal boundaries.
- If a conflict is a war (1,000+ battle-related deaths) it receives a score of one; if it is an armed conflict (25–999 battle-related deaths) it receives a score of 0.25.

### Duration:

- A score is assigned based on the number of years out of the last five that conflict has occurred. For example, if a conflict last occurred five years ago that conflict will receive a score of one out of five.

The cumulative conflict scores are then added and banded to establish a country's score. This indicator is two years lagging due to when the UCDP data is released.

## Scoring Bands

1/5	2/5	3/5	4/5	5/5
No internal conflict	Combined conflict score of up to 4.75	Combined conflict score of up to 9.5	Combined conflict score of up to 14.25	A combined conflict score of 19 or above. This shows very high levels of internal conflict.

## EXTERNAL PEACE INDICATORS

### Military Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP

Indicator type	Quantitative
Indicator weight	2
Indicator weight (% of total index)	2.8%
Data source	International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2021
Measurement period	2020

**Alternative Source:** When no data was provided, several alternative sources were used: National Public Expenditure Accounts, SIPRI information and the Military Balance 2021.

**Definition:** Cash outlays of central or federal government to meet the costs of national armed forces—including strategic, land, naval, air, command, administration and support forces as well as paramilitary forces, customs forces and border guards if these are trained and equipped as a military force. Published EIU data on nominal GDP (or the World Bank when unavailable) was used to arrive at the value of military expenditure as a percentage of GDP.

**Scoring Criteria:** This indicator is scored using a min-max normalisation. Applying this method, a country's score is based on the distance of its military expenditure as a share of GDP from the benchmarks of 0% (for a score of 1) and 8.37% or above (for a score of 5). The bands, while linear, approximately conform as follows:

1/5	2/5	3/5	4/5	5/5
0–2.092	2.093–4.184	4.185–6.277	6.278–8.37	>8.371

### Number of Armed Services Personnel per 100,000 people

Indicator type	Quantitative
Indicator weight	2
Indicator weight (% of total index)	2.8%
Data source	International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2021
Measurement period	2020

**Alternative Source:** World Bank population data used if unavailable from the EIU.

**Definition:** Active armed services personnel comprise all service men and women on full-time duty in the army, navy, air force and joint forces (including conscripts and long-term assignments from the reserves). Population data provided by the EIU.

## Scoring Bands

1/5	2/5	3/5	4/5	5/5
0–657.744	657.745–1,315.489	1,315.49–1,973.234	1,973.235–2,630.98	>2,630.981

**Additional Notes:** The Israeli reservist force is used to calculate Israel's number of armed services personnel.

## Financial Contribution to UN Peacekeeping Missions

Indicator type	Quantitative
Indicator weight	2
Indicator weight (% of total index)	2.8%
Data source	IEP; United Nations Committee on Contributions
Measurement period	2017–2019

**Methodology:** The UNFU indicator measures whether UN member countries meet their UN peacekeeping funding commitments. Although countries may fund other programs in development or peacebuilding, the records on peacekeeping are easy to obtain and understand and provide an instructive measure of a country's commitment to peace. The indicator calculates the percentage of countries' "outstanding payments versus their annual assessment to the budget of the current peacekeeping missions" over an average of three years. This ratio is derived from data provided by the United Nations Committee on Contributions Status reports. The indicator is compiled as follows:

1. The status of contributions by UN member states is obtained.
2. For the relevant peacekeeping missions, the assessments (for that year only) and the collections (for that year only) are recorded. From this, the outstanding amount is calculated for that year.
3. The ratio of outstanding payments to assessments is calculated. By doing so a score between 0 and 1 is obtained. Zero indicates no money is owed; a country has met their funding commitments. A score of 1 indicates that a country has not paid any of their assessed contributions. Given that the scores already fall between 0 and 1, they are easily banded into a score between 1 and 5. The final banded score is a weighted sum of the current year and the previous two years. The weightings are 0.5 for the current year, 0.3 for the previous year and 0.2 for two years prior. Hence it is a three-year weighted average.
4. Outstanding payments from previous years and credits are not included. The scoring is linear to one decimal place.

### Scoring Criteria

1/5	0–25% of stated contributions owed
2/5	26–50% of stated contributions owed
3/5	51–75% of stated contributions owed
4/5	75–99% of stated contributions owed
5/5	100% of stated contributions owed (no contributions made in past three years)

**Additional Notes:** All United Nations member states share the costs of United Nations peacekeeping operations. The General Assembly apportions these expenses based on a special scale of assessments applicable to peacekeeping. This scale takes into account the relative economic wealth of member states, with the permanent members of the Security Council required to pay a larger share because of their special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

## Nuclear and Heavy Weapons Capabilities

Indicator type	Quantitative
Indicator weight	3
Indicator weight (% of total index)	4.2%
Data source	IEP; SIPRI; IISS The Military Balance; United Nations Register of Conventional Arms
Measurement period	2020

**Methodology:** This indicator is based on a categorised system for rating the destructive capability of a country's stock of heavy weapons. Holdings are those of government forces and do not include holdings of armed opposition groups. Heavy weapons numbers were determined using a combination of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance and the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms.

There are five categories of weapons, each of which receive a certain number of weighted points. The five weapons categories are weighted as follows:

1. Armoured vehicle and artillery pieces = 1 point
2. Tank = 5 points
3. Combat aircraft and combat helicopter = 20 points
4. Warship = 100 points
5. Aircraft carrier and nuclear submarine = 1000 points

Countries with nuclear capabilities automatically receive the maximum score of five. Other scores are expressed to the second decimal point, adopting a min-max normalisation that sets the max at two standard deviations above the average raw score.

1/5	Nil–18,185
2/5	18,185–36,368
3/5	36,368–54,553
4/5	54,553–72,737
5/5	States with nuclear capability receive a 5, or states with heavy weapons capability of 72,738 or in the top 2% of heavy weapons receive a 5.

## Volume of Transfers of Major Conventional Weapons as Supplier (Exports) per 100,000 people

Indicator type	Quantitative
Indicator weight	3
Indicator weight (% of total index)	4.2%
Data source	SIPRI Arms Transfers Database
Measurement period	2016–2020

**Definition:** Measures the total volume of major conventional weapons exported by a country between 2015 and 2019 divided by the average population during this time period (population data supplied by the EIU). The SIPRI Arms Transfers Database covers

all international sales and gifts of major conventional weapons and the technology necessary for the production of them. The transfer equipment or technology is from one country, rebel force or international organisation to another country, rebel force or international organisation. Major conventional weapons include: aircraft, armoured vehicles, artillery, radar systems, missiles, ships and engines.

#### Scoring Bands

1/5	2/5	3/5	4/5	5/5
0-3.681	3.682-7.364	7.365-11.046	11.047-14.729	>14.73

### Number of Refugees and Internally Displaced People as a Percentage of the Population

Indicator type	Quantitative
Indicator weight	4
Indicator weight (% of total index)	5.7%
Data source	UNHCR Mid-Year Trends 2020; International Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) 2019
Measurement period	2019-2020

**Definition:** Refugee population by country or territory of origin plus the number of a country's internally displaced people (IDPs), as a percentage of the country's total population.

#### Scoring Bands

1/5	2/5	3/5	4/5	5/5
0-3.034	3.035-6.069	6.07-9.104	9.105-12.139	>12.14

### Relations with Neighbouring Countries

Indicator type	Qualitative
Indicator weight	5
Indicator weight (% of total index)	7.1%
Data source	EIU
Measurement period	16 March 2020 to 15 March 2021

**Definition:** Assessment of the intensity of contentiousness of neighbours, ranked from 1-5 (peaceful to very aggressive) by the EIU's Country Analysis team. Country analysts are asked to assess this indicator on an annual basis, for the period March to March.

#### Scoring Criteria:

**1 = Peaceful:** None of the neighbours has attacked the country since 1950.

- 2 = Low:** The relationship with neighbours is generally good, but aggressiveness is manifest in politicians' speeches or in protectionist measures.
- 3 = Moderate:** There are serious tensions and consequent economic and diplomatic restrictions from other countries.
- 4 = Aggressive:** Open conflicts with violence and protests.
- 5 = Very aggressive:** Frequent invasions by neighbouring countries.

### Number, duration and role in external conflicts

Indicator type	Quantitative
Indicator weight	2.28
Indicator weight (% of total index)	3.2%
Data source	IEDP; UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset
Measurement period	2015-2019

**Definition:** This indicator measures the number and duration of extraterritorial conflicts a country is involved in. Information for this indicator is sourced from the UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset. The score for a country is determined by adding all individual conflict scores where that country is involved as an actor in a conflict outside its legal boundaries. Conflicts are not counted against a country if they have already been counted against that country in the number and duration of internal conflicts indicator.

*Each individual conflict score is based on the following factors:*

#### Number:

- Number of internationalised internal armed conflicts and interstate armed conflicts.
- If a conflict is a war (1,000+ battle-related deaths) it receives a score of one; if it is an armed conflict (25-999 battle-related deaths) it receives a score of 0.25.

#### Duration:

- A score is assigned based on the number of years out of the last five that conflict has occurred. For example, if a conflict last occurred five years ago that conflict will receive a score of one out of five.

#### Role:

- If the country is a primary party to the conflict, that conflict receives a score of one; if it is a secondary party (supporting the primary party), that conflict receives a score of 0.25.
- If a country is a party to a force covered by a relevant United Nations Security Council Resolution, then the entire conflict score is multiplied by a quarter; if not, it receives a full score.

The different conflict scores are then added and banded to establish a country's score.

#### Scoring Bands

1/5	2/5	3/5	4/5	5/5
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No external conflict	Combined conflict score of up to 1.5	Combined conflict score of up to 3	Combined conflict score of up to 4.5	A combined conflict score of 6 or above. This shows very high levels of external conflict.
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## Number Of Deaths From Organised External Conflict

Indicator type	Quantitative
Indicator weight	5
Indicator weight (% of total index)	7.1%
Data source	UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset
Measurement period	2018-2019

**Alternate Source:** Where applicable, IEP also uses several other open-source datasets to construct this indicator.

**Definition:** This indicator uses the UCDP's definition of conflict as "*a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year*".

### Scoring Bands

1/5	2/5	3/5	4/5	5/5
0–24 deaths	25–998 deaths	999–4,998 deaths	4,999–9,998 deaths	> 9,999 deaths

## APPENDIX C

# GPI Domain Scores

TABLE C.1

### Ongoing Domestic and International Conflict domain, most peaceful to least

COUNTRY	SCORE	COUNTRY	SCORE	COUNTRY	SCORE
Botswana	1.000	Bhutan	1.409	Tunisia	1.820
Bulgaria	1.000	El Salvador	1.409	Sri Lanka	1.855
Iceland	1.000	Estonia	1.409	Rwanda	1.858
Ireland	1.000	The Gambia	1.409	Morocco	1.865
Mauritius	1.000	Ghana	1.413	Bahrain	1.867
Singapore	1.000	Sierra Leone	1.413	Djibouti	1.878
Uruguay	1.000	Liberia	1.418	Thailand	1.916
New Zealand	1.002	Senegal	1.418	China	1.927
Canada	1.004	Ecuador	1.420	Mozambique	2.000
Switzerland	1.005	Peru	1.420	Nicaragua	2.022
Austria	1.007	Guinea	1.427	Tajikistan	2.057
Czech Republic	1.007	Madagascar	1.433	Algeria	2.088
Italy	1.007	Kuwait	1.448	Armenia	2.090
Portugal	1.007	Nepal	1.462	Bangladesh	2.091
Romania	1.007	United Arab Emirates	1.464	Venezuela	2.103
Netherlands	1.009	Tanzania	1.479	Colombia	2.104
Malaysia	1.015	Jordan	1.488	Zimbabwe	2.112
Germany	1.022	Cyprus	1.604	Belarus	2.208
United Kingdom	1.042	Equatorial Guinea	1.604	Azerbaijan	2.259
Australia	1.051	Gabon	1.604	Kenya	2.311
Belgium	1.104	Guyana	1.604	Burundi	2.321
Argentina	1.201	Haiti	1.604	Burkina Faso	2.327
Chile	1.201	Kazakhstan	1.604	Israel	2.371
Costa Rica	1.201	Malawi	1.604	Chad	2.405
Croatia	1.201	Serbia	1.604	Philippines	2.410
Jamaica	1.201	Taiwan	1.604	Egypt	2.419
Mongolia	1.201	Turkmenistan	1.604	Saudi Arabia	2.425
Namibia	1.201	Zambia	1.604	Niger	2.440
Trinidad and Tobago	1.201	Papua New Guinea	1.605	Lebanon	2.563
Finland	1.208	Guatemala	1.606	Myanmar	2.607
Norway	1.208	Guinea-Bissau	1.609	North Korea	2.610
Denmark	1.210	Cambodia	1.610	Palestine	2.612
Spain	1.218	Mauritania	1.610	Mexico	2.622
Sweden	1.221	South Africa	1.613	Iran	2.660
France	1.227	Benin	1.619	Mali	2.710
Qatar	1.246	Eritrea	1.619	Ukraine	2.765
Albania	1.403	Republic of the Congo	1.620	Cameroon	2.821
Bolivia	1.403	Angola	1.625	Ethiopia	2.841
Dominican Republic	1.403	Indonesia	1.631	Russia	2.844
Eswatini	1.403	Honduras	1.639	Nigeria	2.872
Japan	1.403	Cote d'Ivoire	1.641	India	2.997
Laos	1.403	Uganda	1.765	Central African Republic	3.026
Montenegro	1.403	United States of America	1.770	Sudan	3.040
North Macedonia	1.403	Brazil	1.798	Turkey	3.159
Oman	1.403	Cuba	1.805	Iraq	3.162
Panama	1.403	Georgia	1.805	Democratic Republic of the Congo	3.243
Paraguay	1.403	Greece	1.805	Pakistan	3.256
Poland	1.403	Kosovo	1.805	South Sudan	3.267
Slovakia	1.403	Kyrgyz Republic	1.805	Libya	3.300
Slovenia	1.403	Lesotho	1.805	Somalia	3.474
Timor-Leste	1.403	Moldova	1.805	Yemen	3.559
Vietnam	1.403	South Korea	1.805	Afghanistan	3.641
Hungary	1.407	Uzbekistan	1.805	Syria	3.828
Lithuania	1.407	Bosnia and Herzegovina	1.811		
Latvia	1.408	Togo	1.818		

TABLE C.2

**Societal Safety and Security domain, most to least peaceful**

COUNTRY	SCORE	COUNTRY	SCORE	COUNTRY	SCORE
Norway	1.182	Saudi Arabia	2.259	Ecuador	2.697
Iceland	1.218	Morocco	2.261	Dominican Republic	2.713
Switzerland	1.242	Albania	2.267	Togo	2.715
Denmark	1.258	China	2.284	Lesotho	2.755
Japan	1.292	India	2.284	Pakistan	2.786
Singapore	1.308	Israel	2.288	Bolivia	2.800
Slovenia	1.350	Kazakhstan	2.291	Cote d' Ivoire	2.801
Finland	1.410	United States of America	2.311	Jamaica	2.812
Portugal	1.443	Senegal	2.319	Thailand	2.820
Sweden	1.455	Botswana	2.320	Haiti	2.833
New Zealand	1.481	Sri Lanka	2.324	Uganda	2.834
Canada	1.501	Montenegro	2.333	Chad	2.847
Netherlands	1.537	Tanzania	2.349	Guyana	2.860
Austria	1.557	Bosnia and Herzegovina	2.352	Papua New Guinea	2.862
Qatar	1.577	Bangladesh	2.356	Iran	2.879
Czech Republic	1.586	Malawi	2.363	Myanmar	2.886
Australia	1.608	Moldova	2.370	Republic of the Congo	2.888
Ireland	1.618	Timor-Leste	2.372	Philippines	2.896
Germany	1.625	Equatorial Guinea	2.373	Guatemala	2.910
Poland	1.628	Georgia	2.375	Ethiopia	2.930
Croatia	1.638	Kyrgyz Republic	2.375	Palestine	2.932
South Korea	1.647	Tajikistan	2.380	Ukraine	2.949
United Kingdom	1.684	Cambodia	2.404	Russia	2.980
Taiwan	1.687	Mongolia	2.441	Burundi	2.991
Bhutan	1.694	Kosovo	2.449	Burkina Faso	3.002
United Arab Emirates	1.709	Rwanda	2.458	Mauritania	3.011
Hungary	1.741	Azerbaijan	2.462	El Salvador	3.022
Kuwait	1.765	Chile	2.469	Nigeria	3.044
Estonia	1.781	Angola	2.482	Lebanon	3.054
Belgium	1.782	Kenya	2.492	North Korea	3.060
Spain	1.796	Turkmenistan	2.497	Turkey	3.060
Romania	1.820	Cuba	2.501	Zimbabwe	3.063
Slovakia	1.836	Paraguay	2.501	Niger	3.118
France	1.870	Zambia	2.503	Cameroon	3.142
Lithuania	1.881	Djibouti	2.504	Honduras	3.200
Serbia	1.956	Mozambique	2.515	Mexico	3.218
Greece	1.963	Panama	2.545	Sudan	3.244
Bulgaria	1.974	Benin	2.551	Nicaragua	3.245
Italy	1.978	Tunisia	2.557	South Africa	3.276
Ghana	1.998	Algeria	2.559	Brazil	3.292
Latvia	2.024	Bahrain	2.571	Colombia	3.421
Armenia	2.039	Belarus	2.572	Eritrea	3.482
Malaysia	2.044	Guinea-Bissau	2.576	Libya	3.525
North Macedonia	2.064	Peru	2.583	Mali	3.528
Oman	2.108	Liberia	2.590	Somalia	3.615
Indonesia	2.135	Egypt	2.591	Syria	3.657
Mauritius	2.143	Uruguay	2.602	Central African Republic	3.722
Vietnam	2.148	Eswatini	2.611	Democratic Republic of the Congo	3.881
Laos	2.156	Guinea	2.620	Iraq	3.888
Costa Rica	2.202	Namibia	2.621	South Sudan	3.891
Uzbekistan	2.206	Madagascar	2.635	Yemen	3.944
The Gambia	2.223	Argentina	2.641	Venezuela	4.089
Jordan	2.237	Gabon	2.656	Afghanistan	4.258
Cyprus	2.253	Nepal	2.671		
Sierra Leone	2.258	Trinidad and Tobago	2.671		

TABLE C.3

**Militarisation domain, most peaceful to least**

COUNTRY	SCORE	COUNTRY	SCORE	COUNTRY	SCORE
Iceland	1.028	Bahrain	1.694	Italy	2.004
Slovenia	1.129	Mexico	1.695	Mauritania	2.004
Hungary	1.170	North Macedonia	1.697	Paraguay	2.004
New Zealand	1.197	Papua New Guinea	1.697	Togo	2.020
Moldova	1.243	Bulgaria	1.700	Democratic Republic of the Congo	2.021
Malaysia	1.266	Philippines	1.700	Bolivia	2.035
Slovakia	1.274	Senegal	1.701	Guinea	2.040
Ireland	1.275	Taiwan	1.704	Nigeria	2.042
Denmark	1.309	Tajikistan	1.707	Ukraine	2.044
Portugal	1.312	Nepal	1.718	Zimbabwe	2.044
Czech Republic	1.315	Gabon	1.734	Sri Lanka	2.047
Bhutan	1.330	Lithuania	1.739	Burkina Faso	2.055
Austria	1.333	Namibia	1.742	China	2.057
Indonesia	1.395	Haiti	1.752	Turkey	2.058
Mongolia	1.409	South Africa	1.758	Guinea-Bissau	2.069
Japan	1.448	Uganda	1.760	Eritrea	2.070
Mauritius	1.448	Tunisia	1.769	Chad	2.077
Latvia	1.460	Romania	1.773	Greece	2.094
Canada	1.497	Ecuador	1.776	Trinidad and Tobago	2.098
Guyana	1.503	Argentina	1.781	Egypt	2.103
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1.512	Angola	1.783	Armenia	2.124
Rwanda	1.512	Liberia	1.792	Somalia	2.155
Zambia	1.519	El Salvador	1.795	Netherlands	2.166
Poland	1.527	Guatemala	1.796	Azerbaijan	2.193
Madagascar	1.529	Serbia	1.796	Republic of the Congo	2.194
Equatorial Guinea	1.547	Morocco	1.798	Qatar	2.196
Panama	1.547	Sweden	1.802	Colombia	2.211
Cuba	1.561	Laos	1.804	Iran	2.213
Thailand	1.562	Mali	1.806	Uzbekistan	2.213
Myanmar	1.570	Ethiopia	1.811	Algeria	2.248
Belgium	1.572	Georgia	1.813	Norway	2.264
Bangladesh	1.574	Lesotho	1.813	Yemen	2.272
Kosovo	1.575	Cameroon	1.819	Central African Republic	2.279
Eswatini	1.581	Botswana	1.824	Syria	2.287
Uruguay	1.582	The Gambia	1.830	Sudan	2.312
Malawi	1.587	Kenya	1.839	Iraq	2.346
Estonia	1.593	Kazakhstan	1.840	South Korea	2.370
Croatia	1.600	Australia	1.856	Turkmenistan	2.383
Sierra Leone	1.605	Germany	1.872	Libya	2.437
Chile	1.616	Brazil	1.875	United Kingdom	2.489
Burundi	1.632	Vietnam	1.876	India	2.496
Montenegro	1.632	Spain	1.898	Pakistan	2.562
Cyprus	1.637	Cambodia	1.914	Afghanistan	2.572
Cote d'Ivoire	1.647	Kuwait	1.916	South Sudan	2.594
Albania	1.661	Belarus	1.921	Saudi Arabia	2.614
Timor-Leste	1.667	Switzerland	1.929	United Arab Emirates	2.652
Nicaragua	1.668	Djibouti	1.932	Oman	2.660
Finland	1.672	Peru	1.938	Lebanon	2.705
Costa Rica	1.674	Singapore	1.943	France	2.780
Kyrgyz Republic	1.675	Honduras	1.945	North Korea	3.135
Ghana	1.681	Niger	1.959	United States of America	3.172
Dominican Republic	1.683	Jordan	1.967	Russia	3.234
Mozambique	1.684	Palestine	1.991	Israel	3.828
Tanzania	1.687	Benin	1.997		
Jamaica	1.693	Venezuela	2.002		

## APPENDIX D

# Economic Cost of Violence

The economic impact of violence includes the direct and indirect costs of violence as well as an economic multiplier applied to the direct costs. The economic cost of violence includes only the direct and indirect costs. Per capita and percentage of GDP results are calculated using the economic cost of violence.

TABLE D.1  
**Economic cost of violence**

ECONOMIC COST OF VIOLENCE RANK BY % OF GDP	COUNTRY	ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE (MILLIONS, 2020 PPP)	PER CAPITA IMPACT (2020, PPP)	ECONOMIC COST OF VIOLENCE AS PERCENTAGE OF GDP	ECONOMIC COST OF VIOLENCE (MILLIONS, 2020 PPP)
1	Syria	20,231.6	1,185.2	82%	18,323.4
2	South Sudan	2,203.9	159.9	42%	1,940.5
3	Afghanistan	50,056.8	1,315.4	40%	32,568.4
4	Central African Republic	2,232.7	462.3	37%	1,811.7
5	Somalia	2,228.6	144.3	35%	1,715.8
6	North Korea	9,570.0	372.9	27%	4,911.7
7	Colombia	228,168.6	4,484.6	27%	179,924.8
8	Yemen	14,437.9	444.6	23%	10,893.9
9	Libya	15,957.3	2,401.8	22%	9,877.3
10	Cyprus	8,972.2	10,126.6	22%	7,584.0
11	Eritrea	1,364.1	384.7	18%	1,050.1
12	Venezuela	15,726.7	562.7	18%	14,188.2
13	Sudan	54,425.4	1,227.3	18%	33,537.7
14	Lebanon	12,713.3	1,862.8	17%	6,530.8
15	El Salvador	12,945.1	1,995.9	17%	9,414.0
16	Palestine	3,958.5	776.6	17%	2,454.2
17	Mali	12,509.3	636.1	16%	7,894.4
18	South Africa	139,223.4	2,333.2	15%	92,625.5
19	Iraq	79,634.5	1,984.3	15%	49,636.8
20	Honduras	10,990.8	1,105.5	14%	8,041.4
21	Lesotho	925.7	448.9	14%	691.4
22	Burkina Faso	9,097.0	434.9	14%	6,278.3
23	Democratic Republic of the Congo	14,018.3	139.0	13%	12,170.7
24	Azerbaijan	26,327.6	2,606.4	13%	17,425.7
25	Oman	30,208.7	6,992.7	13%	15,253.5
26	Jamaica	4,705.2	1,726.7	13%	3,358.8
27	Georgia	9,382.8	2,533.2	13%	6,848.6
28	Bahrain	15,826.0	10,460.0	12%	8,269.8
29	Ukraine	102,817.1	2,475.4	12%	62,095.5
30	Saudi Arabia	333,408.9	9,590.6	12%	170,252.1
31	Botswana	6,385.7	2,638.7	11%	4,159.0
32	Nigeria	139,227.1	675.4	11%	119,018.0
33	Russia	747,416.5	5,091.0	11%	425,902.3
34	Mauritania	4,654.3	1,122.3	11%	2,670.2
35	Mexico	316,704.6	2,456.4	11%	238,324.6
36	Algeria	91,835.2	2,076.5	11%	47,559.5
37	Namibia	3,531.7	1,395.9	10%	2,184.5
38	Kuwait	35,682.8	7,307.6	10%	18,352.2
39	Zimbabwe	4,539.6	298.9	10%	2,905.4
40	United Arab Emirates	115,232.8	10,402.9	10%	58,900.4
41	United States	3,711,178.0	11,245.8	10%	2,063,472.8
42	Burundi	1,358.4	114.4	10%	895.9
43	Brazil	325,046.7	1,537.4	9%	226,996.1
44	Trinidad & Tobago	4,620.2	3,293.1	9%	3,350.7
45	Republic of the Congo	2,293.8	489.9	9%	1,539.3

TABLE D.1

**Economic cost of violence (continued)**

ECONOMIC COST OF VIOLENCE RANK BY % OF GDP	COUNTRY	ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE (MILLIONS, 2020 PPP)	PER CAPITA IMPACT (2020, PPP)	ECONOMIC COST OF VIOLENCE AS PERCENTAGE OF GDP	ECONOMIC COST OF VIOLENCE (MILLIONS, 2020 PPP)
46	Timor-Leste	784.1	594.9	9%	415.8
47	Israel	61,438.4	6,659.3	9%	34,017.5
48	Bulgaria	29,324.7	4,242.6	9%	15,640.0
49	Myanmar	34,935.5	656.7	9%	24,046.1
50	Guyana	1,904.5	2,419.9	9%	1,245.0
51	Cameroon	10,301.5	394.0	9%	8,642.4
52	Armenia	6,455.5	2,173.6	9%	3,441.6
53	Bosnia & Herzegovina	6,694.3	2,041.6	9%	4,329.6
54	Montenegro	2,020.3	3,242.9	8%	1,104.3
55	Bhutan	1,432.3	1,899.6	8%	793.0
56	Serbia	19,556.0	2,819.5	8%	11,132.2
57	Latvia	8,758.0	4,571.0	8%	4,939.7
58	Uzbekistan	38,352.0	1,131.1	8%	20,141.9
59	Chad	2,988.6	181.9	8%	1,922.5
60	United Kingdom	389,028.7	5,784.4	8%	243,243.6
61	Argentina	120,221.4	2,648.7	8%	69,522.3
62	Uruguay	9,133.2	2,586.6	8%	5,777.2
63	Guatemala	15,977.2	889.1	8%	11,229.2
64	Niger	3,716.0	153.5	7%	2,215.6
65	Pakistan	143,919.4	690.0	7%	78,393.5
66	Togo	1,726.2	208.4	7%	1,018.6
67	Liberia	945.0	201.3	7%	529.0
68	Eswatini	986.2	875.1	7%	633.1
69	Costa Rica	11,494.4	2,241.1	7%	7,493.9
70	Cuba	12,208.2	1,077.2	7%	7,069.8
71	Sri Lanka	33,638.2	1,533.4	7%	20,203.0
72	Hungary	38,150.1	3,911.6	7%	21,677.7
73	Turkey	248,864.0	2,956.5	7%	135,708.1
74	Tunisia	16,322.2	1,371.3	7%	8,915.9
75	India	1,037,425.9	750.9	7%	575,081.6
76	Gambia	551.2	227.9	7%	357.8
77	Poland	157,343.7	4,145.2	7%	85,274.9
78	Romania	78,415.0	4,041.2	7%	41,905.6
79	Lithuania	12,095.7	4,368.3	7%	7,310.0
80	Croatia	13,365.7	3,304.2	6%	7,548.1
81	Qatar	27,742.8	9,901.1	6%	14,273.0
82	Jordan	12,177.2	1,192.8	6%	6,476.5
83	Ecuador	19,198.9	1,096.4	6%	11,261.8
84	Panama	12,375.4	2,892.1	6%	7,726.7
85	Gabon	3,069.5	1,456.1	6%	1,864.3
86	Kyrgyzstan	3,517.0	539.7	6%	1,903.6
87	Australia	134,615.2	5,233.1	6%	77,821.8
88	Greece	37,154.4	3,472.7	6%	19,387.2
89	Chile	45,829.2	2,355.3	6%	26,700.1
90	Albania	4,122.8	1,439.0	6%	2,293.1
91	Angola	16,381.1	527.9	6%	9,314.3
92	New Zealand	20,146.5	4,026.1	6%	12,405.2
93	France	320,391.0	4,929.6	6%	190,407.2
94	Estonia	5,432.0	4,099.6	6%	3,027.8
95	Slovakia	18,756.0	3,436.4	6%	10,204.1
96	North Macedonia	4,018.8	1,933.1	6%	2,162.8
97	Morocco	28,097.3	781.5	6%	15,679.9
98	Vietnam	108,791.4	1,117.1	6%	59,832.7
99	Dominican Republic	16,331.9	1,561.2	6%	10,251.2
100	Turkmenistan	10,439.1	1,756.2	6%	5,817.5
101	Belarus	16,396.5	1,742.8	6%	9,614.0
102	South Korea	204,291.5	3,945.3	6%	121,231.5
103	Belgium	51,925.4	4,519.2	5%	33,425.7
104	Peru	33,509.7	1,000.5	5%	20,318.9
105	Paraguay	7,805.0	1,076.1	5%	4,687.3
106	Mongolia	3,446.1	1,027.2	5%	2,127.5
107	Portugal	35,301.8	3,440.4	5%	19,191.1
108	Nicaragua	2,874.5	442.5	5%	1,850.5
109	Djibouti	500.9	451.7	5%	303.6
110	Sierra Leone	1,295.4	162.3	5%	738.5
111	Singapore	51,637.4	8,949.3	5%	27,253.4

TABLE D.1

**Economic cost of violence (continued)**

ECONOMIC COST OF VIOLENCE RANK BY % OF GDP	COUNTRY	ECONOMIC IMPACT OF VIOLENCE (MILLIONS, 2020 PPP)	PER CAPITA IMPACT (2020, PPP)	ECONOMIC COST OF VIOLENCE AS PERCENTAGE OF GDP	ECONOMIC COST OF VIOLENCE (MILLIONS, 2020 PPP)
112	Bolivia	8,639.7	737.0	5%	5,141.0
113	Canada	156,403.5	4,112.7	5%	92,001.9
114	Ethiopia	17,546.0	178.8	5%	13,247.8
115	Benin	3,717.3	306.0	5%	2,188.8
116	Czechia	41,223.8	3,854.8	5%	22,725.4
117	Senegal	4,881.2	291.0	5%	2,961.6
118	Mozambique	2,982.7	93.2	5%	1,902.4
119	Rwanda	2,103.6	166.1	5%	1,440.1
120	Moldova	2,778.7	1,054.9	5%	1,654.5
121	Côte d'Ivoire	10,491.1	389.2	5%	7,139.8
122	Tajikistan	2,886.2	304.6	5%	1,549.5
123	Uganda	8,005.0	194.2	5%	5,233.4
124	Haiti	1,470.0	128.9	5%	934.0
125	Germany	374,690.9	4,506.2	5%	216,826.8
126	Iran	122,381.1	1,454.3	5%	69,696.9
127	Slovenia	6,697.2	3,236.9	5%	3,863.4
128	Norway	27,388.1	5,082.2	5%	15,475.1
129	Nepal	8,446.0	293.0	4%	4,792.6
130	Sweden	42,414.9	4,035.7	4%	25,962.7
131	China	2,041,530.6	1,453.7	4%	1,087,061.0
132	Guinea	2,684.8	192.2	4%	1,740.3
133	Zambia	3,634.0	192.5	4%	2,305.0
134	Kosovo	656.7	363.4	4%	328.4
135	Netherlands	80,823.5	4,677.0	4%	44,716.9
136	Italy	200,197.8	3,320.7	4%	108,952.8
137	Finland	21,213.6	3,838.2	4%	12,457.9
138	Guinea-Bissau	253.0	139.4	4%	176.5
139	Kazakhstan	29,481.7	1,562.2	4%	19,443.3
140	Spain	140,417.2	3,020.2	4%	76,221.5
141	Laos	3,913.6	538.6	4%	2,466.6
142	Thailand	84,799.4	1,214.9	4%	48,769.5
143	Mauritius	1,597.0	1,260.5	4%	936.7
144	Egypt	101,787.3	1,001.7	4%	55,633.8
145	Japan	344,903.8	2,742.6	4%	200,133.8
146	Malaysia	57,911.9	1,755.0	4%	32,495.4
147	Cambodia	4,931.8	294.6	4%	2,724.0
148	Philippines	56,666.6	520.2	4%	35,758.9
149	Denmark	21,606.9	3,717.6	4%	12,718.8
150	Kenya	14,736.3	302.6	4%	9,013.1
151	Austria	31,044.7	3,487.8	4%	18,592.8
152	Taiwan	37,838.1	1,602.2	4%	22,477.3
153	Tanzania	8,990.9	155.0	4%	5,592.8
154	Switzerland	38,396.5	4,440.4	4%	21,913.9
155	Ghana	9,442.4	306.8	3%	5,837.0
156	Madagascar	2,240.2	81.2	3%	1,506.2
157	Equatorial Guinea	1,175.8	836.2	3%	738.2
158	Papua New Guinea	1,682.1	191.6	3%	1,123.3
159	Iceland	868.5	2,386.1	3%	552.8
160	Malawi	941.6	45.1	3%	608.0
161	Ireland	20,101.2	4,013.0	3%	12,300.9
162	Bangladesh	39,083.6	232.2	3%	22,662.3
163	Indonesia	127,658.4	473.5	2%	68,037.4

# ENDNOTES

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# ENDNOTES

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## SECTION 3

1. The 3.7 per cent increase in the impact of military expenditure is in PPP.
2. Includes both internal security spending as well as the costs from Incarceration.
3. Krug, E. G., Mercy, J. A., Dahlberg, L. L., & Zwi, A. B. (2002). The world report on violence and health. *The Lancet*, 360(9339). [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736\(02\)11133-0](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(02)11133-0)

4. This analysis includes only the expenditures by the private and the public. The indicators included are the internal, private, small arms and military expenditure. Therefore, the losses from incarceration are not included.

## SECTION 5

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
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